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Cameroon is a constitutional and political autocracy that has been ruled by two presidents with 
enormous executive powers for 58 years. The persistence of systematic violation of personal 
integrity rights despite its evolving constitutionalism which has widely adopted rights friendly 
legislations has been widely publicised. Its accession to the Covenant and subsequent 
entrenchment of these Covenant rights was viewed as a significant step in the  state-centric 
approach to human rights protection and their justiciability. Its cooperation with the Human 
Rights Committee in the  state reporting and individual communications procedures has also 
increased.  
Despite these developments the gap between accession and compliance remains wide. Studies 
across different disciplines have been undertaken to broadly understand the reasons for the 
widening gap. These studies have shed light on a couple of thematic areas which have been 
objects of further specialized inquiry on their specific role in explaining the gap between the 
Covenant accession and  state compliance 
This thesis explores and examines the problem of political and constitutional autocracy in the 
context of the implementation of its obligation its obligations under the Covenant with a 
specific focus on articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14. The thesis does this by undertaking a detailed 
study and analysis of the political, constitutional systems and the implementation mechanisms 
at the domestic as well as international levels. It also reviews and analyse existing laws, policies 
and practices, communications,  state reports, general comments and concluding observations. 
The autocratic nature of its political structure reflected in its overbearing executive intrusion 
impacts negatively the interpretation of its obligation under the Covenant and consequently 
negatively affects its implementation regime. 
Although implementation has been a subject of many inquiries and has helped in the evolving 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, this thesis contextualizes the inquiry and 
produces new information that should better explain rights violations. The information 
generated during these analyses will help identify strengths, weaknesses and challenges of the 
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This research is concerned with Cameroon’s implementation of articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1 These rights are broadly referred 
to in this study as personal integrity rights2, primarily as they are concerned with the protection 
of human dignity and the processes that ensure political, judicial and administrative process 
that ensure the protection of human dignity.3 Poe and Tate in their 1994 study on repression 
considered the violation of these rights as a coercive activity on the part of the government 
designed to induce compliance in others.4 Although the conception and framing of human 
rights and  state obligations reflects the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of these rights, the significance of national particularities including cultural 
and historical backgrounds play an important role in their realisation. Context matters in 
implementation because a political order in which the institutions are structured to be rights 
unfriendly and where the rights to physical security, and due process are frequently violated 
generates an intense and pervasive fear which annuls the will to exercise other rights. 
                                                 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) herein known as ICCPR or Covenant; The rights 
associated to human worth as considered in this study are articles 7, 9 and 10. 
2 Personal integrity rights are those concerned with individual survival and security, such as 
freedom from torture, ‘disappearance,’ imprisonment, extrajudicial execution, and mass 
killing. (Davenport 2007b:3). For the purpose of this study torture, deprivation of liberty and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment categorised under articles 7, 9, 10 respectively are 
referred to here as personal integrity rights. 
3 Articles 2(3) and 14 are two of the most important domestic tools that can be used to mitigate 
the effect of the violation of personal integrity rights. 
4Stephen C Poe and C Neal Tate, ‘Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 




The imperative for pursuing this research stems from the recognition that while accession to 
the Covenant begins the process of the constructive dialogue, there exists a considerable gap 
between ratification and the genuine respect of these rights, especially when it comes to 
personal integrity rights which are intrinsically linked with autocratic regime survival. This gap 
is even wider in Cameroon with a mixed Franco-British colonial legacy that has produced a 
complex bi-jural legal system and a constitutional autocracy that has empowered the executive 
at the expense of the legislature and judiciary. The considerable gap is also associated with 
structural limitations, wilful disobedience, and ineffective implementation. This research also 
recognizes that while the principal obligatory implementation monitoring mechanisms through 
the reporting process and its associated individual communication under the Optional Protocol5 
are essential, domestic limitations or wilful negation of obligation imperils Cameroon’s 
implementation regime.  
This thesis also embodies the realization that while Cameroon has acceded to the Covenant, it 
marks only the beginning of a challenging journey. The journey from accession to ensuring the 
realization of the rights and obligations captured in the articles of the Covenant has been 
investigated across disciplines.6 There is also a vast database that explains why a country like 
Cameroon ratifies the Covenant without the desire to respect its basic premise. There exist a 
considerable body of knowledge on the effect that accession to international human rights 
treaties in general and the Covenant has on the protection of these rights. The effect of the 
periodic reporting process and individual communication procedures have also produced a 
considerable pool of data which has impacted and alter the country’s attitude in a significant 
way. In recent years, many studies have investigated the emergence, expansion, and penetration 
                                                 
5 Optional Protocol Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976 
6  In the political sciences, see Eric Neumeyer, “Do International Human Rights Treaties 
Improve Respect for Human Rights”? (2005) 49(6) Journal of Conflict Res. 925 Neumeyer 
concluded that rarely do Human Rights Treaties have unconditional effect on human rights; 
also see Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced? (1999) 74 
ILJ, Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a difference’ (2002) 111 Yale Law 




of the international human rights regime, with multilateral treaties garnering much of the 
attention. Researchers have explored the ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ of treaty ratification: the factors 
that elevate or depress rates of treaty ratification among   states and the effectiveness –or rather, 
the ineffectiveness – of treaty ratification as far as the improvement of human rights practices7 
is concerned. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Most scholarly works have focused on understanding why countries signup to human rights 
treaties, even though less attention has focused on the implementation processes of these 
treaties.  Boyle and Thompson’s analysis of human rights abuse cases adjudicated under the 
European Convention on Human Rights is a notable exception. They concluded in their study 
that  state structures that provide more political opportunities domestically and constitutional 
openness, are more positively associated with claims making at the international arena.8 That 
is why Keith’s question of whether it would not be better to direct efforts and resources towards 
changing the internal factors that either weaken the  state’s willingness to respect human rights 
or impede the state’s ability to protect human rights 9  is relevant in understanding the 
relationship between internal configuration and the Covenant implementation. This is not to 
say that other factors do not adversely affect the implementation of the Covenant. Given that 
there is no homogeneity in the internal configuration of repressive countries, the existing 
scholarship is yet to produce a theoretical framework for understanding how autocracies 
implement their obligation under these fundamental rights and how the specific political and 
constitutional construct influence this process. This is the focus of this thesis. 
                                                 
7Wade M Cole, “When All Else Fails: International Adjudication of Human Rights abuse 
claims, 1976-1999”. (2006) 84(4) Social Forces 1909-1935, 1910. 
8 Elizabeth H. Boyle and Thompson Melissa, “National Politics and Resort to the European 
Commission on Human Rights”. (2001) 35(2) Law and Society Review 321-344, 339. 
9 Linda Keith, “United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Does it 




Chayes and Chayes argue that in everyday experience, people, whether because of socialization 
or otherwise, accept that they are obligated to obey the law; so, it is with   states10. They advance 
three reasons why   states may depart from this normative framework. Two of these possible 
reasons are considered herein as factors that by commission or omission would influence 
Cameroon’s implementation of its obligations. The ‘inescapable incidents of the effort to 
formulate rules to govern future conduct frequently produce a zone of ambiguity within which 
it is difficult to say with precision what is permitted and what is forbidden. Ambiguity in treaty 
rules is resolved through domestic treaty body interpretations’.11 Concerning the Covenant, the 
Human Rights Committee is that treaty body whose views on individual communication and 
general comments on specific rights builds the corpus of law that shapes state action. The 
second reason why   states depart from this “obligation to obey the law” as raised by Cole to 
explain noncompliance is the limitations on the capacity of parties to fulfil their obligations. 
He   states that explanations for noncompliance with international human rights treaties, 
although not necessarily incorrect, are nevertheless incomplete. Focusing too much on 
intentions obscures another important dimension of compliance: countries’ ability to translate 
treaty commitments into practices. In his study on the gap between ratification and compliance, 
Cole moved beyond the rationalist’s intentions driven analysis of noncompliance to focus on 
whether ‘the bureaucratic, infrastructural, and coercive capacities of   states condition their 
compliance with international human rights law.12 Cole like Chayes and Chayes, argued that 
limitations on a state’s ability rather than deliberation accounts for non-compliance. For 
example, inadequate resources to build detention centres and feed inmates have always been 
raised by Cameroon as an excuse for the violation of article 10(1) despite the minimum 
conditions rule guaranteed under the Covenant. Cole’s managerial argument to compliance 
does not, however, provide empirical evidence to debunk deliberation especially under 
autocratic systems that purposely design internal structures to protect influential executives. 
                                                 
10 Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance”, (1993) 47 (2) MIT Press 
175- 205, 185 
11 Ibid, p. 189 
12 Wade M Cole, ‘Mind the Gap:  state Capacity and the Implementation of Human Rights 




Whether considered as limitations or deliberations, internal structures within autocratic   states 
suffer from both limitations and deliberations in both their conception and erection. In their 
study on authoritarian   states and human rights, Hafner and Tsutsui make a compelling 
argument on the effect of variation in the internal domestic structure on the level of repression. 
They argued that variations across domestic governance structures inside repressive states are 
important; they are likely to contribute to these  state’s degree of conformity with international 
norms of protection by shaping sovereigns’ perceptions of penalty for non-conformity.13 Risse 
and Sikkink set out to understand the conditions under which international human rights 
regimes and the principles, norms, and rules embedded in them are internalized and 
implemented domestically and thus affect political transformation processes. In their study 
which focused on the rights to life, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, they argued that 
‘enduring implementation of human rights requires political systems to establish the rule of 
law and some measure of liberal political transformation.’14  
The relation between an independent judiciary, the nature of the political system and the proper 
implementation of human rights obligations is mostly a linear one. Using data on the 
ratification of the Convention Against Torture, Powell and Staton sort to determine the 
constraining power of judicial institutions on state behavior and the increase in the cost of 
ratification. They developed a theoretical model which effectively links a state’s repressive 
attitude and its choice to ratify a treaty and which highlights a trade-off between domestic and 
international pressures.15 Their study shows that an independent judiciary that can hold the 
                                                 
13 Hafner-Burton Emile, Kiyoteru Tsutsui and John Meyer, ‘International Human Rights Law 
and the Politics of Legitimation; Repressive   states and Human Rights Treaties’ (2008) 23(1) 
International Sociology 115-141,122. 
14 Thomas Risse and Kathrine Sikkink, ‘The Socialisation of International Human Rights 
Norms in Domestic Practices’ in Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink and Stephen C. Ropp (eds), 
‘The Power of Human Rights; International Norms and Domestic Change 
‘ (Cambridge University Press 2009) 3. 
15 Emilia Justyna Powell and Jefrey K Staton, “Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human 




executive accountable increases the cost of human rights violation and thus reduces violations. 
This conclusion does not find favour in other studies. In her cross-sectional study which 
included Cameroon, Longmiles suggested that in many nations in Africa, an independent 
judiciary does not have a significant impact on a country’s human rights record, contrary to the 
findings of previous works on judicial independence and human rights.16 The lack of influence 
by the judiciary may be as a result of the autocratic nature of its political institutions, a finding 
other studies that have looked into the effect of democratic institutions have debunked. 
In her extensive study including 166 countries and three human rights treaties including the 
Covenant, Hathaway measured a variety of democratic constraints on government behaviour, 
including the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express their 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders; and the presence of constraints on the chief 
executive, including an independent judiciary and a measure of civil freedom and fair trials for 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol 17 . 
Hathaway’s findings though not directly related to the premise of this study, are quite essential 
when interpreted broadly. She argued that every state is constrained to a greater or lesser extent 
by domestic legal and political institutions. How constrained it is, depends on the degree to 
which those outside the government can enforce the state’s legal commitments. International 
legal commitments are more meaningful where powerful actors can hold the government to 
account but where there are no such constraints, even formally binding treaties may be ignored 
with relative impunity.18 She concluded that countries with robust legal domestic institutions 
with a higher likelihood of increasing the cost of commitment through compliance are less 
likely to commit. On the other hand, countries like Cameroon with a weak domestic 
                                                 
16Leticia Longmiles, “Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Africa”. (2011) The Eagle 
Feather 8.  
17 Oona Hathaway (2002) note supra 6 also see Hafner, Tsutsi and Meyer (2008) who also 
argue that the price for this commodity is low, as enforcement is often little called into question 
p. 3. 
18  Oona Hathaway, “Why do Countries commit to Human Rights Treaties” (2007) 51(4) 




implementation regime understand that the cost of commitment is low and thus not engaging 
in the reporting process, and individual communication bears no burden to the state. The 
collateral consequences associated with the Covenant are almost non-existent and therefore 
explains the lengthy delays in implementing views of the Human Rights Committee. 
Apart from the nature of the judiciary, the nexus between such protection and the actual 
enjoyment of these rights is also dependent on several internal factors among which as 
indicated earlier is the nature of the political institutions which undergird their implementation. 
In his studies, Davenport examined the repressive tendencies of different forms of authoritarian 
regimes concerning civil and political rights and personal integrity rights. He concluded that 
autocratic regimes do not use state repression at comparable levels. Slightly depending on the 
nature of the autocratic regimes, there is a difference in the level of civil and political rights 
violations and violations of personal integrity rights. At the same level regimes violate different 
rights at a different level. He argued that as far as personal integrity rights are concerned 
‘…executive constraints and Gross National Product again decrease repression…’19  
The plural institution argument as reflected in the study of Ghandi and Przeworski who offer a 
plausible explanation why autocracies with democratic pluralism will rely on institutions and 
the support of the opposition to sustain their authority. The duo argued that when authoritarian 
rulers need to solicit the cooperation of outsiders or deter the threat of rebellion, they rely on 
political institutions. Partisan legislatures incorporate potential opposition forces, giving them 
a stake in the ruler’s survival. They argued that such autocratic institutions are not just “window 
dressing,” because they are the result of strategic choices and have an impact on the survival 
of autocrats, and also have effects on policy outcomes.20 By broadening the base of support for 
autocrats, these institutions lengthen their tenures. The President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, has 
been in power since 1982 during which time he has authorized the legalization of more than 
120 ‘opposition’ political parties, organising regular elections which his party the Cameroon 
                                                 
19 Christian Davenport, “state Repression and the Tyrannical Peace” (2007a) 44(4) Journal of 
Peace Research 485-504, 498. 
20  Jenifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of 




People’s Democratic Movement has always won. ‘Opposition’ parties are represented both in 
parliament and government to legitimise his rule, and as Ghandi and Przeworski posit, to have 
a stake in Biya’s survival. Their argument that more murder occurs under plural autocratic 
regimes explains the relationship between many autocratic regimes like Cameroon and the 
persistence in the violation of personal integrity rights which Keith et al. in their 1994 studies 
explained. 
They expanded on their 1994 study on personal integrity rights with the intention to validate 
or invalidate its findings. Their primary thrust was to answer the question; why some   states 
abuse the dignity of the person? They offered a realist interest driven purposeful rational 
explanation to this question. In most cases, they postulate, it is because their principal political 
leaders are willing to repress and because they can act on their choice. They choose to commit 
abuses of personal integrity rights because they see these inhuman actions as the most effective 
means to achieve their ends.21 
All of these studies have answered the ‘why’ question and have been able to shed some light 
on the domestic dynamics that affect compliance. Various scholars have overwhelmingly 
shown that ratification of the Covenant does not in any way change the behaviour of the 
autocratic state; if anything, they have tended to abuse more. These abuses are even higher for 
an autocracy like Cameroon with a multiparty system which has the constant potential of 
increasing pressure on the executive as it happened in the 1990s and 2008. After the ratification 
of a treaty, a state must decide whether it will implement its obligation under that treaty. In this 
regard, it must consider whether to accept monitoring of its obligations through processes such 
as the required reporting procedures or the individual communication mechanism. As many 
scholars have shown, the effectiveness of the process of implementation at the domestic level 
depends strongly on the nature of a regime’s political structure and the implications such a 
structure has on the nature of constitutionalism. In many African   states, initial constitutional 
provisions were drawn predominantly from patterns familiar to the departing colonial power, 
hence reflecting assumptions far more common in the metropolis than in African societies and 
                                                 
21 Stephen C Poe, Neal C Tate and Linda Keith, ‘Repression of the Human Right to Personal 
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993’ (1999) 




being externally imposed, some of these constitutions lacked popular support and legitimacy.22 
In Cameroon, as it is shown in Chapter 3, the political structure is strictly top–down – a 
situation which has shaped constitutionalism to protect the executive, thus making the 
enforcement of international norms impossible as the violation of personal integrity rights 
becomes the principal tenet of regime survival tactics. 
It is important to note that the norms of international human rights law, though imperfectly 
enforced, are implemented through a complex, little-understood legal process which Koh 
described as transnational legal processes.23 These processes work through a web of interaction 
between the international and the domestic through processes of ratification, monitoring and 
even compensation for breach of obligation. There is no doubt that the internalization of the 
Covenant either through direct application or internal legislation, has strengthened the primacy 
of the state as the principal duty bearer in rights protection and has shifted emphasis from 
international to domestic jurisdiction. However, despite acceding to the Covenant, Cameroon 
continues the course of impunity. Consequently, the assumption that the law will shape its 
attitude and reduce violations of these rights has yet to materialize. The failure of the law and 
other assumptions grounded on factors such as lack of enforcement mechanisms, arbitrary 
nature of the regime, and internal structures of the state and the strength of its internal 
regulating bodies. For, as Haschke explains, human rights violations are the consequence of 
specific and instrumental behaviour authorized by leaders and executives to achieve political 
goals;24 and without torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions as well as unfair trials, the survival 
of the Biya regime in Cameroon, would be increasingly challenged.  
The literature on the relation between signature and adherence on the one hand and the 
persistence in systematic impunity on the other sheds light on the rationale of why Cameroon 
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has committed itself to protect these rights but has failed in the implementation of its 
obligations. Generally, the enforcement of human rights treaties is multidimensional 25 
including both a domestic and an international component of implementation inherently limited 
to the supervision of domestic measures by political, quasi-judicial or judicial organs. 26 
Country-specific studies on this weakness have produced different results which have shown 
that the nature of these regimes and a range of socioeconomic, social and political factors,27 to 
a great extent, account for the lack of proper implementation of  state obligations under the 
Covenant and this is reflected in systematic impunity as shown below. 
In Cameroon like in most other autocracies in Africa South of the Sahara, the domestic 
configuration faces similar structural challenges emanating from a shared legacy of colonialism 
and post-independence political autocratic institutions micromanaged by an imperial executive 
which to a great extent accounts for the lack of implementation. As Cole explained, weakly 
monitored treaties enable decoupling of this sort, as do purely expressive or qualified treaty 
commitments that allow rights-abusing countries to align themselves with human rights norms 
while circumventing the legal obligation to abide by those norms. 28  Such weaknesses 
notwithstanding, the glaring disparity between theory and practice is nowhere more evident 
than when in the year 2000 Sir Nigel Rodney described torture and other ill-treatment as 
‘widespread and systematic’ and concluded that torture and ill-treatment could only persist 
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where law enforcement officers act with impunity.29 Eight years after Sir Nigel’s report, in the 
year 2008, hundreds of people were killed in the city of Douala, Cameroon, during a protest 
march against constitutional amendments which were designed to give the president a 
presidential life term. During these protest marches, hundreds where arbitrarily arrested, 
tortured and detained incommunicado, with many tried without any minimum standard of 
fairness.30 Paul Eric Kingue (see section 4.1.7 p.222) was arrested during the protest, detained 
for more than 20 days under inhuman and degrading conditions that included placement in a 
solitary confinement cell; being required to sleep on a bare wet floor; unable to communicate 
with family members, a lawyer or doctor; being bound and shackled; and being subjected to 
regular insults and physical threats. His treatment sums up the happenings of that year. Apart 
from the pervasiveness of such attitudes, the same report accuses the government of using the 
criminal justice system to punish its opponents. The persistence in the violation of personal 
integrity rights remains a function of the strict post-colonial constitutionalism and the structure 
of the state and its consequent impact on the nature of its implementation regime. 
Five years down the line since a damning Amnesty International report, the score of Freedom 
House on Cameroon was six, with seven being the worst. It described the judiciary as 
subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and political influence and corruption as weakening the 
courts. Lengthy pre-trial detentions are commonplace, and there are reports of arbitrary 
detention and judicial harassment of activists.31 The US State Department report of 2015 also 
described Cameroon as a Republic dominated by a strong presidency with a multiparty system 
of government, but with the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) in power 
since its creation in 1985. In practice, the political system is one in which the president retains 
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the power to control legislation.32 In its 2016 report, the Bertelsmann Institute captures the 
same picture as expressed by the state Department. The legislative and judicial branches, it 
wrote, have little control over the executive. The 1996 constitution provides for a powerful 
president, elected for seven years. The executive, on the other hand, has rarely been criticized 
or held accountable by parliament.33 These descriptions of the internal realities of Cameroon’s 
attitude towards its citizens are divorced from remedial measures taken to liberalise the political 
space and guarantee human rights. 
In the early 1990s, the government passed the so-called liberty laws to promote fundamental 
freedoms. One such law was Law No. 90/054 of 19 December 1990 relating to the maintenance 
of law and order. It granted exceptional powers to administrative authorities to restrict 
individual freedoms by remanding suspects in custody. This law has been used repeatedly by 
various administrative officials to detain political opponents and cause overcrowding in 
detention centres due to lengthy pre-trial detentions.34 The use of this law to prevent peaceful 
assembly has often resulted in administrative arrests, lengthy pre-trial detentions under 
inhuman and degrading conditions, torture and unfair trials. 35  In writing about inhuman 
treatment and torture, Beth argues that they are often perceived to have a critical bearing on 
the ability of the government to maintain order, security and its own political power.36 In this 
regard, Cameroon has used impunity, deprivation of liberty, cruel inhuman and degrading 
treatment, kangaroo trials and denial of redress as tools of repression to protect its political 
power. While violations of these rights have persisted, implementing their obligation as 
                                                 
32 US State Department 2015/16  
33 Bertelsmann Institute, ‘Cameroon Country Report’, (2016) p.9 
34For example, on 5 September 2005, the Senior Divisional Officer for Fako ordered the 
detention of one Pauline Mukete and 21 others following the disruption of public peace caused 
by a meeting of the ‘Southern Cameroons National Council’ (SCNC), a movement which 
advocates the secession of the English-speaking provinces of Cameroon. 
35Also see Eric Kingue v Cameroon, para 2.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/118/D/2388/2014 (2016) 
36 Simmons A. Beth, “Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics” 




recommended by the Human Rights Committee has been impossible because of the association 
of repression with political power and regime survival. For example, in its 2015 report, 
Amnesty International   stated that prison conditions in Cameroon remain poor with chronic 
overcrowding, inadequate food, limited medical care, and deplorable hygiene and sanitation. 
The population of the central prison in Yaoundé is approximately 4,100, for a capacity of 
2000.37 Apart from the insalubrious conditions under which persons deprived of their liberty 
are detained, many have been subjected to cruel inhuman and degrading treatment and even 
torture while in detention. These conditions of detention have to an extent been deliberate as 
Cameroon has failed many times to implement the Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee that has consistently demanded the improvement of conditions of detentions. 
1.1 COVENANT IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation process of the Covenant is designed to achieve the objective of the 
Covenant as outlined in its article 2(1): 
Each   state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
The Covenant has not given clarity on how to translate the generalised prescription into 
enforceable obligations. Schacter asked whether the obligations to ensure rights and remedies 
within domestic legal systems requires that   states parties make the Covenant itself part of the 
domestic law?’38   In response, Nowak argues that the general obligation to respect and ensure 
the rights of the Covenant as specified in article 2(2) requires   states parties to give effect to 
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the rights recognised in the Covenant by legislative or other measures39. In its article 2(2) the 
Covenant clarifies that “each   state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
the rights recognized in the present covenant”. Many   states have not provided for automatic 
incorporation but in Cameroon, as stipulated in its constitution, where the Constitutional 
Council finds a provision of a treaty unconstitutional authorisation to ratify the treaty is 
deferred until a constitutional amendment is done.40  Duly ratified treaties once published 
override national laws.41 
Seibert-Fohr has argued that the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant depends on 
the implementation measure taken by Statse parties which, as she argues, “are the primary 
mechanisms envisaged by the Covenant to give effect to the rights of the individuals that it 
enshrines”. 42  While there is no general rule that treaties must be incorporated to have a 
domestic effect, the Covenant requires implementation through domestic measures. These 
national measures provide compliance through either legislative, administrative and judicial 
measures to assess   state party’s behaviour under the Covenant.  
Domestic measures of implementation also embody the provision of individuals within their 
jurisdictions with an “effective remedy”, even when they may decide whether that remedy 
takes a judicial, administrative or legislative character, or some combination of those 
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approaches.43 In its article 2 para 3b, the Covenant obliges authorities to ensure that any person 
claiming such a remedy shall have his right to it determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the  state, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy. Such measures 
impose an obligation beyond the provision of domestic mechanisms for a remedy to obligations 
of results. The emphasis on domestic remedy does not in any way preclude the importance of 
international jurisdiction of remedy but to denote the importance of the domestic jurisdiction 
as the most important avenue for human rights protection. In Cameroon, these measures include 
obligations enshrined in the Penal Code to punish violators, compensate victims of torture and 
illegal arrest and detention and the obligation of the NCHRF to investigate and report to the 
competent authorities on any violation of human rights it decides to take up as it is detailly 
analysed in chapter 4. 
1.2 CONSTITUTIONAL ENABLING ENVIRONMENT 
It was the necessity to make norms binding and entrenched within the domestic constitutional 
order that translated the principles embodied in the UN Charter and the UDHR into binding 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.44 By making the 
protection of human dignity a central feature of post-World War II institutions, it became clear 
that the emerging world order would be one in which the nation-  states also puts human rights 
at the centre of their existence. That is why many post-1945   states framed their constitutions 
to reflect this new dynamic and made the protection of human dignity the central focus of their 
constitutional order. If there was anyone country where this was more apparent, it was the very 
country at the center of the challenge of human worth and the inalienability of human rights. 
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The great initial models of this new Universalist constitutionalism were the German and 
Japanese post-war constitutions. These constitutions were the product of Allied thinking.45 
Die wuerde des Menschen ist unantastbar (human dignity is inviolable) remains the most 
indelible phrase of the German constitution.46 For its protection and to ensure that it is not 
merely an accident of inception, the constitution emphasises that its protection ‘shall be the 
duty of the  state.’47 The protection and recognition of the inviolability of human dignity ‘shall 
bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable by law.’48 This rule 
is however in sharp contrast to most post-independence African constitutions including 
Cameroon’s which were drafted to reaffirm and fortify single-party authoritarian political 
dispensations. While the protection of human dignity and human rights, in general,49 were 
mentioned in some constitutions, they were not couched in words that reflect the notion of 
human rights and were further undermined by extremely powerful executives ‘with the 
president practically, and oftentimes legally, above the law, executive fiat and arbitrariness 
became a regular modality of rule in Africa, with damaging consequences for the rule of law.’50 
The early constitutions of Cameroon like most in Africa South of the Sahara were designed to 
protect a single party system and in Cameroon. In Cameroon, ‘multipartyism was abolished, 
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criticism of the government was repressed through stringent laws circumscribing freedom of 
speech, while activists were arrested arbitrarily, detained and tortured.’51 This pattern that 
continues to define and inform the post-single party era of Cameroon and has shaped its 
implementation approaches. 
Post-1990 constitutionalism created an imperial executive that has undermined the 
implementation of the Covenant. With the president practically, and often legally, above the 
law, executive fiat and arbitrariness has become a regular modality of the rule with damaging 
consequences for the rule of law. 52  Although the political and constitutional system is 
structured in a way as to provide the framework for multiparty political participation and the 
incorporation of international human rights treaties including the Covenant, constitutionalism 
is still tailored to protect the interest of the  state with a vague guarantee of these rights not 
anchored in any judicial means of their realisation. It is a structure that has undermined the role 
of the judiciary and controlled the making of laws through a constitutional and electoral 
formalism that guarantees the government parliamentary supremacy. The problem of 
implementation is attributed in part to the influence of an inherited model void of the country’s 
historical and political context,53and with a deficient separation of powers with potential for 
excessive and unaccountable executive power. Most of these post-independence constitutions 
imposed by the departing colonial masters, were quickly transformed into instruments of 
repression on the pretext of pursuing the coveted but elusive goals of national unity and 
economic development.54 While these forms of constitutionalism evolved to incorporate and 
protect these rights, it failed to provide the basic minimum standards in the adequate separation 
of powers, independence of the judiciary and an effective mechanism for judicial review of 
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legislation and administrative acts. The regime survival approach to governance and its 
consequent constitutional approach which leaves a wide gap between actual constitutionalism 
and constitutional practice have had far-reaching implications in the way these specific 
Covenant rights are incorporated and interpreted to protect the citizens. Constitutional reforms 
since independence have sought to strengthen the powers of the executive and effectively 
brought both the judiciary and legislature under executive control. The Constitution 
distinguishes between legislative powers to legislate55 and the power of the executive to issue 
rules and regulations.56 Such a system effectively grants the executive the authority to make 
laws and control the law-making process of the parliament. On the other hand, while the 
constitution prides itself upon judicial independence,57 the president is the one who guarantees 
that independence with enormous executive powers to appoint, transfer, discipline and dismiss 
judges, authority to refer matters to the Constitutional Council, and challenges the very concept 
of judicial independence. 
Such a system of executive control which attacks both legislative and judicial independence 
challenges the implementation of the Covenant both at the domestic and international levels. It 
may also be argued that the Covenant’s laudable interpretation clause that forbids   states from 
engaging in any act that could destroy any of the rights and freedoms recognised in the 
Covenant or encourage their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present 
Covenant cushions the effect of domestic influence.58 In addition, the Covenant’s object and 
purpose plays an essential role in ensuring that implementation must be done to fulfil the object 
and purpose as   stated in article 2(1) and as has been developed by the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee. Barak has argued that at a high level of abstraction, the object and 
purpose of a legal text in what he described as objective purpose are the values, objectives, 
interests, policy, and function that the text is designed to actualize. 59 The Covenant’s unique 
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status as a human rights treaty does not only compel but also justifies interpretation that applies 
to all individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant.60 The Covenant also imposes on these   states many obligations; negative 
obligations as   stated in article 2(1) and apart from the negative obligation not to infringe on 
these rights, the Covenant imposes another obligation that requires active measures of 
implementation through specified conducts including domestic remedies in case of Covenant 
rights violations.61 
The enabling constitutional environment for the incorporation of the Covenant is also 
dependent on whether a country is Monist or Dualist, and this shall also determine whether the 
Covenant is self-executing or needs enabling legislation to be incorporated as part of domestic 
law. 
1.3 THEORY OF THE RELATIONAL BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW 
The legal status of the Covenant within Cameroon’s domestic legal order is highly dependent 
on the theory of the relationship between international law and domestic law. Two primary 
theories inform this relationship. The Monist theory treats the international and domestic 
systems as one single legal framework. Under such a configuration, international law is directly 
applicable to the domestic system.62 
In their empirical study on the relationship between human rights law and domestic legal order 
in Africa, Killander et al. found that human rights law is not optimally used as a source of law 
within the continent.63 Despite this finding, Cameroon broadly described as falling under the 
civil and Common Law systems has adopted domestic measures consistent with its obligations 
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under the Covenant. Most of the Civil Law countries which were mostly former French 
colonies with their constitutions modelled after article 55 of the 1958 French Constitution,64 
are also monist in which the Covenant is self-executing. In case of conflict with Covenant 
provisions, the Covenant has supremacy over domestic legislation.65 
Cameroon is a complex mix between the Common Law and the Civil Law tradition and should 
rationally be described as a bi-jural legal system in which Common and Civil Laws interact. 
However, as Fombad noted, a political and legal desire for complete de-identification of one 
legal legacy in favour of another has not only created a veritable legal imbroglio but may 
undermine the basis of a ‘United Cameroon.’66 In 1993, 14 African   states including Cameroon 
signed the OHADA accord (OHADA is the acronym for the Organisation pour l’harmonisation 
en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, or in English, the Organisation for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa) and set in motion in 1996 a process of the harmonisation of the 
Cameroonian law to develop a home-grown legal system. This process has led to a drastic 
decline in the influence of the Common Law system to the advantage of the Civil Law tradition 
with huge implications on the protection of the writ of habeas corpus in the Common Law 
areas. Cameroon can thus effectively be described as a Civil Law country and like most Civil 
Law countries in Africa, it is monist. Thus, in Cameroon, monism defines that relationship in 
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which the Covenant and domestic law are ‘manifestations of a single conception of law’.67 This 
means that Cameroon’s courts and judges can simply apply the Covenant on ratification 
without any enabling legislation even though there is very little evidence of the use of the 
Covenant in interpreting constitutional provisions. 
The dualist approach to this relationship, on the other hand, conceives of the two systems as 
two distinct legal orders which emphasize that   states adopt the legal measures of the treaties 
into a national provision before they are cited at the domestic level.68 Seibert-Fohr has raised 
three important questions about this relationship: whether an individual may directly invoke 
the Covenant provisions before a domestic court; whether the   state party is required to 
incorporate the Covenant into its domestic legal system; or whether it is obliged to make it self-
executing. 69 A Common Law country like Uganda conforms to a dualist theory in the 
relationship between domestic and international law. It, therefore, requires implementing 
legislation giving formal domestic legal effect to the Covenant. In a fundamental difference 
with a monist country like Cameroon, the Covenant does not become ‘real law’ until it can be 
legislatively incorporated into domestic law, thereby becoming enforceable by courts. 70 
However as noted in the Bangalore Principles, there has been a tendency for national courts to 
have regard to these international norms for the purpose to decide cases where the domestic 
law – whether constitutional, Statute or Common Law – is uncertain or incomplete.71 Kabumba 
has argued that judges in Uganda feel comfortable having regard to the jurisprudence of 
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international law to shed light on the scope of constitutional provisions.72 This relationship has 
had a far-reaching influence on the way these Covenant rights are interpreted and protected 
and the general nature of constitutionalism. 
Most dualist countries rarely use international law in the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions. The non-use of international law is attributed to the fact that the legal system allows 
for the incorporation of international law within the Constitution. Reference to the case of 
Uganda is again essential to highlight this crucial difference. According to article 123(1) of the 
Ugandan constitution, a treaty must be ratified following the ratification of treaties Act (Cap 
204) and then domesticated by Act of the Ugandan parliament before it can be invoked in 
domestic litigations. Unlike in monist tradition, in terms of conflict between the Ugandan 
constitution and the provisions of the Covenant, the Ugandan constitution overrides.73 This is 
inconsistent with Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and has far-reaching 
implications in its ability to meet its obligation under the Covenant. The implication of this 
relationship and the contextual reality of the individual countries mean that interpretation of 
the Covenant cannot follow a pattern that meets its object and purpose. On the other hand, the 
Ugandan judiciary entrenched in some of its rulings the rule of ‘purposive and generous 
constitutional interpretations when it comes to issues of fundamental human rights. This 
approach was upheld in the Constitutional Court in the case of Rwanyarare and others v. 
Attorney General. In a petition brought under article 137(3) of the constitution, Judge Okello 
JJA declared that; “we think that this court is competent to grant redress under article 50 of the 
constitution where a fundamental right or freedom guaranteed under the constitution is 
infringed or threatened”74.  
While many autocracies have constitutions which include provisions that guarantee the 
superior nature of the Covenant over national laws,75 the unique nature of the Covenant ensures 
that their obligations are of an objective nature and protect the fundamental rights of individuals 
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and not the interest of the contracting   states.’76 The constitutions of countries like Uganda and 
Zimbabwe provide no clear clarification on these two issues, yet the basic principles of the 
relationship between domestic law and international law as practiced by Common Law 
countries remain applicable. It is also an application that unfortunately does not change the 
factual protection of these rights. 
There is hardly any doubt that in Cameroon like in most other autocracies in Africa South of 
the Sahara, whether of the Common or Civil Law tradition, coercion is used as a policy tool by 
the government to hang onto power and to deal with internal dissent. Torture, deprivation of 
liberty, inhuman and degrading treatment and unfair trials are the tools most frequently used to 
achieve a political objective of executive dominance. The Civil Law tradition that is 
predominant in Cameroon provides a weak framework and enhances the authority of the 
executive over the judiciary, thereby making violation of these rights more likely. 
Consequently, its implementation approach to its obligation under these rights also remains a 
factor of the weak inherited Civil Law tradition.  
This process does require a review of the constitution and other national laws to determine their 
compliance with Covenant provisions. Implementation of its obligations under these rights 
requires constitutional entrenchment of these rights. The 1996 constitution affirms attachment 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and duly ratified International Treaties 
including the Covenant.  
1.4 JUDICIAL AND OTHER METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
After Cameroon acceded the Covenant, it made it possible through legislative actions for its 
courts to pass judgments that are consistent with these Covenant provisions and to provide 
adequate judicial measures against any infringement of its obligations in the Covenant. The 
judicial implementation of these Covenant provisions is central to their realization. Its Penal 
Code states that any person who violates individual freedoms may be prosecuted for false 
                                                 
76 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The interpretation of acts and rules in public international law’ 




arrest77 and oppression78. Furthermore, the trial court may award damages to victims who file 
civil actions. The law also provides for the possibility of obtaining compensation for an 
extended period of detention that ends in acquittal through the following mechanisms: an 
appeal to the compensation and reparations commission created under articles 236 and 237 of 
the Criminal procedure code and; an appeal to the administrative authorities. Although these 
procedures have been deemed inaccessible and ineffective, they constitute a framework 
through which the undoing, repairing of harm and compensation of victims can be adequately 
carried out. 
On the other hand, its judicial implementation approach has been mainly centred around the 
referencing of its laws without any substantial evidence on where and how that law has been 
used to undo or repair the harm caused by authorities acting in an official capacity to violate 
human rights. For example, each time Cameroon has been accused of the violation of specific 
Covenant rights, it has responded by referring to the provision of its law which it has 
consistently used to justify its actions. In the case of Akwanga v Cameroon, Cameroon was 
accused of violating the premise of article 9 in the arrest of Akwanga without a warrant and 
without informing him of the reasons for his arrests. Cameroon responded by arguing that 
investigations into the incidences that led to Akwanga’s arrest were carried out in full respect 
of the legislation in force at the time. Referring to the Committee’s jurisprudence, the   state 
party notes that it is for the national authorities to decide how to investigate a crime.79 This 
approach has consistently led the Human Rights Committee to conclude on many occasions 
that the availability of remedial measures does not guarantee both their accessibility and 
effectiveness. In Kingue v Cameroon, the Committee declared the communication admissible 
after Cameroon did not contest the claim by the complainant that domestic remedies even 
where available were ineffective. The Committee noted that 
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…the author’s claim, which is not contested by the   state party, that domestic remedies have 
been exhausted because there is no effective remedy to repair the injury that he suffered as a 
victim of arbitrary arrest and detention. The compensation commission created for this purpose 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure has reportedly not yet been set up, and recourse to the 
administrative courts would be pointless since settled case law excludes from the jurisdiction 
of these courts issues of compensation for injury attributable to the functioning of the public 
justice system and since a subsequently adopted law confirms this exclusion.80 
The requirement of article 2(2) for   states parties to adopt legislative and other measures is 
broad. This broadness includes judicial and administrative measures specific to the 
requirements of the rights concerned.  
Administrative implementation of its obligation under the Covenant as overseen under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Justice has been through specialist inter-ministerial commissions 
like the National Commission for Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) which has been set 
up through executive decrees to coordinate and monitor human rights treaty implementation 
efforts including the compilation and submission of reports. Such a specialized body 
compliments legislative and judicial procedure that is required under article 2(2) of the 
Covenant. 
While the domestic jurisdiction is the principal system of implementing the obligations 
contained in the Covenant, the monitoring system put in place at the level of the Human Rights 
Committee also plays a vital role in ensuring that these obligations are implemented at the 
domestic level. When domestic remedies are non-existent or ineffective that is when 
international remedies are most required. In this respect, article 28 of the Covenant provides 
for the establishment of the Human Rights Committee as the principal organ of implementation 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is a quasi-judicial body consisting of 18 
independent experts 81  charged with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the 
Covenant through the Individual Communication, interstate and reporting procedures. 
Robertson   states that the real test of the effectiveness of a system of international protection 
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for human rights is whether it provides an international remedy for the individual whose rights 
are violated.82   
The individual communication mechanism is the most intrusive mechanism that grants the 
individual direct access to an international instrument of adjudication. It is dealt with 
extensively in Chapter 6. While the mechanism’s outcome still relies on the domestic measures 
taken by the  state to give effect to the views of the Committee, it is none the less an effective 
mechanism that not only allows for the scrutiny of how the institutions of   states parties deals 
with their obligations but also how they interpret and implement those obligations. 
Another method of monitoring the implementation of its obligations under the Covenant is the 
reporting procedure. This procedure gives the Human Rights Committee the opportunity to 
scrutinise  state reports on the measures it has taken to ensure respect of Covenant rights and 
the limitations of its domestic implementation regime. With its General Comments on specific 
rights and Concluding Observations after each report, the Human Rights Committee provides   
states with both the sound interpretive approach, orientation of implementation and 
recommendations that should form the basis of the next report. The implementation of the 
Covenant through the Reporting process is one of the obligatory procedures for monitoring the 
obligations of   states parties under the Covenant. The reporting procedure also offers 
Cameroon the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of the measures it has taken to 
harmonize national law and policy with the provisions of the Covenant. The process of 
compiling its report also gives it the opportunity to interact with civil society organisations in 
what is known as the constructive dialogue. The reporting periodicities generally represent a 
minimum reporting requirement. Cameroon has also submitted its report behind schedule. Its 
initial report of 1985 was submitted three years late, that is, in 1988. Its first periodic report of 
1990 was also submitted three years late (in 1993). Its fourth periodic report of 2003 was 
submitted five years late, that is, in 2008. Apart from the delays which have an impact on the 
implementation of its obligation, the quality of its reports has been abysmally inadequate. 
Based on the trend in delays, the Human Rights Committee is even prepared to examine a  
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state’s Covenant implementation record in the absence of a report after notifying the relevant  
state of the date of such examination.83  These mechanisms have been inadequate in the 
implementation processes mainly attributed to the weak constitutional enabling environment 
and a narrow interpretive doctrine that restricts the enjoyment of the rights herein considered. 
This procedure has been dealt with in chapter 5. 
1.5 INTERPRETIVE DOCTRINE 
The Covenant and the nature and efficacy of the regimes that monitor and cause their 
implementation are principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 84 which are 
always being interpreted. The Covenant is a broad framework of an agreement reached through 
compromises by the principal duty bearers in the protection of human rights. Pechota describes 
these compromises as a ‘meeting of minds of the contracting parties on the specific duties and 
obligations they intend to assume, and their agreements that the undertakings must be 
effectively performed’85. Based on this, some scholars have emphatically argued that any 
campaign that seeks to promote human rights must take into consideration the political 
processes that led to the development of such norms and especially the will of the   states to 
pursue such a campaign.86 Jardon Louis’s contention is captured in its broadest form in the way 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties87 lays out the general rules of the interpretation 
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of treaties.  These rules lay out the basic principles and methodology of interpretation that 
embraces a broad range of approaches that cuts across context and time. These principles also 
hold true for human rights treaties and the Covenant as a non-self-executing treaty without 
reciprocity. However, in as much as the contents of these treaties in general and the Covenant, 
in particular, remain vague expressions of desires lacking in clarity of content, indeterminate 
and exclusively a state-centric construction and because standards are set through 
interpretation, legal clarity in content and scope is crucial to ensure compliance. 
The broadest interpretation of these rights and obligations are essential in the protection of 
human dignity and to ensure the realisation of the broader obligation enshrined in article 2(1) 
of the Covenant. For example, to ensure redress for violations,  states parties are required under 
article 2(3) to provide remedies to persons whose rights under the Covenant are violated. The 
Committee has taken a broad view concerning these rights and obligations, relating them to all 
provisions of law rather than simply the terms of the Covenant. In its jurisprudence, it has 
interpreted this right to require a forum to be available to hear an allegation of a violation of a 
Covenant right when it is sufficiently well-founded to be arguable under the Covenant. It has 
argued in the broadest sense that remedies must not only be available but effective as well. In 
Akwanga v Cameroon, the Committee   stated about the availability of remedy that;  
‘with regard to the author’s failure to raise claims of torture and unfair proceedings before the 
domestic courts, the Committee observes that the   state party has merely listed in abstract terms 
the existence of remedies under the Code of Criminal Procedure, without relating them to the 
circumstances of the author’s case and without showing how they might provide effective 
redress.’88 
In Dias v Angola, the Committee   stated that  
under article 2(3) of the Covenant, the   state party is under the obligation to provide Mr. Dias 
with an effective remedy and to take adequate measures to protect his personal security from 
threats of any kind. The   state party is under an obligation to take measures to prevent similar 
violations in the future.89  
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The proper interpretation of the obligations under article 2(3) is essential for Cameroon to fulfil 
their negative and positive obligations under article 7, 9, 10 and 14. These obligations both 
require Cameroon to refrain from acts of torture, arbitrary arrests or detention and if such occur 
refrain from the inhuman treatment of persons in detention. In line with this broad approach 
the Committee, in its jurisprudence on article 9(1), stated that the right to security of persons 
also obtains outside the context of the formal deprivation of liberty. An interpretation of article 
9 that would allow a   state party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained 
persons subject to its jurisdiction would render to ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.90 
Melchem argued that because the Covenant imposes obligations on   states that must be fulfilled 
vis-à-vis individuals as third-party beneficiaries, they would have an obvious interest in 
interpreting them restrictively to retain more liberty in domestic policy.91  This restrictive 
approach to the Covenant’s interpretation has been particularly relevant to Cameroon whose 
survival depends on ultra vires actions against political opponents and can in a significant way 
account for the widening gap between ratification and compliance. 
2. AIMS OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based upon the above observations, the study aims first at investigating and discussing 
Cameroon’s capacity and the limitations that imperil proper implementation of its obligations 
under articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14 and how these obligations are implemented. 
Based on these aims, a series of questions are formulated to guide the study. Two of which are: 
what are the possible obstacles to the implementation of its obligations and how does 
Cameroon implement its obligations under articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant? 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This study is interdisciplinary as it combines both the sociological from an international 
relations perspective and the legal from an international law perspective in understanding how 
models of state conduct affect content and subject of international rules. The study thus adopts 
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an exploratory approach designed purposely to ease understanding of some of these phenomena 
under an autocratic system and how implementation occurs under an autocratic polity. In this 
respect, the study uses the qualitative method given that it is the most productive form of 
research method in this kind of a study. Norman and Yvonna in entering the field of qualitative 
research, write: ‘…qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, trans-disciplinary, and 
sometimes counter disciplinary field. It crosscuts the humanities and the social and physical 
sciences. Qualitative research is many things at the same time; it is multi-paradigmatic in 
focus.’92 
In answering the above questions, the methodology follows a desktop-based research into 
primary and secondary data. To understand the changing dynamics in its implementation across 
different constitutional periods, data is required from its political and constitution frameworks; 
all its periodic reports and Concluding Observations since Cameroon acceded to the Covenant, 
and all submitted individual communications. A detailed jurisprudence of these rights has been 
developed by the Human Rights Committee. The study has involved an analysis of the body of 
case law relevant to these rights and obligations, including court judgements, depositions and 
reviews; primary legislation on implementation approaches including the constitutions of 
Cameroon, its civil and criminal procedure code; the views of the Human Rights Committees, 
including Concluding Observations, General Comments, etc. The analysis of secondary data 
includes a broad range of journal articles by scholars, practitioners, and other professionals. 
The study also includes a review of books and an extensive review of the work of the Human 
Rights Committee. Also consulted for this study were different international and regional 
human rights treaties. It then proceeded with an extensive review of the periodic reports since 
it ratified the Covenant. In order to capture the state’s understanding of its obligation under the 
Covenant, the study reviewed all Individual Communication to the HRC, General Comments 
(GC).  
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The historical and descriptive approaches are used in generating the data on the nature of the 
domestic political order and how this shape domestic approaches in the implementation of the 
specific provisions under investigation. The data is generated by studying the different 
governmental arms of the state and how they interplay under an autocratic political order. The 
executive, judiciary and legislative branches are united through the constitution of Cameroon 
which functions according to the legal tradition. By understanding the nature of the 
constitution, the legal tradition and how the different branches of government function, it is 
possible to understand how the Covenant is internalised and how this internalisation translates 
into the protection from torture and deprivation of liberty with dignity and humanity. 
In considering the cases, the study relied on the case law of the Human Rights Committee. 
From the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, the study examines all cases that have 
been brought against Cameroon and whose decisions span a 20-year period. This gives the 
study the scope in the evolution of the implementation regime. These cases also involve issues 
in articles 2(3), 7 9, 10 and 14. In the Mukong v. Cameroon case, the Committee found that 
Cameroon violated article 7 and 9(1) of the Covenant. In the Gorji v. Cameroon93 case 10 years 
later, the Committee found Cameroon in breach of its obligation under articles 9(1), 10(1)(2)94. 
In the Akwanga v. Cameroon case the Committee found that Cameroon breached articles 7, 
9(2)(3)(4), 10(1)(2) and 14 95 . Akwanga spent seven years in four different prison cells. 
According to his submission to the Human Rights Committee, he was kept incommunicado for 
18 months, subjected to torture and imprisoned under inhuman and degrading conditions.96 A 
full understanding of his experience will capture the structural-agency dynamic of systematic 
impunity and should lay the foundation for a review of Communication 1813/2008. 
The study also reviewed initial and periodic reports submitted to the Human Rights Committee. 
The reports of special rapporteurs are also examined to glean the views of an independent 
expert on the attitude of the   state party towards its obligation under the Covenant. Although 
the special rapporteur now operates under the special procedure of the Human Rights Council, 
                                                 
93Gorji v Cameroon, No. 1134/2002 paras 5.1- 5.3 
94 Ibid para. 5.1- 5.3 
95Akwanga v Cameroon No. 1813/2008, para 8 




it still focuses its work on the obligations laid out in the various human rights treaties. As 
indicated in the UN system, as of 1 October 2014, there has been 39 thematic areas covered 
and 14 country mandates established. These thematic areas and countries have included issues 
relevant to this study. 
4. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The study embodies a reflection of critical analysis involving many cases, concepts and 
doctrinal approaches to Covenant implementation. Thus Chapter 2 discusses the 
conceptualization of the implementation of the Covenant with a focus on 1) the choice of 
Covenant as the treaty of inquiry 2) the reason behind the selection of the specific Covenant 
rights, and 3) the autocratic state considered in the study. It also lays out the foundation of the 
study by outlining the ways these rights are entrenched in the Covenant, the way the HRC 
interprets them and the structure of the autocratic polity.  
Before positivist empiricism became the dominant mode of scientific validation, 
historiography provided an important inductive approach to scientific knowledge. Stedman 
argues that history was a science because it was composed of facts which were events which 
resulted from the actions of individuals producing them through the framework of 
institutions.97  And because human rights protection does not occur in a vacuum and the 
corresponding  state institutions, their development and how they impact implementation are 
critical to its protection, capturing the historical development of Cameroon with a view to 
neatly stitching the pieces of vital historical developments necessary to understand the 
construction of its political system, is the essence of Chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 presents an overview of the constitutional system that shapes the implementation 
approach of Cameroon. Cameroon adopted the political structure and legal systems of its 
colonial masters. In Cameroon, bi-juralism seems to be inconsistent with the nature of its 
constitutionalism and the lack of a clear demarcation in its application. Since encroaching into 
Southern Cameroons, the British colonial legacy has continued to be undermined to the point 
that it has very minimal influence at the constitutional level. It is noted that the normative 
standards of the separation of powers are geared at pre-empting the arbitrariness and tyranny 
                                                 




that inheres in the over-concentration and uncontrolled exercise of power.98 It also considers 
the administrative structures put in place and their effectiveness in implementing the  state’s 
obligations under these rights. This chapter demonstrate that ‘imperial executive’ is arbitrary 
and impinges on the protection of these rights and consequently on the state’s implementation 
of its obligation to protect. 
These legal systems have significant implications on how treaties are given effect. While the 
Common Law and Civil Law systems are most prevalent, there are pseudo mixed jurisdictions 
in countries with both British and French backgrounds. While the study does not involve 
comparative analyses of the different systems, emerging differences in the structure and 
domestic approach have inevitably enriched the overall objective of the study. The judiciary 
and the protection of rights, powers of judicial review, and interpretive approaches to the role 
of the imperial executive in the implementation process are all developed based on the nature 
of the political structure of the state. Constitutional systems matter in the implementation 
process of these rights. By shedding light on the political structure of the autocracy, the actual 
as opposed to the formal relationship between the executive, legislature and judiciary and how 
this relationship impacts the protection of these rights the chapter will establish a better 
framework for understanding how implementation occurs at both the domestic and 
international levels.  
The Covenant provides for three implementation mechanisms: Inter- state reports, state 
reporting mechanism, and individual communication mechanism. Chapters 5 and 6 turns to 
international mechanisms of monitoring implementation. Human rights implementation takes 
place within two jurisdictions. The primacy of the state in its implementation is central to the 
drafting of treaties; but also, where   states are unable or unwilling to give effect to their 
obligation, individuals or groups of individuals can ‘jump’ jurisdiction and seek redress at the 
Human Rights Committee. The focus is on the political and cultural features of nation-  states 
that prompt individuals to seek redress in the international system by addressing their 
                                                 





grievances to the HRC.99 Based on weaknesses in the monitoring process and an emphasis on 
procedural commitment in merely submitting reports and participation in the reporting process, 
a number of patterns have emerged in the attitude of Cameroon concerning its substantive 
commitment to the Covenant that has significantly influenced the way its implements it 
obligations. Chapter 6 proceeds to critically analyse all the cases dealt with at the Human Rights 
Committee under the Optional Protocol, with a focus on the procedural and substantive 
obligations of the state under the Covenant. This chapter asserts that a focus on procedural 
rather than a substantive commitment to implementing its obligation under these rights is due 
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CONCEPTUALISING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COVENANT 
RIGHTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the 119th session of the Human Rights Committee, there were 169   states parties 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 116   states parties to the 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant100including Cameroon. These legal commitments have 
engineered a significant shift in the structure of the international human rights system and a 
complex interplay between international law and domestic law on the one hand and 
international law and domestic practices on the other. Despite these connections that brings 
national practices through a complex monitoring network to international scrutiny, the 
persistence of systematic violations of human rights across the globe remains rife. The 
implementation of the Covenant, though a state-centric affair, coexists with regional and 
international monitoring systems including the right of individual victim adjudication which 
all play essential roles in a state’s approach to implementing its obligation.  Consequently, 
understanding the different thematic areas around implementation is critical.  
This chapter outlines and examines the different thematic areas around implementation; 
develops the foundation argument around each thematic area and explores the justification of 
the selection criteria. The chapter specifically answers the questions why the Covenant? Why 
the specific rights? and moreover why the autocratic state of choice?  
The Covenant is a pillar of the United Nations human rights system and together with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), forms the core pillars of the UN international bill of 
                                                 





rights system. While the UDHR’s non-binding premise sets a critical moral tone on the 
universal application, respect and upholding of civil, political and economic rights and plays a 
vital role in norm formation, the Covenant as a Treaty-based convention is binding on   states 
subject to reservation and other kinds of exceptional circumstances contained in the comment 
on treaties. It was the understanding that the respect and protection of human rights as a binding 
national obligation was quintessential for the maintenance of international peace and security101 
that gave rise to the translation of the norm-setting Universal Declaration of Human Rights into 
a legally binding treaty obligation. This obligation is expressed in article 2 of the Covenant in 
absolute terms 102 and imposes both duties of results 103 and of conduct 104 . These binding 
obligations explain to a certain extent the relevance of the Covenant in this study. 
The choice of the Covenant is intrinsically tied to its broad scope regarding the protection of 
different rights and the availability of an expert-led proper monitoring body that has set robust 
standards regarding the interpretation and implementation of the rights considered. As Keith 
argued, “adherence to this document would signal an even stronger commitment to human 
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rights and because adherence to this document would make the state subject to more 
comprehensive reporting and complaints procedures”105  
As a human rights treaty, the Covenant confers rights on individuals and corresponding 
obligations on   states parties “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within their territory 
and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant”106. Apart from 
the qualificative premise of most of the rights which leaves room for different interpretations 
under different circumstances, the Covenant falls short of being very specific about how these 
rights should be ensured. Seibert-Fohr argues that the implementation of the rights in the 
Covenant depends on domestic measures taken to give effect to the Covenant provisions107. 
While international norms and treaty obligations may help ‘shed light on the distinctive 
function of one’s system’, they do not replace the domestic value system that informs the laws 
of the country. 108  Apart from being a treaty whose implementation has shaped domestic 
institutions, it also provides secondary avenues of implementation through the Interstate 
mechanism,109 the Reporting System110 as well as the individual complaint mechanism.  While 
the first mechanism is rarely adhered to, the efficacy of the second largely depends on   states 
submitting reports and to a very large extent on the quality of the reports and their cooperation 
in the consideration process. Freeman and Gibran have argued that the indispensability of the  
state in the implementation of these rights and the provision of remedies suffer major mutilation 
when it comes to enforcing them because of the contemporary organisation of international law 
that has   states as the main constituent units. 111  This limitation is however limitedly 
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circumvented by the right of the individual to challenge the  state beyond the domestic 
jurisdiction and in some countries the possibility of challenging the constitutionality of the 
domestic Statute.112 The individual complaint mechanism overseen by a separate protocol in 
which participation is contingent on ratification of the protocol provides for a procedure 
through which individuals who feel their rights have been violated and who have exhausted all 
domestic remedies of redress can file in complaints at the Human Rights Committee. 
These domestic and international opportunities to hold   states accountable for their obligation 
under the Covenant is reinforced by the high number of state ratification of the Covenant and 
its Optional Protocol. The great legitimating value of the Covenant accounts for this high 
ratification despite deliberation in rights violations and a systematic approach through treaty 
interpretation to ‘justify’ such abuses.113 It may be right to argue that while ratification of the 
Covenant exposes domestic practices to extra-territorial scrutiny, a weak monitoring system 
and the nature of the domestic regime have not helped narrow the gap between ratification and 
compliance.  
Concerning the merits of the Covenant, Keith has also argued that its strength and that of other 
human rights treaties lie in their ability to declare international norms of human rights, their 
ability to generate information about  state human rights policies and actual behaviour, and 
their ability to direct world attention to abuses.114 Its constraining power to  state action is 
designed to positively influence governments’ authority to treat citizens as they see fit, 
empowering individuals to make   states accountable for their domestic activities.115 Despite 
ratification, the level of impunity and flouting of its obligation under the Covenant remains 
disturbingly high. This is the contradiction of the human rights treaty system. It is a 
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contradiction which Hafner et al. offer a fantastic insight into by clarifying the disparity even 
when it does not solve the puzzle of the gap116. On a specific perspective, the nature of the duty 
bearer reflected the state, its legal architecture, its level of wealth, the organisation of its 
domestic jurisdiction, how it chooses to give effect to its treaty obligation and how it interprets 
these obligations are critical factors that determine whether rights are protected or violated. 
This is however not a textbook and straightforward process even if all other factors that affect 
human rights are frozen. Nonetheless, these factors have a direct or indirect bearing on how   
states interpret and implement their obligation under different treaty regimes.  
2. THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY CONSIDERED 
The choice of the Covenant lies in the fact that it is the only international human rights treaty 
that guarantees all of the rights under consideration and the obligation contained in articles 2(1) 
to respect and ensure the enjoyment of these rights is non-progressive and independent of 
economic or political development. In contrast to the Covenant, article 2(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) allows for the progressive 
realization of the rights. The immediacy in the Covenant’s approach generates state obligations 
and provides for the justiciability of the rights incorporated in the Covenant. This means that 
when these rights are violated the aggrieved party(s) can move the courts for their enforcement. 
It also provides a set of ‘common minimum standards’ across a range of substantive rights. As 
with other multilateral human rights treaties, the Covenant contains substantive provisions, 
some of which detail treaty purposes and principles of interpretation, while others specify 
particular rules: structural provisions related to monitoring and enforcement, and procedural 
rules pertaining to application, relationship to other international legal norms, entry into force, 
and related subjects117. These are essential substantive and procedural issues that structure the 
implementation and interpretive approaches of   states parties. 
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The Covenant is also an authoritative legal instrument of civil and political rights with a broad 
appeal and ‘probably the most important human rights treaty in the world’.118 It is neither issue-
specific nor group-of-individuals-specific. While the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is 
specific to the protection of torture, the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) apply only to specific individuals, the Covenant ‘purports to apply to all classes of 
persons,’.119 Other treaties deal with these rights either in times of conflict120 or in a subsidiary 
fashion.121.  
As far as the regional treaties are concerned, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
to which Cameroon is also a   state party offers a weak monitoring mechanism, and the Charter 
weakens the African Commission on Human Rights’ implementation of its recommendations 
or decisions. The African Court of Human and People’s Rights that complements the work of 
the Commission strengthen the monitoring capacity of the Charter, but only five countries have 
yet accepted the declaration that permits individual citizens to seek the jurisdiction of the court 
directly. While the Human Rights Committee is also seen as ineffective regarding the 
enforcement of its views, its composition and quasi-judicial nature offer more clarity in legal 
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interpretation that strengthens the holistic approach of interpretation offered by the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
This study has been limited to understanding the limitations and the implementation approach 
of Cameroon concerning the Covenant and limited to specific rights. Nonetheless, it recognizes 
the role that other treaty bodies and charter base approaches to monitoring human rights and 
especially the new review process under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) play in 
monitoring  state attitudes towards specific rights.122 Within the period of the first review 
process, two autocracies in Africa South of the Sahara ratified the Convention against 
torture.123 The UPR has proved its appeal with a 100 percent participation rate in the first 
review process. The second and third review processes were also concluded successfully. 
Cameroon’s participation in these three review processes has reflected its participation under 
the individual treaty body mechanisms.  While Purna’s argument that the level of participation 
is because of the ‘discussion of peers’ approach unlike a review by ‘expert approach’124 of the 
treaty bodies is correct, ongoing studies have shown that the level of participation in such 
processes alone provides essential tools to monitor state behaviour and to determine their 
understanding of their obligation. In comparison to the UPR that also deals with thematic issues 
encompassing all the considered rights, the Human Rights Committee is an expert-led 
monitoring body as opposed to the Charter base and state-led approach under the UPR. There 
is also evidence that the practicalities of the UPR are also divorced from its   stated goal of 
‘complementing and adding value’ to the work of treaty base approaches. De Frouville explains 
that in areas where the “Committee points out areas of concern and made recommendations in 
the most accurate manner, the immense majority of   states taking the floor during the UPR 
have focused on praising a country for its significant achievements in the field of human rights, 
including its ‘pluralist’ democracy, the freedom of the media and the interaction with civil 
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society…”125. As examined below, despite the Covenants appeal, not all the substantive and 
procedural rights here considered are written in absolute terms. 
3. THE SPECIFIC ARTICLES OF THE COVENANT CONSIDERED 
International efforts to protect human dignity and to stop arbitrary actions in the arrest, 
deprivation of liberty and trial of persons, whether at the domestic or international level, have 
remained the primary inspiration behind the erection of both domestic and international 
institutions on the one hand and domestic legislation and international human rights treaties on 
the other. As Donnelly and Rhoda have argued, the conception of human dignity, in their social 
and political aspects, express an understanding of the inner nature and worth of the human 
person and their proper relations with society.126 It is with this mindset that in developing the 
post-World War II (WWII) foundation for the peaceful coexistence of peoples and   states, the 
drafters of the United Nations Charter ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person’.127 It was an affirmation and a recognition which is 
prominently reflected in the proclamation of the basic rights and freedoms catalogued as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.128 
The broad range of rights contained in the Covenant makes it challenging to produce and 
analyse a   state party’s obligation in such a qualitative study. The focus on these selected rights 
is rooted in their centrality of their suppression for the survival of the Cameroon regime. While 
the violation of other fundamental Civil Rights which Goldstein refers to in his definition of 
repression as first amendment rights remain high in Cameroon, the restrictions on individuals’ 
civil rights, aimed at limiting the coordination and mobilization capacity of groups and 
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individuals remain a general phenomenon across different regime types. The way these 
limitations are carried out is crucial to its effectiveness and the survivability of the Cameroon 
regime. 
It must also be noted that the method used by Cameroon to prevent the enjoyment of what 
Goldstein describes as first amendment rights are torture, deprivation of liberty, cruel inhuman 
and degrading treatment and the use of kangaroo courts sometimes through military tribunals 
to deter political opponents. The violation of these rights is essential to instil fear, prevent free 
speech, freedom of association and even freedom of conscience and thought. In its General 
Comment 35 on article 9, the Committee emphasised this point when it   stated that the 
deprivation of liberty and security of persons, torture, unfair trials and lack of remedy have 
historically been the principal means of impairing the enjoyment of other rights.129 
Davenport has also argued that these rights are concerned with individual survival and security; 
such as freedom from torture, ‘disappearance,’ imprisonment, extrajudicial executions, and 
mass killing.130As Lupu also posits, the cost of prosecutable information on these rights is quite 
high and leads to fewer litigations, especially under autocracies. The high cost of prosecutable 
offenses is attributed to whether, a) the litigants in such rights violations have either been 
deprived of their liberty and cannot provide the information acceptable in court; or b) the 
government can effectively prevent the accusers from having access to such information 
through denial of their presence or through hiding such information; and c) the accusers and 
government interests are at variance131. Such restrictions serve the interest of the state, and as 
Dai argues, ‘to assess   states’ interests in monitoring, we need to know whether they have 
incentives to protect the potential victims of noncompliance. Such incentives, he argues, will 
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depend on who the victims of noncompliance are and whether their interests are aligned with 
that of their   states’.132 When the victims of one country’s noncompliance are domestic non- 
state actors, as in human rights regimes, this  state does not represent the victims’ interests.133 
Consequently, it is a fact that while violations of such rights are quite rife in Cameroon, 
domestic remedies for such violations are absent. The lack of such remedial possibilities has 
implications on the respect of articles 2(3) and 14.  
In their 1999 study on why some   states abuse personal integrity rights, Poe, Tate and Keith 
argued that the commission of these inhuman actions are the most effective means for these 
countries to achieve their ends. 134  They set out and developed five categorisations that 
explained different levels of personal integrity rights violations. Cameroon fits category three 
made by Poe, Tate, and Keith in their study of personal integrity rights. Based on their 
assessment and as   stated in category 3, under such a system there is extensive political 
imprisonment or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders 
and brutality may be typical. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is 
accepted.’135 Their approach to personal integrity rights investigation is one that emphasises 
the lack of an effective mechanism that constrains or check the coercive power of the abusing 
state. 
The selected rights are also rights with limited or no qualifying clauses that justify their 
violation under certain circumstances. These are also rights that manifest the notion of the 
special status of the human rights law in the concept of non-reciprocity and   states positive and 
negative obligations from both a vertical and horizontal perspective. 
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4. THE AUTOCRACY UNDER CONSIDERATION 
In Africa South of the Sahara, Cameroon is amongst 21 of the regimes classified as 
authoritarian, and as Freedom House in its 2014 reports   states, these regimes were beginning 
to abandon the quasi-democratic camouflage that allowed them to survive and prosper in the 
post–Cold War world.136 In its 2017 report, Cameroon is classified as ‘not free’ with a score of 
6 for civil liberties and 6 for political freedom with 1 being most free and 7 being least free. 
Cameroon also has a cumulated aggregate score of 24 with 0 being least free and 100 being 
most free. According to the Economist Intelligence Units Index of Democracy of 2017, 
Cameroon ‘s score as an authoritarian regime rose from 3.46 to 3.61 in 2017 with 0 to 4 
classified as authoritarian regimes and 8 to 10 classified as full democracies. The categorisation 
approach of the Economist Intelligence Index as reflected in the theoretical approach in 
explaining human rights violations of personal integrity rights under autocracies are based on 
the repression explanatory framework. In explaining Goldman’s 1978 definition of 
repression,137 Davenport argues that: 
Like other forms of coercion, repressive behaviour relies on threats and intimidation to compel 
targets, but it does not concern itself with all coercive applications (e.g., deterrence of violent 
crime and theft). Rather, it deals with applications of state power that violate First Amendment–
type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or 
security 138. 
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The classification between authoritarianism and totalitarianism informed the typology of the 
1950s to 1960s in the classification of non-democratic regimes. Post-1990 non-democratic   
states have embraced a high level of openness. In his 2002 studies, Diamond explained a new 
typology that lies between these two variances and which are neither distinctly democratic nor 
conventionally authoritarian.139 Diamond describes such multi-party autocracies or what he 
terms authoritarian electoral  regimes as ones in which ‘the existence of formally democratic 
political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to 
legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination’.140 Based on Diamond’s classification of 
such regimes Cameroon with its over 130 political parties, multiparty parliament, and regular 
electoral calendar will fall between competitive authoritarian and hegemonic electoral 
authoritarian regimes.141 This description is also reflected in the 2013 study by Wahman et al. 
in which they distinguish three types of authoritarian regimes by their methods of ‘accessing 
and maintaining power.’ Wahman et al. argue that the methods by which authoritarian regimes 
maintain power, correspond to three generic types of regimes classified as monarchies, military 
regimes and electoral regimes.142 Electoral authoritarian regimes are the ones which allow for 
some level of opposition participation and contestation and even a high degree of integration 
of elected opposition officials within the ruling system to legitimate state policies. According 
to Davenport such mixed and transitional regimes, which combine elements of autocracy and 
democracy, are the most coercive143.  
In her study on why autocracies sign up to the Convention Against Torture, Vreeland validates 
Davenport’s conclusion and argues that in Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Mauritania, Rwanda, 
and Cote d’Ivoire, the average score of torture jumped up by two scores following a transition 
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from single-party autocratic rule to a multiparty system.144 It is also in such   states that the 
basic principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ 145  in both domestic constitutional and Covenant 
implementation is seriously challenged. This democratic formalism continues to mask the 
domestic jurisdiction from coercive international oversight, especially when it comes to dealing 
with personal integrity rights. The strong desire of Cameroon to survive as a multiparty 
authoritarian state has translated into constitutionalism that constantly seeks to extend the 
powers of the executive, suspension of habeas corpus and the prevention of judicial scrutiny 
and oversight. 
Cameroon, like most other autocracies in the region, has developed pluralist institutions146as a 
means of sustaining and soliciting the cooperation of the opposition. Benin has more than a 
dozen political parties with two represented in the legislature: Burundi is also a multiparty state 
with more than a dozen political parties and with three represented in the legislature: Cameroon 
has more than 150 legalised political parties with five represented in the legislature. Gandhi 
and Przeworski argue that such autocratic institutions are not just ‘window dressing’, because 
they are the result of strategic choices and have an impact on the survival of autocrats and have 
effects on policy outcomes.147 As an autocracy with a long term serving autocrat who has 
endured long periods of political upheavals, it has survived through impunity that co-exists 
with neo-liberal political institutions that have incorporated these rights. These institutions are 
designed to perpetuate the survival of the state and the president through persistent cosmetic 
cooperation between the domestic order and international human rights institutions.148  Its 
political and legal colonial heritage, which manifests itself today, in a common post-colonial 
political regime and legal systems, have a significant influence on the way it implements its 
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obligation under the Covenant. Despite Cameroon having some form of a bi-jural legal system 
due to this historical reality, it is mostly a Civil Law system. The distinctive nature of its Civil 
Law regime lies in its emphasis on how individual rights are protected from state interference. 
Its basic premise is that the government executive and the legislature exist in order to regulate 
individual behaviour through a series of constitutional provisions, decrees, and criminal 
procedure codes. However, as is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, these realities concerning the 
theory are insufficient in practice in guaranteeing and protecting the rights of its citizens. Its 
relationship with the Human Rights Committee when it comes to dealing with individual 
communication is critical to understanding the gap between theory and practice in the guarantee 
and protection of these rights. 
As a   state party to the Covenant and its Optional Protocol, Cameroon has dealt with several 
complaints from persons subject to its jurisdiction who claim a violation of their rights under 
the Covenant. The Committee has had to deal with less than 60 cases from all the autocracies 
in this region put together. While the Democratic Republic of Congo has had to deal with 21 
cases concerning varying violations, it has failed to respond on 15 of those cases while it has 
provided information on only 5 of them. According to the treaty database, Cameroon has had 
to deal with 9 cases, and it has responded to most of them, including providing a remedy 
concerning compensation. Togo has had 5 cases according to the treaty database and has 
substantively responded to those cases. Angola has had to deal with 2 cases but has failed to 
cooperate with the Committee in consideration of any of the communication. Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Guinea, and The Gambia has not dealt with any case. Equatorial Guinea has had 5 
cases but has never submitted a substantive state response to any of the cases. Madagascar has 
had 5 cases with the last submission being in 1983149 with the views adopted in 1987 and there 
is no data found on any of those cases.  
5. THE AUTOCRATIC POLITY 
In his study on the phenomenon on ‘imperial presidency’ in Africa South of the Sahara, Kwasi 
argued that the phenomenon and its persistence in post-authoritarian Africa are rooted first in 
aspects of its post-colonial history and evolution of the African  state; and, second, in aspects 
                                                 




of its contemporary constitutional design.150 On the influence of postcolonial regimes, Kwasi 
further noted that postcolonial African presidents saw themselves as a modern reincarnation of 
the traditional African ‘chief’151 and the custodian and preserver of hard-won independence. 
This is a phenomenon that still thrives today and post-1990 presidents have rephrased the 
traditional chief argument in the form of national security, a threat of political instability to 
perpetuate themselves as the sole instruments of order. Such threats have translated into a 
constitutionalism that does not only give these presidents far-reaching powers but also 
undermine oversight by other branches of government.   
The way a country generally interprets and implements its obligation under the Covenant 
depends on its desire to either protect or violate these rights as a matter of policy. Such an 
interpretive pattern is also highly dependent on the nature of the regime, the organisation of its 
political institutions and the benefit it exacts from either course of action. Political ‘institutions 
operating under dictatorships matter in the attitude of these dictatorships to their commitment’. 
For Cameroon, repression has another dimension: restrictions on individuals’ civil rights, 
aimed at limiting the coordination and mobilization capacity of groups and individuals152. 
Consequently, the institutions of the state are constructed in a way that sustains such policy 
options because they are the result of strategic choices and have an impact on the survival of 
autocrats 153 . They also influence policy outcomes and at the same time reflect inclusive 
domestic institutions that reflect a preparedness on the state’s part to respect its obligations. 
The expectation that a transition from a one-party military style autocratic rule which is 
unaccountable and lacks consent to a multiparty autocratic rule would usher in an atmosphere 
of improved economic performance and respect of human rights, has failed to materialise in 
Cameroon. There is hardly any doubt that post-1990 autocratic   states witnessed great 
socioeconomic and political transformations. The greatest of these transformations has in the 
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areas of constitutionalism which entrenched civil and political rights, modified the institutions 
of the state and institutionalised ‘electoral formalism’ as the means of power alteration. 
Cameroon’s amended constitution has entrenched charter of rights and a clear separation of 
powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary. Most of these constitutions have also 
entrenched a very powerful executive with powers that stretch into the legislative and judicial 
realms.154 Most of these autocracies have constitutional provisions which guarantee the right 
to judicial review by citizens155 while others restrict such rights to the executive and the 
legislature.156 
Despite these constitutional guarantees, Kwame argues that ‘the restoration and re-
empowerment of parliaments and courts in Africa have not altered the presidential orientation 
of African governments or diminished presidential supremacy within the political sphere.157 
This imperial executive oversight in Cameroon has dramatically reduced the powers of other 
balancing institutions because a powerful executive whose survival is guaranteed by the way 
the other institutions’ function guarantees itself such powers as may be reserved for the 
judiciary or legislature. For example, the independence of the judiciary, which is an important 
arm in the implementation regime and the interpreting of the constitution, is guaranteed by the 
executive.158 To ensure judicial independence Keith has argued that a  
‘formal guarantee of judges’, which can protect a judge from a dictatorial executive or an 
overzealous legislature and shelter him or her from retaliation should the judge position himself 
or herself between the people and an abusive state – and this could be especially important 
during   states of emergency – must be guaranteed.159  
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On the contrary, judges in Cameroon are appointed by the President for a specific period.160 
The budget for judges is overseen by the parliament which is an extension of the executive as 
seen in the relations between the executive and national assembly.161 
Cameroon is a presidential Republic, and despite a formal legislature that makes laws, actual 
legislative power rest with the executive. The executive is also empowered to rule by decree 
and to appoint members of the upper house of parliament as well as those of the Constitutional 
Council.162 Elections are regular features that are used as a means of selecting members of the 
legislature and executive. But in most cases, these electoral formalisms have simply become a 
common showcase tool that is mastered and enforced from top to bottom. This kind of 
legitimating process has significantly altered the way they manage the political opposition and 
deal with country’s obligation under the Covenant. While regular elections have been 
conducted, they have lacked fairness, excluded potential candidates and primarily been rigged 
in favour of the incumbent. Since 1990, Cameroon has conducted four presidential elections, 
four parliamentary elections. A centralised approach to governance and control, accounts in no 
small extent for the gap between theory and practice as far as respect for human rights are 
concerned. 
Decentralisation in Cameroon in its current form has been based notably on the constitution 
embodied in Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996. 163 According to this provision of the 
constitution, “decentralised local entities of the republic shall be Regions and Councils”. 
Decentralisation, according to the explanatory statement of the law on decentralisation, is 
designed to devolve the unique powers of the state to Regions and Councils and appropriate 
resources to regional and local authorities164. For instance, elections organised around this 
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decentralisation objective are rigged in favour of the ruling party, especially in areas of strategic 
economic importance. In urban areas where fraud has been difficult, the government has 
appointed Government Delegates as chief executive officers over elected Mayors. Such 
practices have given control of political authority to the government in opposition won 
municipalities. In other smaller municipalities, the budget or program of action of the 
municipality is subject to approval by Divisional Officers appointed by the Executive.  
Constitutionalism has become a tool in the hands of the imperial executive to manipulate the 
electoral calendar, institutionalise life presidencies, and entrench unique domestic approaches 
to interpreting and implementing its obligation under the Covenant. It is a system which 
coexists with a neo-patrimonial approach to governance which is an ethnic-driven approach. 
This is brought into sharp focus in a comparative study on the variation of human rights regimes 
and human rights protection across the world. In this study, Landman establishes that the gap 
between ratification and compliance is most significant for countries in Africa South of the 
Sahara and for non-democracies165. The conclusion of Landman and others have far reaching 
implications on how the domestic constitutional order absorbs these rights and how the 
corresponding institutions enforces state obligations under the Covenant. 
6. PATTERNS OF INCORPORATION OF THESE RIGHTS 
Cameroon, like most autocracies in Africa South of the Sahara, has formally incorporated these 
rights as set forth in the Covenant.166  Most of the Covenant rights including those under 
investigation are vaguely protected in the preamble of the constitution of Cameroun while the 
penal and civil procedure codes define the scope of protection and penalties associated with 
violations. Despite this constitutional guarantee, some have not been expressed in absolute or 
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categorical terms, while the true meaning of others is buried within other provisions. This is a 
pattern that has been observed in other autocracies. In Gabon for example, while the prohibition 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is expressed in categorical terms, 
it appears to be buried within the framework of the protection of other rights. This ambiguous 
protection clause obscures the broad interpretive approach of the drafters and exposes the text 
to varying interpretation. It   states that “each citizen has the right to the free development of 
his person but respecting the rights of others and public order’. Moreover that ‘no one will be 
humiliated, mistreated, or tortured, especially when he is in a state of arrest or 
imprisonment”167. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the protection of torture and 
other cruel inhuman and degrading treatment is subject to many interpretations. While in article 
16 of the constitution of the DRC, the right to the physical integrity and the free development 
of their personality is protected, it is done so subject to the respect of “the law, public order, 
the rights of others and public morality”. In the same provision, the protection against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment is   stated as follows: “no one maybe subject to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment”. The “may be” 168  is a qualifying term subject to different 
interpretations and in conflict with the case law of the HRC on the absolute nature of the 
protection of torture. Such an approach is in sharp contradiction to the wording in the Ugandan 
constitution. “No person shall be subjected to any form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment”.169 
Torture is a crime of violence against the person and all countries have laws dealing with it. 
Countries are obliged to criminalise torture as to create an international crime and then be able 
to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime. There are explicit constitutional provisions 
that forbid torture even though some provisions have vaguely defined torture and failed to 
criminalise the act of torture in the Statute. In its 2012 Concluding Observation on Togo’s 
second periodic report, the Committee Against Torture emphasized the need for the adoption 
of legislation that clearly defines and criminalises the act of torture. The Committee requested 
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that Togo “take the necessary measures to incorporate in the Criminal Code all the elements of 
the definition of torture contained in article 1 of the Convention, as well as provisions 
criminalising and penalising acts of torture with penalties commensurate with their gravity”170. 
As Keith argues, “the best way to safeguard individual freedoms is through the enumeration of 
rights, which extends the reach of the rule of law and provides individuals’ protection from the 
abuse of government power”171. While formal as opposed to actual constitutional protection 
does not guarantee the enjoyment of these rights, they are the first step towards ensuring 
domestic protection since they provide standards against which to measure the action of   states. 
The nexus between such protection and the actual enjoyment of these rights, is dependent on 
several internal factors, among which is the nature of the regime. Government agencies 
instigate the violation of articles 7, 9 and mostly carried out by the police, military and 
intelligence agencies and in some cases surrogate agencies linked to the state. Most of the 
violations take place during pre-trial detentions and in some cases during government actions 
to prevent mass protests and other opposition activities against the state. Administrative 
detentions have also been used to circumvent state obligation under article 14 and to provide 
the cover for inhuman treatment of persons in detention. These policy options also have far-
reaching implications on the respect of articles 2(3) and 14 of the Covenant and have always 
been used by respondent   states to argue against complainants’ non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies.172 
It is evident that apart from systematic state action through its agencies to ensure its survival, 
power relations between the abuser and the abused, and lack of accountability within the police, 
military, and intelligence agencies are key driving forces that explain infringement on the 
dignity of ordinary people. Treaty ratification by itself does not guarantee the protection of 
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these rights. While monitoring and other domestic measures ensure avenues of protection and 
redress, the scope to which these obligations are interpreted and implemented accounts in no 
small extent for whether these rights are guaranteed or violated. In practice, adequate 
safeguards to protect those deprived of their liberty from cruel inhuman or degrading treatment 
by both correction guards and other detainees are absent.  
Despite vague legislative provisions in the constitution of Cameroon ensuring due process and 
the right to habeas corpus,173 more than 50 percent of those detained are in pre-trial detention. 
Access to lawyers is made more difficult by the absence of legal aid, and in cases where 
detainees have been subjected to torture, the provision of medical support is limited. It is not 
the absence of institutions that compounds human rights abuses; instead, it is the independence 
and effectiveness of these institutions in areas of investigation and the application of relevant 
rules of safeguard that ensures and guarantees effective due process. 
The gap between theory and practice in the implementation process in Cameroon and especially 
in those areas associated explicitly with their obligation under articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14 of 
the Covenant and protocol form part of the broader structural problems, including the 
implementation of their obligation under the Covenant. 
7. INTERPRETATION OF THE COVENANT 
Interpretation of the Covenant is a crucial element in the implementation process both at the 
domestic and international levels. The necessity for the definition of the scope and content of 
guaranteed rights arises from the broad and open nature of both the constitutional and treaty 
languages of the states and treaty bodies. This necessity is also rooted in the textual and 
normative differences of the wordings of the obligations and the heterogeneous nature of both 
the political and legal systems of   states parties. Beyond the textual and contextual framework 
that shapes interpretation, the customary norms within which both text and context operate can 
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be constraining factors. Based on general international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties lays down the methodological approach in the interpretation of General 
International law. 
In his brief foreword to Gardiner’s book on treaty interpretation, Sir Michael Wood submits 
that “interpretation is an art, not a science... and in terms of the tools necessary to master this 
art, he prescribes ‘studying the practice”174.  This entails training and immersion in the law and 
interaction in the specific area within which a dispute of understanding arises. Wood’s 
prescription holds true within a domestic context that observe rules consistent with the spirit 
and obligation of the Covenant. 
Generally, the interpretation of international law is a critical tool in understanding the scope of 
duty bearers’ positive and negative obligation. Its importance can be gleaned from the fact that 
most adjudications between complainants and the autocratic state, whether under treaty bodies 
or domestic courts on right violations, have been centred on the extent to which these   states 
interpret their obligations under the Covenant. Shelton argues that, “as a matter of legitimacy,  
states have conferred on treaty bodies, a monitoring role, one of gathering information, 
developing a body of jurisprudence and engaging in constructive dialogue to further the object 
and purpose of the Covenant and to define and interpret the obligations contained in the 
Covenant”175. Under the rules of operation of the Covenant, the exercise of its interpretation is 
undertaken by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) which uses several mechanisms to 
interpret the obligation of   states parties. As an appellate jurisdiction for the right bearer, the 
HRC defers primary authority for treaty interpretation to the  states parties. Kerstin Melchem 
argues that the Committee’s interpretative role helps establish a “normative content of human 
rights and in giving concrete meaning to individual rights and state obligations”176.  The 
Committee, as Shelton also argues, uses General Comments (GC)177 as a device to express its 
                                                 
174 Richard Gardiner, “Treaty Interpretation’ (The Oxford University Press 2008) xiii. 
175 Shelton Dinah. (Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds) ‘The Legal Status of Normative 
Pronouncements of Human Rights Treaty Bodies. Coexistence, cooperation and solidarity’ 
(2011) Martinus Nijhoff Pubblishers 553, 559. 
176 Ibid 562. 




considered legal opinion on the scope of a right or obligations contained in one of the provisions 
of the treaty it supervises.178  For example, General Comment 35 specifies in a detailed manner 
the spirit of article 9 and the safeguards contained therein. Liberty of person concerns freedom 
from confinement of the body, not a general freedom of action while security of person 
concerns freedom from injury to the body and the mind, or bodily and mental integrity. It   states 
that “the right to security of person protects individuals against intentional infliction of bodily 
or mental injury, regardless of whether the victim is detained or non-detained”179. This involves 
taking action to prevent and to remedy. The General Comment sets it out as follows: “ states 
parties must take both measures to prevent future injury and retrospective measures, such as 
enforcement of criminal laws, in response to past injury” 180 . The General Comment is 
exhaustive in its detailed clarification of the scope of article. This broad interpretation ensures 
that   states parties do not use domestic law to restrictively interpret their obligation as was seen 
in the case of “Gorji v Cameroon”181. 
The interpretive doctrine of the Committee is dictated by the nature of the Covenant as an 
international human rights treaty and the nature of the rights under general international law 
and its case law. It is argued that the work of the Committee is very helpful or even crucial to 
the correct and comprehensive understanding of the object and purpose of the instrument and 
exact scope and meanings of the requirements set forth in its provisions.  While it is governed 
by the general principles laid out under articles 31-33 of the VCLT, its special status as a human 
rights treaty also gives the Committee specialised tools in its interpretation. The relevance of 
the VCLT in the interpretation of the Covenant could be seen in a 1986 case in which in 
interpreting the scope of article 22 of the Covenant, the Committee   stated that  
“in interpreting the scope of article 22, the Committee has given attention to the 'ordinary 
meaning' of each element of the article in its context and in the light of its object and purpose 
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(article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).  The Committee has also had 
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation (article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties)”182 
Relying on standard approaches of interpretation catalogued in the VCLT or its General 
Comments on the various rights does not mean interpretation of the Covenant is a static 
business. In Judge v. Canada, the Committee emphasised the dynamic nature of its interpretive 
doctrine as follows 
While recognizing that the Committee should ensure both consistency and coherence of its 
jurisprudence, it notes that there may be exceptional situations in which a review of the scope 
of application of the rights protected in the Covenant is required, such as where an alleged 
violation involves that most fundamental of rights – the right to life - and in particular if there 
have been notable factual and legal developments and changes in international opinion in 
respect of the issue raised183 
The necessity for dynamism was also seen in the dissenting opinions under article 14 in 
Akwanga v Cameroon and under article 6 in “Turaeva v Uzbekistan”184. Akwanga is discussed 
in detail in chapter 6, section 5. In Turaeva, the Committee   stated that “the imposition of a 
death sentence after a trial that did not meet the requirements for a fair trial amounts also to a 
violation of article 6 of the Covenant”. It however then concluded that there has not been a 
violation of article 6 in the case in question because “185. Despite this view, the Committee 
concluded that because the   state party had commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, 
there was no need for a separate consideration of the authors claim under article 6. In their 
dissenting opinions, Committee members Ms. Christine Chanet, Ms. Zonke Zanele Majodina 
and Mr. Fabián Omar Salvioli observed that  
In the interpretation of human rights law, and in the name of progress, an international body 
may amend a view it previously held and replace it with an interpretation that provides greater 
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protection for the rights contained in an international instrument: this constitutes appropriate 
and necessary development of international human rights law186 
As a Human Rights treaty, the Covenant is perceived to possess distinguishable characteristic 
to public international law and consequently needs special tools in its interpretation. Writing 
about this special status, Orakhelashvili argues with reference to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) that, the “obligations contained in the convention are of an objective 
nature and protect the fundamental rights of individuals and not the interest of the contracting   
states”.  The special character of the Covenant arises from the obligation of   states towards 
individuals. Concerned primarily with the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle 
of inter- state reciprocity has no place. 
The principle of non-reciprocity has also been reflected in the advisory opinion on reservations 
of the ICJ. It emphasized the special nature of the Genocide Convention by stressing its 
individual and holistic protection character. This principle is premised on the fact that while 
general international law regulates activities between   states, the Covenant regulates activities 
between   states parties and all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.  
Despite this emphasis, there is a limit to reciprocity. This limited nature of reciprocity is also 
the subject of Article 20(5) of the VCLT. Despite the non-reciprocal nature of the obligations 
in the Covenant, the Committee has invoked article 20(5) to deal with what it perceived as 
problematic reservations being entered by   states parties. 
The Covenant however fails to provide guidelines governing the interpretation of articles 2(3), 
7, 9, 10 and 14 even though on the other hand it has used the General Comments to, among 
other things, deal with ‘questions related to the application and the content of individual articles 
of the Covenant’.  The interpretation of the obligations related to the   stated rights depends on 
their status under international law. The Covenant’s interpretation as defined in its article 5 and 
the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee remain the guiding principles of the 
interpretation of articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14 and all other rights under the Covenant. The 
importance of these principles follows the broad nature of the codification of these rights under 
the Covenant, the changing social reality and the development of the jurisprudence of the 
Committee. However, like most treaty-based human rights systems, it only plays a 
                                                 




complementary role to the primary role of the  state in the interpretation, implementation and 
protection of these rights 
For example, article 2(3) has an accessory character. As Nowak wrote, a violation can only 
occur in conjunction with the concrete exercise of one of the substantive rights ensured by the 
Covenant. In concrete terms, a violation of article 2(3) will only occur when a   state party fails 
to provide effective remedy for a violation of any of the substantive rights in the Covenant187. 
The peremptory status of article 7 which forbids torture raises obligations that are absolute in 
nature.  The jurisprudence of the Committee has also dealt with the interpretation of article 
10(1) by putting in place certain minimum standards which state parties must respect. The 
interdependent nature of these rights is also a subject dealt with in General Comments 20. It is 
argued by the Committee that ‘the prohibition in article 7 is complemented by the positive 
requirements of article 10, para. 1, of the Covenant, which stipulates that, ‘all persons deprived 
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person’.  Even though article 9 appears as a qualified right governed by the principles 
of proportionality, acceptability within a democracy and within certain jurisdictions, its 
interpretation is broad to include protection of persons out of detention.  In other cases, the 
interpretation of certain rights might be intrinsically attached to certain broad-based principles. 
For example, the interpretation of article 7 is attached to the protection of human dignity. And 
while torture is separated to cruel inhuman and degrading treatment by the severity of pain and 
motivation, absence of both might still be interpreted as torture when perceived as infringing 
on the inherent dignity of the victim. 
Generally, interpretation is not a stand-alone concept. It is inter-woven in the complex 
multifaceted nature of human rights norms and the structure and nature of the different agencies 
involved with its utilisation. It is also dependent on whether the norm has a legal effect on the 
domestic legal system. International human rights norms in the form of laws and practices of 
foreign nations generally do not have any legal status in a domestic legal system, and therefore 
have been considered irrelevant in domestic judicial reasoning. In the case of Akwanga v 
Cameroon, the   state party dismissed accusations of torture by arguing that ‘torture and ill-
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treatment are of a criminal nature and therefore the onus of proof is on the author’. About 
allegations that the complainants’ rights to liberty and security have been violated, Cameroon 
argued that the SCNC is a secessionist movement, all actions of which are illegal and 
prohibited. In both instances, it failed to address its substantive obligation to investigate the 
claim of torture but rather focused its response on the steps it has taken to make the Covenant 
part of domestic reasoning. This approach cuts across many other autocracies within the same 
region. In responding to accusations of torture under article 7 of the Covenant in a case brought 
before the Committee by Zoumana Traore, Ivory Coast argued that Ivorian law (the Criminal 
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure) protects citizens from violations as serious as those 
alleged under article 7.  By citing the Ivorian Criminal procedure code, rather than focus on the 
specifics of the violation of article 7 raised by Zoumana Sorifing Traore, Ivory Coast 
emphasised procedural rather than substantive commitment to the Covenant. The emphasis on 
procedural commitment rather than on the specific steps taken to give effect to article 7 remains 
a disturbing trend that disregards both the reporting guidelines of the reporting process and its 
relevance in ensuring that these   states live up to their Covenant obligations. It is through such 
restrictive patterns of interpretation that Cameroon defends its own record as evolutionary 
which challenges the object and purpose of the Covenant.  
In line with its broad scope of interpretation, the Committee, in its views in Mariam Sankara et 
al v. Burkina Faso, stated that the interpretation of article 9 does not allow a   state party to 
ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction.   It is 
relevant to point out that Cameroon has consistently used ‘lack of resources’ to defend its 
incapability to protect the personal integrity of detained persons. It has deliberately ignored the 
scope of article 9(1) which has a wider field of application. In Dias v Angola, the Committee 
also   stated that article 9(1) ‘protects the right to security of persons also outside the context 
of formal deprivation of liberty’ and that any interpretation ‘which would allow a   state party 
to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons subject to its jurisdiction 
would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.’  
The nature of the Covenant dictates the interpretive doctrine of the Committee as an 




or even crucial to the correct and comprehensive understanding of the object and purpose of 
the instrument and exact scope and meanings of the requirements set forth in its provisions.’188  
The role of the state as the primary guarantor of human rights is shaped by the nature of its 
political system, the nature of its constitutionalism and the stability of its actors. As it is shown 
in Chapter 3 below, Cameroon has evolved from a colonial state under France and Britain to 
an independent autocratic system with a constitutionality governed by excessive executive 
control. This has shaped state institutions and the values and principles that informs governance 
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‘To understand the social and political dynamics of the human rights experience in Africa, it is 
necessary to begin in the colonial setting. It is within the colonial setting that the contemporary 




1. INTRODUCTION.  
Present-day Cameroon is a construct of two nations of distinct and highly competitive colonial 
legacies which have in a significant way, shaped its domestic political structure and influenced 
its human rights protection regime. Because constitutional systems matter in the protection of 
personal integrity and civil and political Rights in general, the influence of French colonial 
legacy on contemporary Cameroon constitutionalism fails to support the protection of these 
rights.  
Despite the tenuous coexistence of two legal systems in Cameroon, the argument that Common 
Law systems support stronger judicial independence relevant to imposing constraints on 
governments’ repressive tendencies190 is made redundant in Cameroon by simple political 
considerations which make the Civil Law system the dominant legal theory in the country. The 
assertion of Keith et al. is partially supported by the fact that the British Common Law system 
has tended to produce more explicit and in-depth constitutions; whereas, former, French 
territories have tended to adopt shorter constitutions that merely set a general outline of 
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governmental organization. 191  The argument that Common Law systems are designed to 
protect the individual from the  state is also defeated in Cameroon by the dominance of the 
Civil Law system designed to protect the interest of the  state. The protections offered by 
Common Law systems are in turn thought to be buttressed by a social commitment to the rule 
of law and institutional checks (e.g. an independent judiciary, separation of powers) that protect 
individuals from expropriation by the state.192 These elements are lacking in Cameroon as is 
shown in Chapter 4.  
Cameroon is a state-created through a marriage between international and domestic processes 
that have significantly shaped its political structure and domestic policies as far as the 
protection of specific human rights is concerned. Consequently, a proper understanding of its 
implementation approach to the rights of the Covenant under consideration would require a 
proper appreciation of the historical context that has given rise to the present political system. 
As Beth argues, human rights treaties do not exist in a vacuum. She argues that their negotiation 
and ratification reflect the power, organisation, and aspirations of governments that negotiate 
and sign them, the legislatures that ratify them and the groups that lobby on their behalf.193 
Consequently, this chapter’s principal argument is that the constitutional and judicial 
organisations that alters a state’s attitude towards human rights protection are primarily a 
function of the political order that shaped their construction. That is why the relationship 
between the nature of the domestic political configuration and the respect of personal integrity 
rights is a function of both a country’s historical development and its post-colonial construct 
as reflected in both its political and constitutional systems. 
The chapter begins with a brief historical sketch on the ‘creation of Cameroon.’ It goes on to 
discuss the two principal colonial systems whose influence greatly shaped Cameroon’s modern 
political system. French and British colonial legacies left a lasting impact on Cameroon’s 
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political system. It is not the aim of this chapter to give a detailed and chronological overview 
of the development of the political system and how it accumulated power to establish autocratic 
institutions that have led to the present-day system in Cameroon and its significance as a 
cornerstone of its implementation approach of the Covenant. Instead it attempts briefly to 
highlight the end of formal colonial rule as a setting for the creation of an independent 
autocratic Cameroon state and how such a political system has since been antithetical to a 
constitutional order favourable to the protection of personal integrity rights. 
Welch identifies three features of colonial rule that tended to hinder the protection of human 
rights.  
 Colonialism, he argued, created   states in which the promotion of self-government was, at 
most, a minor priority for the ruling powers until the last years of the colonial interlude. Little 
opportunity existed even after independence for redrawing the boundaries, helping to set the 
stage for political conflicts and later attempts at secession…’ After this first phase, he argued 
‘an authoritarian framework for local administration was installed, reducing most indigenous 
rulers to relatively minor cogs in the administrative machinery and leaving until the terminal 
days of colonialism the creation of a veneer of democratization. And lastly ‘European law 
codes were introduced and widely applied, notably in the urban areas, while traditional legal 
precepts were incompletely codified, relegated to an inferior position in Civil Law, and applied 
particularly in the rural areas. Legal recognition and protection of rights in the colonial   states 
of Africa were belated and inadequate, with constitutions hastily created at independence, 
being in many cases the first significant expression of them194 
2. BACKGROUND 
Since its independence, the state of Cameroon has been characterised by political murders, 
arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, as well as false and politically motivated charges of 
opponents, both real and imagined. The legacy of colonialism in shaping the political structures 
of Cameroon is undeniable. It continues to play a significant role in the harmonisation process 
in education, judiciary and the very nature of the political institutions that should undergird the 
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process of rights protection. Colonial policies and approaches are essential determinants of 
post-colonial political institutions and constitutionalism as ‘the idea of control over 
governmental power, which assumes the form of normative limitations and institutional 
diversification and operationalised in the rule of law and a specific mode of organising the 
institutions of government and their interplay.’195 
For example, post-colonial constitutions in Cameroon, rather than becoming a normative 
framework for the control of the powers of the state, became a foundation upon which that 
power assumed both legality and relevance. Quantitative studies in comparative politics and 
specific case studies have shown a strong correlation between the policies of the colonial era 
and post-independence constitutionalism. The influence of colonial-era politics on 
constitutionalism is particularly true for Cameroon because of the holistic inheritance and 
transplantation of colonialist policies and value systems adopted by the League of Nations196for 
France and Britain.  
The League’s mandate provision was adopted in the Trusteeship Agreement and vigorously 
pursued by France and Britain during their Trusteeship mandates in the Cameroons.197 Article 
5 (a) relating to Britain provided that Britain shall have ‘full powers of legislation, 
administration, and jurisdiction in the Territory’ to be administered in accordance with its laws 
subject to modifications necessitated by local conditions and subject to the United Nations 
Charter and the present Trusteeship Agreement. Article 4(1) of the Agreement relating to 
France was similarly worded except that it did not require French law to be modified to 
accommodate local conditions.  
The assumption in theory that the system bequeathed to Cameroon has impacted the nature of 
post-independence political institutions is supported by empirical evidence.  In their study of 
legal systems and constitutionalism in Africa South of the Sahara, Keith and Ogundele argue 
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that the nature of post-colonial political institutions empowered the executive excessively 
which, in effect, destroyed the independence of the judiciary and an executive-constraining 
organ. Makau also contends that the post-colonial state is a reflection of the colonial state. He 
argues that ‘the post-colonial  state was autocratic at its inception because it wholly inherited 
the laws, culture, and practices of the colonial  state.198 The colonial  state, he argues, ‘was 
specifically organized for political repression to facilitate economic exploitation.’199 Lee and 
Schulz posit that the men who built Europe’s colonial empires thought they were doing a favour 
to those whom they conquered. They argued that the institutional package that they brought to 
the colonies would ultimately lead to a higher standard of living and quality of government 
than that provided by the institutions they destroyed.200 Cameroon’s post-colonial scholar,  
Mbembe writes that such claims negate the re-ordering of society, culture, and identity and a 
series of recent changes in the way power is exercised and rationalised.201 He goes on to posit 
that the primary goal was not only to bring a specific political consciousness but also to make 
it effective.202 It is a reordering which was deliberate under French rule and inherited to benefit 
the autocratic puppets that have ruled Cameroon for the past 56 years. 
The goal of colonialism in Cameroon as has been elsewhere was universal: extract economic 
benefits for the colonizing government. However, France and England had fundamentally 
different approaches to their colonial rule. While they both wanted to exploit resources and 
create a profitable environment for their settler communities, France espoused an additional 
goal of transforming Cameroon’s populations into French citizens. Nonetheless, like 
Cameroon, other French West African colonies enjoyed close economic, political, and cultural 
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ties with the metropolis. The French and British rule in the Cameroons were structured around 
direct or indirect rule respectively. 
Direct rule favoured by the French deemed local structures of governance inadequate to meet 
immediate economic and long-term political goals; they, therefore, established ‘civilising’ 
parallel administrative structures. In what was to be a real reflection of direct rule was a 1924 
Decree which made applicable laws and decrees promulgated in French Equatorial Africa 
before to 1 January 1924.203 Crowder argued that while the French system gave the chief an 
entirely subordinate role to the political officer, the British system depended on the advisory 
relationship between the political officer and the native authority, usually a chief, heading a 
local government unit that corresponded to a pre-colonial political unit.204.The British also 
preferred adapting and using existing local structures in what became known as indirect rule. 
While international rules guided both systems either under the mandate or trusteeship systems, 
French post-colonial legacy has tended to have a more far-reaching influence on the 
construction of post-colonial Francophone African   states. Lee and Schulz summed it up this 
way: the two countries’ colonial practices in Cameroon differed on a number of dimensions 
identified as important in previous research: the legal system (Common Law vs. Civil Law), 
the nature of colonial rule (direct vs. indirect), labour policies (paid vs. forced), and the 
prevailing religion205.  
On a specific note, studies have also shown that French and British colonial legacies have 
different influences on post-independence institutions and the way they absorbed their 
obligations under human rights treaties and especially when it comes to repression of personal 
integrity rights. While many of these studies have focused on systems with uniquely French or 
British traditions, a few have focused on the effect of colonial legacy on both systems operating 
under a tenuous relationship within one system. Post-colonial Cameroon reflects the 
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administrative imperial executive structure of the fourth French Republic. However, unlike 
France, it was first governed by a single party with the president sharing powers with weak 
institutions that were immediately dissolved or simply became an executive façade under the 
control of the president. Prempeh submits that under such a system, parliament, where one 
existed, was under the de facto or de jure control of the president’s party, and its primary 
purpose was to provide a façade of institutional and procedural propriety to the president’s 
decrees.206 The proper scope of this control system is rooted in the historical evolution of the  
state and the externalities that have shaped that evolution. 
3. HISTORICAL SETTING 
Cameroon has a chequered history that is written depending on the political position of the 
writers. Its known history is traced back to the 15th century. Le Vine writes in his book on ‘The 
Cameroons’ that seafarers in the pay of a rich Lisbon merchant, Fernando Gomez, arrived, 
possibly in 1472, in the Blight of Biafra and visited the island of Fernando Po. At the estuary 
of what is now known as the River Wouri, ‘they were struck by the presence of immeasurable 
prawns which they named Rio dos Cameroes or River of Prawns’.207 Despite this discovery, 
the Portuguese failed to establish any fixed stations on the Cameroons coast. Fombad argues 
that the Portuguese highly desired to establish administrative footprints within these territories 
but malaria prevented any significant settlement and conquest of the interior.208 On the other 
hand, the British established a foothold in the armpit of Africa, specifically in what became 
known as British Cameroon as far back as 1847. In 1858, they took over an English missionary 
settlement at Ambas Bay in the Gulf of Guinea and named the British colony Victoria, after 
Queen Victoria. A British Missionary, Alfred Saker would later become the de facto governor 
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of the new colony in the absence of an officially appointed administrator.209 Thirty years later, 
in 1887, Britain sold the settlement to Germany which four years earlier (in 1884) had 
proclaimed by force a protectorate over mudflat area some 100 miles to the east. Le Vine wrote 
that the last remaining obstacle to complete German control of the Cameroons after forcefully 
dismantling the British Court of Equity in Douala, was the British colony in Victoria. The 
English Baptist Missionary Society sold its holdings to the Basel Mission.210 Following the 
British cession, from 1888 onwards, Germany slowly extended its imperial control from its 
original Kamerun protectorate to the contiguous territory that would later be known as the 
Southern British Cameroons. 
The first German governor, Julius von Soden, would later raise the German flag in Buea and 
made it the capital of the German protectorate of Kamerun. As far as German rule was 
concerned, the prioritization of trade over building viable institutions that could enhance 
governance. Le Vine explains that the German governor saw himself as a realist in 
administrative matters. He favoured corporal punishments and was unwilling to improve on 
the working conditions of native plantation workers, approved of keeping native girls as semi 
concubines in European houses, and generally felt that the primary mission of the White man 
in a colony exploitation of the economy, came before all other considerations.211 This pattern 
of rule would completely endanger German interests in Cameroon following the outbreak of 
the First World War.  
The German protectorate lasted only 30 years until the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914, but 
during those short years, the Germans negotiated and established the country’s international 
boundaries, set up the institutions of modern administration, and brought about the idea of 
togetherness amongst the peoples of the various ethnic groups and traditional   states of the 
territory. After the German defeat in 1918, its territories were taken as part of the Versailles 
agreement and divided between the French and British and governed under the mandate 
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system. 212  Article 119 read: ‘Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.’ It also had to cede all 
its properties within such colonies to any new government that should eventually exercise 
authority within that colony.  
3.1. THE MANDATE SYSTEM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC POWER STRUCTURES 
The Mandate System became the supranational body instituted by the Treaty of Versailles to 
oversee the transition of colonial territories which had become treasures of war to self-rule and 
consequently independence. The position of the League of Nations towards Mandates was a 
little peculiar. It had nothing to do with allocating territories under the Mandate but left it to 
the Powers; after the Powers had decided who was going to control what, then the League of 
Nations was to be a co-guarantor with the great powers. 213  Angie argues that “the task 
confronting the Mandate System was both unprecedented and formidable. It involved far more 
than simply bestowing a juridical status on dependent people; rather, it contemplated nothing 
less than the creation of the social, political, and economic conditions thought necessary to 
support a functioning nation- state”214. These conditions negated the contextual realities of the 
people of the Cameroons and imposed exogenous approaches to the nation- and state-building 
that disrupted in a significant manner the natural evolution of these societies. 
When the First World War broke out in 1914, British-led forces from neighbouring Nigeria 
overran areas that included the Victoria settlement which Britain had ceded to Germany in 
1887. At the same time, General Aymerich attacked from the French Congo while General 
Dobell led a seaborne expedition against Douala.215 A significant consequence of her defeat in 
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World War I was that Germany, as provided in the Treaty of Versailles, renounced and 
relinquished title and right to all her colonial possessions. The possessions in question included 
the Kamerun territory seized in 1916 by Britain and France as war booty. The territory was 
partitioned between the two Powers along what became known as the Milner-Simon Line. 
Britain administered the Western zone (comprising two separate areas, later known as the 
Northern and Southern Cameroons) under a League of Nations mandate. This area was the 
whole area it had overrun in 1914 at the onset of the War, and it became known as the British 
Cameroons. To soothe French pain and humiliation resulting from the crushing defeat of 
France by Germany in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, France was allowed to take the first 
German Kamerun protectorate proclaimed in 1884, naming it French Cameroon. The rest of 
this territory (comprising four-fifths of the total) was administered by France, directly from 
Paris. 
Out of the lost German colony emerged two separate and distinct legal and political entities, 
British Cameroons and French Cameroon. Each of these two political entities was placed under 
the Mandate System, the goal being the ultimate independence of the natives of each mandated 
territory. In its article 22(1), the Versailles Treaty emphasizes one of the core principles of that 
system thus: as a result of the war which has caused them to lose their former colonial sovereign 
… as a sacred trust of civilization, the well-being and development of peoples living in those 
colonies shall be the thrust of the Mandate. The central provision for the legal concept of the 
Mandate System was thus established by para. 2 that refers to the notion of sacred trust:  
“The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples 
should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experiences or 
their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept 
it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League”216 
In 1922 the League of Nations granted to Britain a mandate over the British Cameroons and a 
mandate to France over French Cameroon. These territories were categorised according to para. 
5 of article 22 as territories at such a stage that the Mandate must be responsible for the 
administration of those territories under conditions which would guarantee freedom of 
                                                 




conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. In doing 
so the League confirmed the 1916 Anglo-French partition put in treaty form in the 1919 Anglo-
French boundary treaty between the British Cameroons and French Cameroon (Milner-Simon 
Declaration). The frontier alignment between the British Cameroons and French Cameroon, as 
defined by the 1919 boundary treaty, was more particularly determined in the 1931 Anglo-
French boundary treaty (Graeme-Marchand Declaration) and confirmed once again in 1946 by 
the United Nations in the Trusteeship Agreement relative to the British Cameroons and the one 
relative to French Cameroon. 
The British Cameroons and French Cameroon were thus separate, new, legal and political 
entities created in 1922 by the political force represented by the Mandate System. The juridical 
basis of their respective existence and the international basis of the frontier between the two 
countries are the Mandate System, transmuted into the Trusteeship System after World War 
Two. The two mandates set off to fill the gap left by the Germans. They set up administrative 
structures reflective of their respective socio-political and legal systems. The French, for 
example, divided their territory into ‘the traditional circumscriptions, and these in turn into 
subdivisions’.217 The premise of this transfer of authority was consistent with this civilising 
approach to colonialism. This approach turned Cameroon into French and British territories 
within which they experimented their policies within.  
As Fombad argues, the League of Nations’ agreement with the French and British conferred 
on these two powers, in Article 9, ‘full powers of administration and legislation.’ The two 
powers were authorised to administer Cameroon in accordance with their laws and as an 
integral part of their territory, subject to such modifications as may be required by the local 
conditions.218 The legal foundation of such governance became the basis was the basis for the 
almost wholesale exportation of the English Common Law and the French Civil Law to 
Cameroon  
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The court system was also reorganised and presided over by French administrators and justice 
dispensed according to the norms and customs of the people as long as it was not in conflict 
with French civilisation. Le Vine   stated that the mandate ushered in a new phase of 
development in the Cameroons. The two Cameroons, he argued, were under separate 
administrations, and moved off in different directions, propelled by the force of colonial 
policies. As is shown below, the approach of the two colonial powers to their mandate, though 
premised under the same legal prescription by the League of Nations, produced two distinct 
systems that would shape their approach to the Covenant in different ways. 
3.2. BRITISH MANDATE 
In furthering the premise of the Mandate, the British Order in Council of 26 June 1923 divided 
its Mandated Territory of the British Cameroons into two parts: a southern part known as the 
Southern Cameroons and a northern part known as the Northern Cameroons. Each part was 
tagged with Nigeria in an administrative union and administered as though they formed an 
integral part of that country. By this act of the Administering Authority, the Southern British 
Cameroons became a distinct territory from the Northern British Cameroons within the 
international system and a distinct unit of self-determination. Carlson Anyangwe argues that 
based on this ‘disguised administrative union’ British Southern Cameroons then came to share 
with Nigeria, a common constitution, budget, administration, legal system and technical 
services.219 
The British adopted an indirect rule in British Cameroons and used traditional institutions in 
areas where they existed and tailored to fit British administrative needs. In Northern 
Cameroons where, traditional Fulani institutions were quite robust and indirect rule worked 
perfectly to achieve British political and economic objectives without a strong desire to 
restructure or alter social and political life. In the Southern part of the British territory, Le Vine 
wrote that the British found a bewildering array of tribal groups, clans, chiefs, and other 
traditional political arrangements. ‘In appointing native authorities, the British tried to maintain 
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natural political structures and natural ties of family or community’.220 These were done based 
on proper British assessment of ‘the nature of local socio-political structures and the objective 
of its mandate.  
Despite British efforts in maintaining traditional institutions and ensuring their participation in 
governance and other judicial aspects of the community, the British focus had been mainly 
administrative and economic. This focus meant that Britain failed to develop a British 
Cameroons political consciousness in fulfilling the objective of self-rule. To a certain extent, 
this explains why its two territories have never had the level of its nationalism that underpinned 
their different struggles. Instead, they developed stronger attachments to Nigeria as was the 
case with Northern British Cameroons and to Cameroon as was the case with Southern British 
Cameroons. The alignment became apparent in the UN-sponsored plebiscite of 11 February 
1961 in which the former voted to integrate with Nigeria while the latter voted to federate with 
Cameroon.   
Despite British focus on administrative and economic issues, a group of Southern British 
Cameroons intellectuals used their presence in Nigeria to develop a foundation for long term 
political involvement in shaping Southern British Cameroons emergence from colonial rule. 
The formation of the Cameroon’s Youth League (CYL) by a group of Southern British 
Cameroonians, was an important milestone that defined Southern Cameroons history. While 
the CYL was a common interest or mutual welfare association whose foundation was outside 
Southern Cameroons, their leaders became involved in Nigeria’s nationalist groups.221 The two 
founders, Dr. Emmanuel Lifafa Endeley and P. M. Kale, would later play an important role in 
Southern Cameroons domestic politics, with Dr. Endeley campaigning actively in 1961 for the 
integration of Southern British Cameroons into Nigeria during an UN-organised plebiscite.  
The approach to British rule that left existing traditional structures of power intact led to a high 
level of cooperation with its Trust Territory. On the other hand, the French managed their 
mandate by implementing policies of cultural and political assimilation, with the goal of 
creating French citizens out of their mandate. 
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3.3. FRENCH MANDATE 
The French mandate’s idealistic goal of civilizing the Africans stretched beyond dismantling 
local institutions including those left behind by the Germans. They included offering French 
citizenship and legal rights of Frenchmen to western educated Cameroonians.222 The French 
approach produced two sets of citizens with two sets of rights. The ‘subjects’ were subject to 
native customs while the ‘civilized citizens’ enjoyed civil and political rights identical to 
persons of French origin. Le Vine argues that this approach of administration stemmed from a 
paternalistic perception of the African; a perception that would have far-reaching implications 
concerning the conventional structures of governance invested in the Council of Notables, the 
native chieftaincies and the system of justice.223 
The civilizing process was overseen by elaborate political and administrative institutions, the 
most important of which was the Civil Commissioner for the colony who was responsible to 
the minister of colonies. The Commissioner possessed both administrative and military powers 
as other French colonial governors in French Equatorial Africa. They could appoint regional 
and district administrative officers including members of the Administrative Council (Conseil 
Administratif) – a body composed of the most critical administrative personnel and French 
notables used by the Commissioner for the colony discretionally as a matter of policy to 
gradually phase out customary institutions. 
The French also used the Council of Notables and the Chiefs to further policies conceived in 
Paris. The powers of the Chiefs were greatly reduced even before the creation of the Council 
of notables. Crowder argues that the French system placed the Chief in an entirely subordinate 
role vis-a-vis the political officer. The Chief was a mere agent of the central colonial 
government with clearly defined duties and powers. He did not head a local government unit, 
nor did the area which he administered on behalf of the government necessarily correspond to 
a pre-colonial political unit224. Though they found it impossible to immediately dispense with 
the services of the German-era Chiefs, they steadily reduced their autonomy and authority, 
                                                 
222 Alexander Lee and Kenneth Schultz.supra note 200, p.7 
223 Le Vine supra note 207 p.99. 




treating them as petty bureaucrats who could be hired and fired at will.225 This erosion, Le Vine 
argues, constituted another means through which the French sought to introduce a French-
created system of local control. Apart from taking away customary authority from the Chiefs, 
they were reclassified into three categories with sometimes overlapping territorial jurisdictions. 
Such a system has so far had far-reaching implications on cohabitation of different chiefdoms 
as claims of legitimacy and territorial delimitation have characterized the relationship between 
these artificially created and natural chieftaincies. One of the most significant aspects of this 
local control was its influence on the administration of justice. The German Schiedsgerichte 
(mixed courts) vested in the Chiefs were undermined with the reorganisation of chieftaincies 
in 1922 when judicial powers were transferred under the authority of French-controlled 
administrative authorities. The perception of Africans as people who needed European 
civilisation meant that Europeans and ‘évolués’ were subject to the laws of the mother country, 
while ““natives”“ were subject to local customary law, though this law was usually interpreted 
and enforced by the colonial administration.226 The system of the ‘évolués’ and ‘indigenat’ 
created a dual legal regime based on criteria that fractured society and created a class system 
that hugely benefitted the colonial project.  
French rule generally and effectively undermined civil society development and customary 
processes through the introduction of the ‘indigenat’ seen as discriminatory, semi autocratic 
administrative and judicial authority invested in the administrators and most importantly the 
suppression of native courts. Through the suppression and sometimes deposing and exile of 
natural chiefs, the French gradually took over the nerve centre of the structure of society and 
replaced them with French-tailored institutions and stooges. This would become the foundation 
upon which French policy during the Trusteeship period revolved. 
4. FROM TRUST TO STATEHOOD 
The Charter of the United Nations was adopted in June 1945 in San Francisco and entered into 
force on 24 October more than a year after the Yalta Conference of 1944. On 13 December 
1946, the UN created its Trusteeship Council to replace the Mandate System of the defunct 
                                                 





League of Nations. The Trusteeship system was established under Chapters 7 and 8 of the UN 
Charter as a mechanism to safeguard stability in a territory’s transitional process of attaining 
self-governance. The primary objective of the Trusteeship system was expressed in Article 76B 
of the UN Charter on Trust territories, as follows: 
‘to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the circumstances of each territory and its peoples and 
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of 
each trusteeship agreement.’227 
The experiences with the League of Nations Mandate System as one of the first international 
concepts of political trusteeship modelled on a Common Law trust serve as a background to 
the UN Trusteeship System.228 It could be the continuation of a more robust platform following 
the mode of termination of World War II. The Trusteeship system did not change the approach 
of the British and the French. If anything, it reinforced the approaches of the two trustees. 
Within both territories controlled by the United Kingdom and France, the policies and 
institutions put in place to oversee the transition were conceived abroad for the broadest 
application possible. While France’s Trust ambition as was with the Mandate system was to 
see Cameroon as its metropole assimilated in France, the British hoped that their two trust 
territories of Southern and Northern Cameroons would become integral parts of the 
administration of Nigeria.  
If the premise of the Trusteeship was to uphold the principle that the interests of the inhabitants 
are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the 
system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of 
the inhabitants of those territories, then the policies adopted by Britain and France in particular 
within the trusteeship period failed to achieve those objectives for the Cameroons. As is 
examined below, while France and the UK adopted direct and indirect rules respectively, the 
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unification of Cameroon produced a state of two conflicting political and constitutional systems 
which have since been unable to harmonize a system of governance to provide for the enabling 
environment for Covenant rights protection. 
4.1. UN TRUST TERRITORY OF FRENCH CAMEROON 
France, like the United Kingdom, received a mandate under article 73 to administer Cameroon 
based on article 76B of the UN Charter on Trust territories. At the onset of its Trusteeship, 
France aimed at integrating Cameroon into the French Union in line with its assimilationist 
policies under the Mandate System. This was governed by the French ‘general principle of 
subordination, centralisation and uniformity’ reflected in France’s 1946 constitution. After the 
Brazzaville Conference of 1944, France grouped French overseas territories into its Associated   
states and Associated territories. Cameroon fell in the latter category and its citizens given the 
right to elect representatives to the French National Assembly and the Council of the Republic. 
This French approach was facilitated by a premise of the Trusteeship agreement which 
guaranteed that Cameroon could be administered as an ‘integral part of France.’229 The premise 
of this agreement which is crucial to the internal political development of Cameroon guaranteed 
that France undertook to respect the primacy of the interest of the population of Cameroon and 
develop their gradual participation in the administration of their territory; ensure and safeguard 
their security and develop their economic interests and property rights; ensure the intellectual 
progress of Cameroonians by developing primary, secondary and technical education; and most 
importantly ensure freedom of conscience, speech and association. Crucial to this clause to 
administer Cameroon as an integral part of France was the right given to France to establish 
customs, and fiscal and administrative unions with other territories.230  
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This translated into the negation of existing indigenous structures and forms of governance into 
colonial structures and foreign modes of governance. The preferred policy of assimilation and 
acculturalisation was never inspired to create a self-government but to the erection of a system 
of governance where French Cameroonians “would participate in the central government of 
the French Republic dominated by the French” 231 . While the UN Trusteeship Council 
supervised these activities, nationalist groups which demanded the immediate unification and 
independence of both Cameroons were very critical of the clause which demanded that 
Cameroon be administered as an integral part of France.  
This clause split French Cameroon between evolutionary leaders who, despite their misgivings 
about France’s intentions, nonetheless aligned their political objectives towards greater 
association with France, and revolutionaries who wanted a clear break with French colonial 
policies. The evolutionary leaders led by former President Ahmadou Ahidjo formed the Bloc 
Démocratique Cameroonaise (BDC) highly favoured by France, while the revolutionaries who 
wanted immediate independence, reunification and non-interference were grouped under the 
first indigenous political party in Cameroon known as l’union des Populations du Cameroon 
(UPC) headed by its late charismatic leader Reuben Um Nyobe. The significance of these 
alignments in shaping the post-independence Cameroon constitutional system was enormous. 
Richard wrote that the significance of these constitutional developments in France for 
Cameroon was that the French administration, in order to counteract the development and 
popularity of radical elements and entrench its power on Cameroon, it used its control over the 
Chiefs and the agents of local administrations to encourage the growth of pro-colonial 
administrative tendencies and in many cases, ensure their election to the national and territorial 
assemblies.232 That was seen in the election in 1951 where the revolutionary party failed to 
gain a single seat in the Assemblée Territoriale (ATCAM). Before the election of 1951 a French 
decree of 9 October 1945, had instituted an Assemblée Representative du Cameroon in 
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Yaoundé (ARCAM). This was a Representative Assembly whose members would in turn elect 
representatives to the Paris Assembly. 
In 1956, the Mendes Reforms were translated into law No: 56-619 of 23 June 1956 which 
became the basis for a political and constitutional framework of the new state. It provided for 
the setting up of a legislative assembly in Yaoundé with 70 elected Deputies from a single 
college by direct universal suffrage, a government with ministers headed by a prime minister, 
Cameroonian citizenship, a flag, an anthem, and a motto. Ndille et al. argue that despite these 
initiatives the French kept a firm grip on Cameroon. The French National Assembly retained 
supreme powers over legislation, and its laws continued to take precedence over decisions 
made by the Cameroonian Assembly. The state public services, including the District Officers 
(DO) and Traditional Rulers, were placed under the office of the High Commissioner.233 
France granted independence to French Cameroon on 1 January 1960 and sponsored the new 
state’s admission to the United Nations in September that year. The post-independence leaders 
had been carefully selected through political manoeuvres and carefully crafted decrees and 
legislation to serve French interests and continue to construct Cameroon’s constitutional 
development in line with the image of France. Independence did not represent a clean break 
from the colonial era. Many would argue that the new era simply replaced colonialism with 
neo-colonialism, where the state was still coerced, or at least influenced, by the former colonial 
power and colonial policies leading to instability and political turmoil.  
4.2. UN TRUST TERRITORY OF BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONS 
By article 73 of the UN Charter, the administering power ‘recognize the principle that the 
interests of the inhabitants are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote 
to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present 
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of those territories.’ According to the Trusteeship 
agreement signed between the United Kingdom and the United Nations in 1946, Britain 
assumed full powers of ‘legislation, administration, and jurisdiction over the territory…’ also, 
it was granted the powers to ‘administer the Southern Cameroons according to its laws and as 
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an integral part of its territory, and with such modifications as may be required by local 
conditions….’234 It was on those basis that the internal configuration of Southern Cameroons 
concerning its political and constitutional structures were shaped. 
The assertion that trustees should abide by the basic objective of the trusteeship system, ‘to 
promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the 
trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence,’ 235  reflects the cornerstone of both the Mandate and Trusteeship systems. 
Gordon et al describe the emerging political systems as a hand-me-down suit never fitted to its 
new wearer. Western multiparty political systems, they argue, (hastily handed over to Africans 
experienced with only colonial despotism) did not ‘fit.’236 The Trusteeship System was no 
doubt merely a political cloud that obfuscated the continuation of colonial practices under a 
legal institution. The nature of the   states that emerged from this system and the subtle and 
sometimes brutal control that still exist under an imperial presidency is a direct reflecting of 
the nature of colonial policies. 
Up to 1960, the Southern Cameroons, though under international tutelage, was administered 
by Britain as part of her contiguous colonial territory of Nigeria. However, its distinct identity 
and personality, separate from Nigeria, remained unassailable. UN Resolution 224 (III) of 18 
November 1948 protected the Trust Territory from annexation by any colonial-minded 
neighbor. While acknowledging that the Trusteeship agreement made allowance for 
‘administrative union’, the resolution provided that ‘such a union must remain strictly 
administrative in its nature and scope, and its operation must not have the effect of creating any 
conditions which will obstruct the separate development of the Trust Territory, in the fields of 
political, economic, social and educational advancement, as a distinct entity.’237 
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In 1954 the Southern Cameroons became a self-governing region within Nigeria and gradually 
asserted its distinct identity and its aspiration to statehood through increased political and 
institutional autonomy, and in 1958 the British government   stated at the UN that the Southern 
Cameroons was expected to achieve in 1960 the objectives set forth in article 76 b of the UN 
Charter. The British position was in sharp contrast to its 1948 declaration before the UN 
Trusteeship Council in which British representatives   stated that: “…it is improbable that the 
Trust territory, given the artificiality of its territorial boundaries and the heterogeneity of its 
ethnical composition will ultimately become a separate political entity”’238. Another statement 
by the United Kingdom to the fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 
1958 clearly   stated that the Cameroons under the United Kingdom administration was 
expected to achieve in 1960 the objectives outlined in UN Charter article 76 and requested the 
Trusteeship Council to examine this position and that of its visiting mission. In resolution 1218 
(xiii) the UN Trusteeship Council to transmit its observations to the General Assembly to 
enable it in consultation with the administering authority to take the necessary measures to 
ensure the full attainment of the objectives of the Trusteeship system.239 
On 13 March 1959, in a move that undermined the spirit of Article 76B of its Charter on Trust 
Territories, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1350 (XIII) recommending a plebiscite 
in the Southern Cameroons to determine its political future. The Resolution was followed by 
another General Assembly resolution, 1352 (XIV) of 16 October 1959, ordering a plebiscite to 
be held in the Southern Cameroons ‘not later than March 1961’. The people of the Southern 
Cameroons were to pronounce themselves on ‘achieving independence’ by either ‘joining’ 
Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon.  
Following these developments on 1 October 1960, the Southern Cameroons became officially 
separated from Nigeria, and its Constitution Order in Council came into force. As a full self-
governing territory with all the instruments of power within legitimate state institutions like a 
house of parliament, Chiefs and a Prime Minister. The Southern Cameroons oversaw all 
internal matters except defense and foreign affairs that were overseen by the United Kingdom. 
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Before the plebiscite and subsequent federal union, the Southern Cameroons was fully self-
governing from 1954 to 1961. It was a thriving constitutional democracy operating a 
parliamentary system of government modelled after that of the British. During that period, it 
had two free and fair elections, a peaceful regime change, and a Constitution (the Southern 
Cameroons Constitution Order-in-Council 1960) based on values of democracy, the rule of 
law, an independent judiciary, an open society, a free press, freedom of expression and 
movement, human rights and accountability. 
On 31 May 1960, the Trusteeship Council adopted Resolution 2013 (XXVI) requesting the UK 
Government “to take appropriate steps, in consultation with the authorities concerned, to ensure 
that the people of the Territory are fully informed, before the plebiscite, of the constitutional 
arrangements that would have to be made, at the appropriate time, for the implementation of 
the decisions taken at the plebiscite”240. 
These Resolutions had far-reaching constitutional implications. The clarity of a vote to join 
Nigeria was reflected in the constitutional framework of Nigeria. With a robust decentralized 
system, the Southern Cameroons would have joined Nigeria as a full self-governing region. On 
the other hand, Cameroon was structured as a centrally-run Republic with a unitary 
constitutional framework and therefore needed far-reaching constitutional amendments to 
accommodate a Southern Cameroons with its Anglo-Saxon background. 
On 11 February 1961, Southern Cameroons voted to join the Republic of Cameroon and on the 
21 April 1961, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 1608 (XV) inviting ‘the 
Administering Authority, the Government of the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of 
Cameroon to initiate urgent discussions with a view to finalizing before 1 October 1961 the 
arrangements by which the agreed and declared policies of the parties concerned would be 
implemented.’241. It is instructive to note that for this Resolution to pass, 64 Nations voted for, 
23 against, while 10 abstained. La République du Cameroon, supported by France and French-
speaking Africa, except Mali, voted against. This resolution was supposed to be the instrument 
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of implementation of the vote of 11 February 1961 which would have then establish a Union 
treaty between the two nations.  
The United Nations, France, and the United Kingdom failed to implement this resolution 
thereby allowing Cameroon to oversee the unification process all alone. It did so by dictating 
the terms of the union and amending its constitution to create the federal constitution which 
became the foundation document of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. On 30 October 1961, 
Britain transferred sovereignty over the territory of Southern Cameroons to the Republic of 
Cameroon. It should also be noted that a similar plebiscite on the same day saw British 
Northern Cameroons voting to integrate into Nigeria. Similar policies of assimilation and 
neglect form the causes of the Boko Haram crisis in Northern Nigeria.  
The unification of French Cameroon and British Southern Cameroons in 1961 created a new 
state with an internal configuration at odds with its constituent parts. Both the institutional and 
cultural legacies under the Mandate and Trusteeship Systems which were wholly inherited by 
the French and British approaches to fulfilling their obligations under the UN Charter remained 
unchanged. Politics in Cameroon after the ‘termination’ of the Trusteeship System has been 
characterised by autocratic forms of rule, the erection of clienteles’ institutions, corruption, 
general economic failures and systematic violations of human rights. Apart from the impact of 
colonial rule, pre-independence political struggles shape the post-independence institutional 
setting, allowing the emergence of entitlement style governance and state building. It also laid 
the groundwork for the emergence of political parties along regional/ethnic lines and a patron-
client relationship. Such socioeconomic and political configurations fostered dictatorial 
consolidation politics marred by violence. 
5. THE BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 
As   stated above, Cameroon is a state of two nations put together through a flawed UN-
sponsored plebiscite that translated into outright annexation. These two nations inherited both 
French and British colonial legacies which significantly impacted their constitutional structure. 
There have been three constitutional periods of great significance. On 15 April 1961, the UN 
passed a Resolution recognising the results of the plebiscite which went in favour of union with 
Cameroon. It then invited the administering authority, the Government of Southern Cameroons 
and the Republic of Cameroon to initiate urgent talks in view of finalising before 1 October 




implemented. The Resolution was followed in 1961 by a constitutional conference organised 
to draw up a constitution that should define the federation of the two   states. The federal system 
that came into existence in September of 1961 was based on a two- state federation consisting 
of West Cameroon, that is, former British Southern Cameroons, and East Cameroon, the former 
French Cameroon242. This translated into a constitutional structure reflective of the colonial 
legacies of the two   states until the country became the ‘United Republic of Cameroon’ in 
1972 when a unitary system of government was introduced. The two federated   states had each 
retained their inherited colonial system of justice although this was under the control of a 
Federal Ministry of Justice.243  However, the early history of the independent and unified 
Cameroon was marked by strides towards complete political and legal unification.  
Soon after unification, president Ahidjo issued decree No. 61-df-15 of 20 October 1961 
wherein the Federation was divided into administrative regions with a Federal Inspector in each 
administrative region accountable to the Federal President. Ebune argues that the Federal 
Inspectors were empowered to represent the president in all areas of civil life and judicial 
matters ‘supervised and enforced federal laws and regulations, maintained order according to 
the laws and regulations in force, and had at their disposal the police force and gendarmerie, 
and federal services’.244 By this absolute decree, the president set in motion a process that 
would completely dismantle the economic and political structures of Southern Cameroons in 
favour of a more centralised  state which he could micro-manage. 
Despite this approach by 1964, two Federal Law Reform Commissions had been created to 
draw up a Penal Code, a Criminal procedure code, and several other Codes. Its only 
achievement was the 1967 Penal Code which remains the only reasonably successful 
legislation that reflects the country’s dual legal culture, although it was substantially based on 
the French Penal Code. Based on the unitary Constitution of 1972, Ordinance no.72/4 of 
August 26, 1972, which has been amended several times, a civilian-style unitary system of 
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courts was created to replace the different court structures that had operated in the two   
states.245 Nevertheless, the new Constitution of 1972 sought to preserve the integrity of the two 
legal systems. In its article 38, the drafters   stated that, 
 ‘the legislation resulting from the laws and regulations applicable in the Federal state of 
Cameroon and in the Federated   states on the day of entry into force of this constitution shall 
remain in force in all of their dispositions which are not contrary to the stipulation of this 
constitution, for as long as it is not amended by legislative or regulatory powers.’ 
On this account, despite the unified court structure, the two pre-independence legal systems 
continued to operate. 
Also, the two constitutional systems guaranteed the rights of their various citizens from being 
subjected to torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment, and protected their rights to 
personal liberty and security.246 While the Cameroon constitution of 1960 presented blanket 
protection of these rights in the preamble, the Southern Cameroons Order in Council was quite 
explicit in its protection and included specified limitations. For example, the protection of 
torture was expressed in these terms: ‘No person shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading punishment or other treatment’.247 In sharp contrast to the 1996 constitution, the 
preamble of the 1960 constitution was not considered an integral part of the constitution, 
thereby making the vague rights protection non-justiciable. 
Another significant difference in the two constitutional systems which is critical in today’s 
constitutionalism in Cameroon was in a judicial review of civil and political rights legislation. 
The Southern Cameroons Order in Council provided in its section 86(1) the possibility that 
‘any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this chapter has been contravened in 
relation to him may apply to the High Court of the Southern Cameroons for redress.’248 
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The Federal constitution which was considered a highly developed amendment of Cameroon’s 
1960 constitution entrenched civil and political rights as contained in both the UDHR and the 
UN Charter.249 As a result of this, despite the unified court structure, the two pre-independence 
legal systems continued to operate. 250  Issues of human rights 251 and administration of 
justice252were maintained under Federal jurisdiction with enormous presidential authority in 
ensuring both their independence253and the viability of the judiciary. In 1972, the Federal 
system of governance was replaced by a unitary system which translated into the dissolution 
of the two separate judicial system. 
5.1. POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 
So far, the first part of this chapter has clearly shown the strong correlation between colonial 
policies and the emergent state since these colonial   states were the determining factors that 
conditioned the countries’ development. Political turmoil defined the construction of the 
Cameroon state. This turmoil was defined by the nature of the colonial policies of the French 
and the competing approaches of domestic forces fighting to terminate it.  
As Awasom wrote:  
‘…this political turmoil was the handiwork of French administrators who indulged themselves 
in the uphill task of exterminating anti-French Cameroonians. Prime Minister Ahidjo used the 
turmoil as a pretext to obtain emergency powers from parliament to design Cameroon’s [first] 
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constitution. The constitution was adopted in a referendum while a state of emergency was in 
force, [and] the French army was protecting the Ahidjo government against its citizen.’254 
In the French Cameroon, the unitarist presidential system of the state was highly influenced by 
the structure of the French Fifth Republic which concentrated powers in the executive. On the 
other hand, in the former British Southern Cameroons, the brief parliamentary system of 
governance was a replica of the British Parliamentary democratic order. Both nations evolved 
based on the values and norms of their respective colonial masters until 1 October 1961 which 
saw the creation of a federal system in response to the vote of 11 February 1961 in Southern 
Cameroons to form a federation with the Republic of Cameroon. Since 1961, the structure of 
the state has reflected the unitarist presidential system with enormous powers to legislate and 
adjudicate resting with the executive. 
Based on this unitarist presidential configuration, there are 10 regions, 58 divisions, 269 sub-
divisions, and 53 districts. There are 10 regional governors and 58 divisional officers. The 
President appoints these administrative officials who are organized under the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD). These administrative officers 
represent the President in the local regions to decentralize the seat of government from the 
capital city, Yaoundé.255  
5.2. SYSTEM OF LAWS 
As indicated in section 3.4 the premise of the League of Nations agreement was governed by 
its article 9 which granted ‘full powers of administration and legislation’ to both Britain and 
France to govern their respective territories. The two powers were authorized to administer 
Cameroon per their laws and as an integral part of their territories, subject to such modifications 
as may be required by the local conditions. Consequently, this became a conduit through which 
the Common and Civil Law systems were introduced as the primary sources of law in 
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Cameroon. The arrangement under article 9 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was 
transferred to the Trusteeship system as is evident by the preamble of the Nigeria Order in 
Council of 1946, replacing the Cameroons under British Mandate Order in Council 1923, as 
amended by the Cameroons under British Mandate Order 1932. This provided that ‘whereas 
the intention has been expressed that, notwithstanding the termination of the existence of the 
League of Nations, the Cameroons shall continue to be administered following the obligations 
of the said Mandate until other arrangements have been agreed between the Mandatory Power 
and the United Nations...’ 
Because the Southern Cameroons was initially administered as an integral part of Nigeria, the 
laws introduced by Britain to the Nigerian system were transferred to the Southern Cameroons. 
As indicated earlier, the real source of the Common Law into Southern Cameroons was the 
British Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890. This Act granted Britain sweeping powers to exercise 
or even alter the laws of its foreign possessions. Mikano Kiye argues that one of the most 
influential pieces of legislation enacted by the British was the Southern Cameroons High Court 
Law of 1955. 256  It governed the administration of justice by the colonial High Court of 
Southern Cameroons. This law was the domestication of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act into 
Southern Cameroons and became the source of law all through British administration and 
beyond. This involved the Common Law, doctrine of equity. 
On the other hand, the source of laws in French Cameroon has been holistically French and 
French-derived laws which were both imported and made by French colonial administrators 
respectively. Like in the case of Southern Cameroons, the instruments of French laws in 
Cameroon were also anchored in article 9 of the League of Nations agreement between France 
and Britain which granted both countries ‘full powers of administration and legislation’. 
Generally, in French speaking colonies, the primary source of procedural and criminal laws 
was the Code d’instruction Criminelle and the French Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808. 
This Code was introduced into French Equatorial Africa via Senegal in 1903 and was rendered 
applicable to Cameroon by the Decree of 22 May 1924. France passed a decree in 1924 which 
became the source of French authority to legislate within Cameroon which   stated that, ‘the 
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Commissioner of the Republic shall promulgate Statutes, decrees, orders and regulations made 
by the Government of the mandatory state, as well as orders and regulations made by the 
Government of the mandated territory’. That notwithstanding, these statutes, decrees, and 
regulations that were in force in France were not to be rendered executory in Cameroon except 
by decrees of the French Head of state. In May 1924, another decree indicated that ‘Statutes 
and decrees promulgated in French Equatorial Africa before the 1st day of January 1924 are 
hereby rendered executory in the territory of Cameroon placed under French mandate. The 
powers conferred on the Governor-General and Lieutenant Governors by those instruments 
shall devolve on the Commissioner of the Republic.’257 
The federal system of government that came into place and its subsequent dismemberment in 
1972 and 1984 gradually strengthened the ascent of French and French-derived laws in 
Cameroon. These laws coexisted with a political structure that strengthens executive powers 
over legislative prerogatives and judicial oversight.  
Colonialism, whether in its pure and unregulated form or disguised under the Mandate or 
Trusteeship system, profoundly altered the political and constitutional structure of Cameroon. 
First, the basic shape of the state itself was the consequence of European administrative 
convenience or imperial competition. It was a phenomenon seen across the continent. On 
Rwanda, Melvern posits that its great divisions might have been more natural to heal and its 
tragic history somewhat different had it not been for the involvement of outside interest.258 The 
influence of Belgium and then France shaped Rwanda’s institutional dynamics which 
influenced policy choices in a more dramatically. Like most other trustees, they tailored 
socioeconomic and political systems based on their subscribing ideology. Trust Territories 
under the capitalist system adopted a ‘marketisation and liberalisation’ approach to both 
nations- and state-building which prioritise civil and political rights over economic, social and 
cultural rights. It is tempting to agree with Mandani when he uses the genocide in Rwanda to 
argue that political economy alone as a framework of analysis fails to explain why post-
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independence strives in Africa cut across social classes rather than between them259and that the 
political legacy of colonialism and the colonial state is a legal, institutional complex.260. These 
systems dictated the nature of the political systems and the priority of the regimes concerning 
the protection of human rights. 
French and British colonialism altered the political and constitutional structure of the state of 
Cameroon and its implications for the protection of human rights. Like most other African 
countries, the political system in Cameroon since its independence in January of 1960 reflects 
the pre-independence political configuration instituted under the trusteeship system. It is highly 
structured on the French model that centralises substantial powers in the executive. It is a form 
of personal rule-oriented constitutional structure based on loyalty to the President as opposed 
to institutions, which are regularly monitored and controlled to ensure that they do not achieve 
any balance of power that could threaten the system.261 Richard submits that under such a 
system, multiparty politics was abolished, criticism of the government was repressed through 
stringent laws circumscribing freedom of speech, while activists were arbitrarily arrested, 
detained and tortured.262 
Cameroon’s human rights regime is informed by this complex historical experience, which has 
had far-reaching implications on its legal framework, political structure, and constitutional 
order. As a product of both the France and British colonial heritage, the attempt by successive 
Cameroon Presidents at unifying the two systems through coercive assimilationist policies has 
created tensions between the two peoples that threaten the state.  
It is a tension expressed by Neil Walker as follows: 
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The desire by the francophone leadership in Cameroon to eliminate any trace of the 
Anglophone system through constitutional amendments of ‘dubious legality’ remains the 
political context in which Cameroon constitutionalism is evolving. If constitutionalism matters 
in the general protection of human rights and its obligation under the Covenant, then those 
normative standards that are geared at pre-empting the arbitrariness and tyranny that inheres in 
the over-concentration and uncontrolled exercise of power must be observed to the letter263 
The languages of rights and colonial paternalism coexist. The role of international law during 
the mandate period was partly to regulate the relationship between the colonising and the 
colonised state. But as Anghie argued ‘the contradiction within the mandates was that their aim 
was to further self-government, but at the same time they created a structure that replicated 
colonial relationships.’264 This contradiction has been shown in the almost whole exportation 
of colonial law and practices into Cameroon legalised by the mandate agreement with Britain 
and France and sanction by article 9. This wholesale exportation of law and practice has created 
a political structure deficient in accommodating a constitutionalism that can guarantee these 
rights. The domestic constitutional enabling framework for the implementation of these rights 
within this political structure has been shaped by colonial factors. Article 45 of the 1996 
Constitution is still modelled along the lines of article 55 of the 1958 French Constitution. Of 
interest to this study is the 1972 constitution with amendments in 1996, 2008 and 2015 in which 
significant entrenchment of these rights have been achieved and some modest attempt made at 
entrenching the separation of powers. However, as it is discussed below, the overlap of 
constitutional authority works in favour of the executive and undermines in a significant way 
the protection and realization of the rights considered herein. 
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DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK FOR COVENANT IMPLEMENTATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In acceding to the Covenant and through such activities as individual communication and state 
reporting265 mechanisms,   states parties send a signal of their desire to respect their obligations 
under the Covenant. Yet in practice, there exist a considerable limitation and a lack of desire 
for actual protection of these rights. One of the problems, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui argue, is 
that global human rights treaties supply weak institutional mechanisms to monitor and enforce 
regime norms, offering governments the incentive to ratify human rights treaties as a matter of 
window dressing…’266 These weak institutions are reflected in both domestic institutions like 
weak constitutionalism that translates into a lack of judicial independence, over-encroaching 
executive prerogatives and a weak role of the Human Rights Committee at the international 
monitoring and enforcement level. In a May 2012 paper presented at the annual conference of 
the International Studies Association, Von Stein argued that some autocrats operate by creating 
an air of legitimacy and authority.267 It is through such a repressive mechanism, he contends, 
that such autocratic systems regularly test their relevance.  
While most societies – whether democratic or autocratic – engage in some form of domestic 
repression, the peculiarity with autocratic systems lies in the absence of an internal structural 
configuration on which citizens can rely to promote and protect their rights. Generally, Human 
Rights Treaties are only relevant within a context of viable domestic institutions which can 
protect human rights and hold violators accountable. Donnelly and Rhoda have argued that the 
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ability of citizens to enjoy their rights depends on an effective national system of enforcement. 
Such a system they argued requires the “separation of the functions and powers of government 
and the conferral of independence on the courts so that they may watch over and review the 
actions of other branches of the government”268. The absence of such a remedial institution 
including the separation of powers as a factor of the nature of the constitutional system and the 
assent it gives to the protection of these rights renders ineffective any human rights protection 
regime. 
Africa’s contemporary constitutions legalise opposition parties, impose term limits on 
presidential tenure, grant independent courts constitutional review authority, and guarantee 
essential civil and political liberties.269 Most of the autocracies in Africa South of the Sahara, 
including Cameroon, are presidential unitary Republics 270  with a presidential system of 
government, a multi-party constituted parliament and a judiciary whose independence is mostly 
guaranteed by the executive271. The exceptions are Ethiopia that operates a semi-presidential 
federal Republic and Nigeria, which runs a presidential unitary federal system with 
considerable powers devolved to the   states. The preamble of the Ethiopian constitution sets a 
tone that marks a departure from the turbulent past that inspired its present constitutional 
framework. Apart from entrenching human rights,272 a fundamental and foundational principle 
of the state, it also recognises diversity and devolution of powers in building ‘a single political 
community which is based on our common consent and the rule of law to ensure lasting 
peace.’273  
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Apart from the framework of constitutional entrenchment, International human rights law has 
created legally binding obligations for   states parties to adopt national laws to reflect treaty 
obligations and to create legitimate institutions to ensure that these rights are guaranteed. The 
ability for citizens to enjoy their rights depends primarily on these national enforcement 
regimes, including the availability of remedies when these rights are violated. Donnelly once 
more argues that national law, legal institutions, the principle of the rule of law, and substantive 
rules -- are essential to assuring that the state operates as the protector rather than a violator of 
human rights.274 
As has been shown in Chapter three, the political trajectory of Cameroon to full sovereignty 
and political independence has been fraught with institutional limitations which have put rights 
protection in conflict with the political aspirations of the executive. Consequently, it needed 
some measures of domestic action for the Covenant to be implemented as domestic law. 
Generally, this has depended on the relationship between the Covenant as an international 
treaty and the domestic law in Cameroon. This relationship has also depended on whether the 
Covenant has direct applicability or needs prior legislation to be invoked and how this 
legislation is crafted to give effect to Cameroon’s obligation under the Covenant. Article 2 
para.1 of the Covenant addresses this as follows: 
‘Each   state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. 
This could be construed as ensuring direct applicability until it is read together with para. 2: 
‘Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each   state party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or 
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other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant’. 
In its General Comment No. 31 of article 2, the Human Rights Committee has   stated that:  
     ‘Article 2, para. 2, requires that   states parties take the necessary steps to give effect to the 
Covenant rights in the domestic order. It follows that, unless Covenant rights are already 
protected by their domestic laws or practices, state Parties are required on ratification to make 
such changes to domestic laws and practices as are necessary to ensure their conformity with 
the Covenant. Where there are inconsistencies between domestic law and the Covenant, article 
2 requires that the domestic law or practice be changed to meet the standards imposed by the 
Covenant’s substantive guarantees. Article 2 allows a   state party to pursue this in accordance 
with its own domestic constitutional structure and accordingly does not require that the 
Covenant be directly applicable in the courts, by incorporation of the Covenant into national 
law’ 
In recent years and in the face of domestic political resistance and the threat from Boko Haram, 
Cameroon’s priority has changed from locking in with its international obligations under the 
Covenant to national security, and this has translated into legislation which has had more 
executive rather than legislative and judicial ascent. The role of the legislature is critical in 
defining the parameters on how defined laws are translated including the enabling domestic 
environment for the rights incorporated to be invoked in domestic courts275  and critically too, 
to the political, administrative and judicial organisation.276  
This chapter thus outlines the constitutional incorporation of the rights to effective remedy as 
defined under articles 2(3), the prohibition of torture as forbidden under article 7, the right to 
security of person under article 9, the humane treatment of persons in detention under article 
10, and the right to fair trial as provided under article 14. It then considers the role of the 
judiciary in the implementation of state obligations under these provisions and finally examines 
the role of administrative procedures in the implementation process. The chapter determines 
that the national framework for the implementation of these rights in Cameroon is inadequate. 
This inadequacy is due to excessive executive control in the making, interpretation, and 
application of the law compounded by the way the institutions responsible for implementation 
are structured. Powell and Staton have argued that “effective domestic enforcement is not only 
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a function of the power of the courts to set a limit on state behaviour but also of the 
government’s expectations whether victims of repression will seek legal redress”277 . The 
expectation of a government to respect and ensure to its citizens the rights in the Covenant 
must be reflected in the way it has structured its national political and constitutional 
environment to ensure that accession to the Covenant finds an accommodating domestic 
environment that can translate into rights protection.  
2. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
Cameroon’s constitution does not exist in a political vacuum. It functions within a multi-
layered hierarchical political bureaucracy with competing interest. The system that has 
absorbed the political opposition as accessories to the survival of the  state and the laws that 
supposedly project a liberal, open and transparent political order. Such an order Prempeh 
argued, may be associated with the jurisprudence of executive supremacy that regards the ‘ 
state’ (personified in an omnipotent chief executive), and not a supervening constitution, as the 
source, juridically speaking, of all ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms.’278 It may equally relate both to the 
form of the institutional arrangements adopted in given societies, but also to the effectiveness 
of the constitutional order as a whole, especially that of protecting human rights against the 
legislature.279 Neil has also argued that the historical preoccupation of modern constitutions 
amongst others is directed against the dangers of tyranny or arbitrariness associated with the 
concentration of political power.280  Beyond hindering the dangers of tyranny, Gavison sets out 
three essential pillars of a constitution. First, to both authorise, and to create limits on, the 
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powers of political authorities. Second, to enhance the legitimacy and the stability of the 
political order. Third, to institutionalize a distinction between ‘regular politics’ and ‘the rules 
of the game’ and other constraints (such as human rights) within which ordinary politics must 
be played.281 Like other constitutional scholars have argued, it is also useful for constitutions 
to be reflective of the socioeconomic, political and cultural contextual realities of the country 
in question. Such a reflection will go a long way to prevent the kind of wholesale exportations 
experience during immediate post-independence constitutions. Such constitutions should, at 
their barest minimum, ensure the separation of powers between the three arms of government, 
entrench fundamental civil and political rights and provide a firm basis to avoid executive 
amendment of the constitution. Constitutions, Lutz also argued, may not describe the full 
reality of a political system but when carefully read they are windows of the underlying 
realities.282 
Post-1990 constitutional amendments in Cameroon have been sold to the people and the world 
as a body of norms designed to mitigate or eliminate the perennial ills of autocracy that have 
in most African countries translated into massive curtailment of rights. Such curtailment led to 
declining economic development associated with exclusion of vast sections of the society and 
political instability associated with  state impunity. While many of the amendments in the post-
independence Cameroon constitution have considerably opened up the political space for the 
ordinary person, they have not adequately addressed the institutional weaknesses that made 
dictatorship and the concomitant repression, corruption, and economic mismanagement 
inevitable.283 
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3. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF POWER 
Cameroon is a political construct of two nations coexisting in a tenuous relationship. These 
two nations inherited both French and British colonial legacies which significantly impacted 
their constitutional structure. The 1996 and 2008 constitutional amendments defined the 
constitutional structure of modern-day Cameroon and the way this constitution absorbs the 
notion of rights protection. It has one of the most complex autocratic structures of power. The 
impact of colonial legacy on both the political and constitutional structures and the way they 
impact their human rights regime is more visible on the nature of their constitutionalism. It 
inherited a constitutional system drawn overwhelmingly from patterns familiar with the 
departing colonial power, hence reflecting assumptions far more common in the metropolis 
than in particular African societies. 284  This has also translated into a jurisprudence of 
supremacy that regards the  state and not the constitution as the juridical source of all rights 
and freedoms.285 Their Civil Law tradition reinforces the notion of the  state as supreme and 
citizens as subservient to the  state. These attributes have had huge implications on rights 
protection, interpretation, and enforcement. 
The 1996 constitution in which significant entrenchment of these rights are spelled out and 
some modest attempts made at entrenching the separation of powers is the central focus of this 
analysis. However as shall be examined below, the overlap of constitutional authority works in 
favour of the executive and undermines in a significant way the protection and realization of 
the rights considered herein. 
3.1. 1996 CONSTITUTION; THE NEW FACE OF CAMEROON’S CONSTITUTIONALISM 
For a legal environment to be conducive to impact litigation, there is a need to have a 
constitution which entrenches human rights; a constitution with a bill of rights in which 
protected rights are justiciable. Is it currently the case? Besides, the courts and especially 
constitutional jurisdictions should be accessible to all persons in all matters, especially in 
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constitutional review-related matters and not only in electoral disputes as is currently the case 
generally. The constitution defines the relationship between the government and the people; it 
defines the laws and regulates the powers and interactions between the different centres of 
powers. 
The Cameroon constitution defines the rights and obligations of citizens and demarcates the 
powers of the various arms of government. It is the embodiment of the rules, norms, and 
mechanisms through which personal integrity rights can be protected. The role and relationship 
between the different centres of power are as important as the rules they are created to enforce. 
Constitutional power in Cameroon like in most constitutions is distributed between the 
executive, legislature and judiciary. Unlike the fourth French Republic where the French vested 
supreme authority in the National Assembly, the Cameroon constitution is modelled after the 
constitution of the fifth French Republic where the centre of power rests in the executive arm. 
However, unlike the French where legislative and judicial independence can have checks on 
the executive, the constitution of Cameroon prides itself on executive supremacy associated 
with matters of judicial and legislation competences.   
3.1.1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
 The corresponding legislation in Cameroon for the implementation of the Covenant and other 
international treaties clearly   states that “the president of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify 
treaties and international agreements. Treaties and international agreements falling within the 
area of competence of the legislative power as defined in Article 26 shall be submitted to 
parliament for authorisation to ratify” 286 . This parliamentary authority, however 
constitutionally guaranteed, is limited to issues of fundamental liberties, civil status, penal 
procedures, political, administrative and judicial organisation, financial and patrimonial 
matters, social and economic programme and the educational system.287 This limitation is 
justified by the sweeping executive powers to legislate that is vested in the hands of the 
president with its impending implications on the sovereignty of parliamentary proceedings. 
These broad-based powers without any apparent limitations threaten primary legislation 
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enacted by parliament and potentially undermines human rights protection. Most legislations 
enacted to protect personal integrity rights and other human rights require enabling institutions 
for their realisation. These institutions usually require executive decrees to be established. For 
example, the Cameroon Penal Code was created by secondary law,288and despite subsequent 
amendments to the law, the old provisions have remained in force. 
The preamble of the constitution affirms Cameroon’s “attachment to the fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations and 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and all duly ratified international 
conventions…” 289 . These various treaties embody the principle for the protection of the 
inherent dignity of all persons. This is expressed in specific terms in the protection against 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, deprivation of liberty and any other action that 
impairs the protection of individual rights.  
The Covenant on ratification and publication effectively became part of the domestic law 
without the need for a separate legislative act for its incorporation.290 This has given ordinary 
citizens the opportunity to seek enforcement of their rights before national courts and tribunals. 
Any conflict that arises between any of the Covenant provisions and the constitution before it 
was ratified is resolved through a constitutional amendment as defined by article 44 of the 
constitution. The superiority of international law as outlined in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 291  over domestic law is a point explicitly grounded in the Cameroon 
constitution, as expressed in its article 45. This ensures that in the event of a conflict between 
domestic and international law, the latter will have priority. On a specific note, this means that 
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the Covenant ‘takes precedence over domestic law in the hierarchy of norms.’292  It is important 
to note that this section is given additional relevance by article 65 that makes the preamble, 
being the only section of the constitution that guarantees personal integrity rights and other 
rights, an integral part of the constitution. Before its 1996 constitutional amendments, the 
preamble was never considered as part of the constitution. After the amendment, the preamble 
has become an integral part of the constitution that can be invoked as a constitutional provision 
in the protection of these rights. The preamble outlines the state’s responsibility to see that, 
“every person has the right to life, to physical and moral integrity and humane treatment in all 
circumstances. Under no circumstance shall any person be subjected to torture, to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment” 293 . Despite outlining these rights in the preamble, the 
constitution is however very vague in the protection of Covenant rights articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10(1) 
and 14 and mostly deferring responsibility to secondary legislation. That means while the 
protection of these rights is outlined in the preamble of the constitution, their actual protection 
is spelled out by a separate law.  
The constitution is supposed to be the supreme law of the land and should, therefore, be very 
categorical and explicit not only on the protection of these rights but also on the mechanisms 
of their enjoyment and instruments of redress. Apart from the vagueness, several constitutional 
provisions undermine the constitutional implementation of the rights considered. The most 
important of this is the emergency powers provisions defined under article 9. The president of 
the republic may, where circumstances so warrant, declare by decree a  state of emergency 
which shall confer upon him such special powers as may be provided for by law.294 In the event 
of a serious threat to the nation’s territorial integrity, existence, independence or institutions, 
the President of the Republic may declare a  state of siege by decree and take any measures as 
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he may deem necessary. He shall inform the nation of his decision by message.295 While 
Cameroon has never officially entered a derogation under article 4 of the Covenant, it has 
imposed curfews, state of emergencies and used administrative actions and antiterrorism 
legislation to limit the enjoyment of certain rights.  
It must be noted that the rules governing situations of emergency are spelt out both in the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee296 and the Covenant 297 as   stated in article 
4(1): 
in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which 
is officially proclaimed, the state’s parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin 
Also, essential and necessary to this condition is the obligation of the   state party to officially 
declare298 a state of emergency unlike what happens in Cameroon where a de facto state of 
emergency has been in existence for more than 20 years. The executive has used state of 
emergencies and curfews to suspend due process, turn a blind eye on torture as a means of 
extracting information, incommunicado detentions, cruel inhuman and degrading conditions of 
detentions. In its 2017 report, Amnesty International noted that  
security forces continued to arbitrarily arrest individuals accused of supporting Boko Haram, 
often with little or no evidence and sometimes using unnecessary or excessive force. Those 
arrested were frequently detained in inhuman, life-threatening conditions. At least 101 people 
were detained incommunicado between March 2013 and March 2017 in a series of military 
                                                 
295 Constitution of Cameroon, article 9(2). 
296 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights supra note 1, article 4(1). 
297 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 29:   states of Emergency (Article 4)’ UN 
Doc. CCPR/C521/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). 




bases run by the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and facilities run by the intelligence 
agency299 
Article 9 of the constitution of Cameroon is quite important in giving clarity to the president’s 
excessive powers. In having the right to declare a  state of emergency and conferring extra 
powers to the executive branch, the president cannot be held responsible for any abuse that 
occurs during that  state of emergency. Apart from the accumulation of unwarranted authority, 
the president is exempt from prosecution in acts committed in pursuance of articles 5, 8, 9 and 
10 of the constitution and he shall not be accountable for them during the exercise of his 
functions.300  
The emergency powers to legislate by decree is solely vested in the hands of the president. This 
gives the executive alone enormous room to navigate in terms of the interpretation and of its 
powers and the limit of executive actions during a period of emergencies. 
3.1.2. THE EXECUTIVE 
‘With the president practically, and oftentimes legally, above the law, executive fiat and 
arbitrariness became a regular modality of rule in Africa, with damaging consequences for the 
rule of law’301 The US State Department, in its annual human rights report in 2017, describes 
the political system as “… a republic dominated by a strong presidency. The country has a 
multiparty system of government, but the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) 
has remained in power since it was created in 1985. In practice the president retains the power 
to control legislation”302 and a conformist parliamentary majority that facilitates the control of 
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the legislative process303. According to its 1972 constitution, as amended in 1996 and 2008, 
executive power is shared between the president, a prime minister and cabinet ministers whom 
he appoints. The president is the head of state,304 armed forces305 and despite the guarantee of 
judicial independence in the constitution; 306  the guarantor of the independence of the 
judiciary.307Fombad argued that politicians whose rule is threatened by the independence of 
the judiciary should never be constitutionally vested with the powers to guarantee its 
independence.308  
Beyond being the organ that guarantees the independence of the judiciary, executive control 
over the judiciary is sanctioned in article 37(3) of the Constitution, which puts the absolute and 
unfettered power to appoint, promote, and discipline judges all in the hands of the President of 
the Republic, the head of the executive arm of the state. According to the Commonwealth 
Latimer House Principles, Cameroon is still one of those Commonwealth countries where 
executive only appointment of judges still exists. According to the Latimer House principles, 
the appointment of judges should follow an independent process which must require a 
combination of legal safeguards and settled political conventions to be a reliable and legitimate 
means of appointing judges.309 While this principle recognises the peculiarity of different 
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domestic jurisdictions, the necessity for judicial independence, impartiality, competency and 
honesty will guarantee that different systems will uphold the rule of law. 
The president’s powers also stretches into the legislative branch with the authority to appoint 
one third of the members of the Senate. 310  Under the constitution, the legislative branch 
exercises parliamentary authority to legislate311 while at the same time the executive branch 
encroaches in this domain and exercises governmental powers to issue rules and regulations in 
the implementation of parliamentary legislation, 312 and considerable legislative authority 
exercised in the form of decrees and ordinances. The exercise of decree powers under certain 
circumstances is exempt from administrative court review. However, some exceptions have 
occurred in which executive orders have been deemed so ultra vires that ordinary courts have 
declared their competence to handle them. In the Wakai et al case in which more than 172 
persons were arrested and detained under executive prerogative without due process, the 
Bamenda High Court noticed that the extent of the violation of Convention rights was out of 
character that it could not be seen as administrative acts and so it declared its jurisdiction to 
hear the case.313  
Again, Fombad argued that the enormous powers given to the President of the Republic under 
the constitution to appoint, dismiss, promote, transfer and discipline judicial officers, especially 
judges and prosecutors, limits in a fairly significant way not only the independence of the 
judiciary but also the effectiveness of the separation of powers314. This concentration of power 
goes deep and has been institutionalised as reflected in the Cameroon constitution in defining 
the role of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) which assists the president in the appointment of 
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members of the bench and the legal departments.315 The promotion, appointment, transfer, and 
discipline of magistrates and judges pass through the hierarchy of the minister of Justice who 
makes proposals and recommendations to the presidency of the republic before it gets to the 
Higher Judicial Council. The Council is presided over by the head of the executive branch of 
the government who is the president of the country. The president promotes, appoints, transfers 
and integrates magistrates and judges into the judiciary. The president has the powers to move 
magistrates and judges from one department to the other. A presiding magistrate on the bench 
can be transferred to the legal department as a prosecutor and vice versa. In other words, there 
are no specific magistrates and judges assigned to the bench and the legal department. They all 
work interchangeably, i.e., the Court of First Instance and the High Courts, and the Office of 
the Attorney General at the levels of the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Courts, with the 
Minister of Justice as the hierarchical supervisory authority. This department supervises, 
controls and directs all investigations, and prosecutes same at different levels.  
The problem with this organ is its composition and its independence. There are 10 members of 
the Higher Judicial Council, including the president as the chair, the minister of Justice 
appointed by the president as the deputy chair, three parliamentarians who probably must have 
gained their seats through their allegiance to the statecraft and a single independent personality 
still appointed by the president and three senior judges all of whom are presidential appointees. 
This assisting body, in helping executive prerogatives in the appointment of judges, hardly 
meets the test of the Bingham Commonwealth principles. Another worrying executive 
intrusion which calls to question the independence of the judiciary is the power of the President 
to dispense of fixed retirement age for judges. The case of former supreme court Advocate 
General, Justice Ayah Paul Abine is relevant in understanding how the executive abuses power. 
Justice Ayah who was a group 1 magistrate was arrested and detained for his political opinions 
against the policy of sending French speaking judges in English speaking courts. According to 
Article 629 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  
when a magistrate of the judiciary is liable to be charged with an offense, the competent public 
prosecutor submits an application to the President of the Supreme Court, who designates One 
judge charged with investigating the case and three others, with a rank less equal to the one in 
                                                 




question, with a view to the eventual judgment of the case in the first instance. The President 
of the Supreme Court then indicates the city where the case will be judged 
Unable to put Justice Ayah on trial, the President of the Republic chaired a meeting f the Higher 
judicial Council on 1st July 2017 which decided to send Justice Ayah on early retirement. 
Another area of executive overstretch is in legislative intrusion, and the constitution empowers 
the president of the republic to legislate by way of an Ordinance for a limited period and for 
given purposes. 316  This is particularly troubling as this area of executive exceptionalism 
involves executive intrusion into constitutionally guaranteed rights. While the constitution 
guarantees the power of legislative prerogative over the passing of bills,317 the president can 
legislate by Ordinance in “safeguarding individual freedom and security”318.  
The constitutional structure of power between the three arms of government treats both the 
executive and legislature as powers, while the constitutional status of the judiciary is reflective 
of its status in the French Constitution 319  as an authority whose independence must be 
guaranteed by the executive. This diminutive constitutional status of the judiciary somehow 
accounts for the lack of judicial independence. This has far-reaching implications in judicial 
oversight in the protection of constitutionally entrenched human rights and the interpretation 
of state obligation under the Covenant. 
 
3.1.3 THE LEGISLATURE 
Cameroon’s legislature is a bicameral structure with a lower house known as the National 
Assembly and an upper house known as the Senate. The National Assembly is made up of 180 
members elected by universal suffrage for five years.320 The Upper House of the National 
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Assembly or the Senate was conclusively established with the election of 14 April 2013 of 70 
Senators, with 56 from the ruling Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) and 14 
from the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF), and the appointment of 30 others by the 
president of the Republic on 8 May 2013. Because of this appointment, four other political 
parties including the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP), the National 
Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP), the Movement for the Defence of the Republic 
(MDR) and the Front pour la salute National (FNSC) have a seat each in this Upper House, 
bringing to six the number of political parties represented at the Senate. The Senate made up 
of 100 Senators amongst whom are 20 women, and 15 traditional rulers went operational on 
14 May 2013 during its session as provided for by the law. The president’s party has an absolute 
majority in the National Assembly, and he appoints most members of the Constitutional 
Council which he chairs. By being the primary source of bills to be debated in Parliament, the 
executive branch apart from its ability to legislate by decrees, controls in a significant way the 
kinds of bills that are debated and adopted in Parliament.  
The ANDP and FNSC were once an integral part of the NUDP. All the leaders of these three 
parties including the MDR have been members of the government of the ruling CPDM and 
long-time political allies. The leaders of all these political parties have once been or have at 
one time or the other held top-level positions within the Cameroon National Union which ruled 
the country as single party dictatorship from 1966 until 1984 when it changed to the CPDM. 
The president therefore has a secure parliamentary supremacy and unquestionable executive 
powers which facilitates both the making, interpretation and enforcement of laws. For example, 
its 2014 antiterrorism law was debated in parliament and passed using the ruling party’s 
absolute majority in Parliament. Despite procedural flaws in its introduction, it was passed by 
the legislative branch, approved by the constitutional law commission and signed into law by 
the President. For example, Chapter 3, Section 11 of the law   states that, “the duration of 
remand in custody shall be fifteen (15) days renewable upon the authorization of the  state 
prosecutor”321.  The power vested by this law to the prosecutor is in direct conflict with the role 
of a trial magistrate who is constitutionally vested with the powers to decide on detention. Since 
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Cameroon’s independence, the ruling party has maintained its legislative majority and has 
increased its powers through four significant constitutional amendments, leaving both the 
judiciary and legislature as mere auxiliaries of the executive. 
Article 26 of the Constitution defines the legislative prerogatives of the Parliament, especially 
concerning the protection of fundamental rights. It guarantees the protection of fundamental 
rights and ‘safeguards the protection of individual freedoms and security.322 This is a critical 
area of legislative prerogative, especially in areas of entrenchment of state obligation under the 
Covenant. The gap in the convergence between its obligation on these rights under the 
Covenant and its practice can be narrowed by legislative actions to create an enabling 
environment for their protection. Parliament is the critical institution in law making, and 
represents the collective aspirations of the masses, translating such aspirations into laws and 
ensuring that executive action in the protection of human rights is regulated through adequately 
crafted legislation. Unfortunately, the executive is such a powerful and omnipresent institution 
that has the powers to amend the constitution at will, extend the mandate of the National 
Assembly or completely dissolve it. In examining the impact of excessive executive influence 
on the constitution, Ndifor concluded that: 
‘…based on three decades of legislative superiority and constitutional weakness, it is safe to 
conclude that the use of executive decrees for permanent, rather than temporal law-making 
undermines the standard legislative process. In the context of Cameroon, the extensive and 
uncontrolled use of executive decrees is evidence that the legislature is being marginalized and 
democratic institutions are ineffectual.’323 
It is in the backdrop of this reality that the judiciary operates as a weakened and dependent 
institution incapable of striking down primary legislation. 
3.1.4. THE JUDICIARY 
Cameroon has been described as having a bi-jural system with a tense co-existence between 
the Common and Civil Law systems. Fombad submits that “the bi-jural system or at least the 
remnants of it which exist today de facto, has no clear de jure constitutional recognition or 
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protection”324. The co-existence of these two opposing legal systems is traced to the colonial 
era which entrenched the Civil Law in the former French Trust Territory of Cameroon with the 
Common Law system in the former UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons with no 
constitutional protection. He also argues that in 1972, the Cameroonian constitution attempted 
to organise and structure the judicial system, but it left out any specific instruction on how the 
law would be applied in mixing Common and Civil Law and the effect it would have on the 
judicial system that the constitution was trying to create.325 
The political mix of both systems designed for progressive harmonisation has translated into 
the selected application of justice and has seen detainees under the Common Law jurisdiction 
being tried using Civil Law procedures. It is also noted in some politically charged cases of 
detainees being deliberately moved from the Common Law jurisdiction to avoid its strict 
procedural obligations of the presumption of innocence and right of the writ to habeas 
corpus.326 The overall scenario is captured by Fombad in his thesis on legal pluralism as an 
evolution of legal bijuralism within the context of dubious political legalism aimed at political 
absorption and assimilation 327 . This systematic attempt at political absorption alongside 
deliberations in structuring the judiciary in a way that challenges its efficacy and independence 
has far-reaching implications on the notion of fair trial, provision of minimum conditions while 
in detention, personal security and even torture.   
This sort of political system leaves a state without a stable constitution that guarantees personal 
integrity rights through the rule of law with an effective of powers between the legislative, 
judiciary and executive branches. It is a system in which Judicial independence coexists with 
an imperial executive organ that oversees and controls each department of the state and a 
weakened legislative branch, which is incapable of effective balance. Despite these institutional 
defects, the principles underlying the administration of justice are partially reflected in the 
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preamble of its constitution. Justice shall be administered in the name of the people328; the law 
shall ensure the right of everyone to a fair hearing before the courts and specific to this study; 
every person has a right to life, to physical and moral integrity and humane treatment in all 
circumstances. Under no circumstances shall any person be subjected to torture, to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.329 
Yet the force of the law depends strongly on its underlying principles and the institutions put 
in place to administer justice. In their study on the assessment of national human rights 
performance, Donnelly and Rhoda argued that, “the most effective internal checks require the 
separation of the functions and powers of government and the conferral of independence on 
the courts so that they may watch over and review the actions of other branches of the 
government” 330 . The institutional framework for judicial independence is outlined in the 
constitution and other ordinances issued by executive decrees. Despite this framework, the 
executive controls the tools that guarantee the independence of the judiciary as a direct means 
of enhancing its own powers. Apart from appointing judges, the executive determines their 
salaries through decrees, controls the Higher Judicial Council that oversees the discipline of 
judges331 and can decide on the retirement and promotion of judges without an independent 
review process. While judges of the fourth grade are required to retire at age 65, third grade 
ones at 60 and first and second grade judges at 58332, the president may by decree dispense 
with the retirement age. 
The corresponding structure for the administration of justice rests at the heart of the conflict 
between judicial powers and its independence and executive control or oversight. Despite its 
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unique status,333 Cameroon’s judicial system is structured in a manner that reinforces its 
subordination to the executive. The most repressive machinery of the state, that is, the police, 
army, and gendarmerie, are all extensions of the executive arm and oversee critical aspects of 
human rights protection associated with judicial oversight, including arrests, detentions, and 
pre-trial investigations. These executive appendages can stretch their powers into the judicial 
realm through administrative actions in the area ordering detentions. With such a level of 
executive intrusion and control of the judiciary, the executive frustrates most attempts at 
holding public officials to account. Powell and Staton have argued that effective domestic 
enforcement of either constitutional or Covenant provisions is not only a function of the power 
of the courts to set a limit on  state behaviour but also of the government’s expectations whether 
victims of repression will seek and receive legal redress.334 Such a system will also depend on 
how accessible it is to the ordinary citizens and how it is structured to render justice to the 
unjustly afflicted. 
3.1.5. GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
There are two main judicial centres of power that oversee the implementation of the law. Judges 
of the bench preside over cases and according to the constitution “their activities shall be guided 
by the law and their conscience”,335 while prosecutors form part of what is known as the legal 
department. The legal department functions to enforce laws, judgments and in criminal matters 
undertakes investigations, issue warrants and general prosecutions and investigations.336 The 
Prosecutor General heads it at the level of the Appeals and Supreme Courts, and answerable 
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directly to the ministry of Justice337 and by a  state Counsel at the level of the High Courts and 
Courts and answerable to the General Prosecutor of the Appeals Court within that geographic 
region. The legal department shall, as provided for in this section, comprise the magistrates in 
the legal department of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Court 
of First Instance.338 
 Although the court system in Cameroon is decentralised, adjudication of the violation of 
personal integrity rights remains complicated. Fombad argued that,  
the effect of the 1972 Judicial Organisation Ordinance, which has since been amended on 
several occasions, is that English Common and French Civil Law continue to co-exist, however 
uneasily, in both parts of Cameroon, but are now applied within an essentially civilian-style 
court structure. It is this court structure that operates in both legal districts of the country339 
The enforcement regime of the judiciary is significantly affected by the executive influence 
over both legislative and judicial matters but most importantly in the way the court system is 
structured and how this structure enables both access and ensures its independence. 
3.1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE COURT SYSTEM 
Judicial organisation in Cameroon is spelled out in Ordinance No. 72/04 of 26 August 1972 
and amended by Law No 2006/015 of 26 December 2006 and most recently Law No 211/027 
of 14 December 2011. Judicial organisation ordinance structures the courts as from the 
Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, lower courts for administrative litigations, lower audit 
courts, military courts, High Courts, Courts of First Instance and Customary Courts.340  As 
Fombad wrote, at the apex of this judicial pyramid is the Supreme Court, the only court 
specifically mentioned in any detail in the Cameroon constitution. The organisation, 
functioning, composition and duties of all the other courts mentioned in part V of the 
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constitution are left to be determined by subsequent legislation. The Court of First Instance 
operates in each sub-division, a High Court for each division and a Court of Appeal for each 
region, and a single Supreme Court for the entire country. The Supreme Court has amended 
section 9(1) of Ordinance No. 72/06 of August 1972 to confer to the administrative bench of 
the Court the sole authority to deal with charges of administrative disputes against public 
authorities. This amendment leaves the country with one administrative court with huge 
implications for accessibility and cost, and because of the backlog of cases, effective remedy 
can be difficult. Despite a 2008 constitutional amendment to decentralise the functioning of the 
courts to handle administrative disputes, which human rights cases fall under, there is yet to be 
a smooth transition341. 
Part V (articles 37–42) of the constitution outlines the powers and responsibilities of the 
judicial branch. This section establishes the Supreme Court together with the Courts of Appeal 
and the Tribunals and defines their roles under the executive government. The President retains 
the power to appoint the members of this judicial branch of government. 
Part VII (articles 46–52) of the constitution, defines the Constitutional Council and its duties 
to rule on the constitutionality of laws and to oversee national elections and referendums. The 
constitution of Cameroon, therefore, provides for a Constitutional Council in Part VII (articles 
46–52) different from the Supreme Court in Part V (articles 37–42) 
According to the constitution, the administrative bench shall examine all the administrative 
disputes involving the  state and other public authorities and shall also give final rulings on 
appeals against final judgements passed by lower courts in cases of administrative disputes.342 
In 1999, Akwanga brought a challenge against the military tribunal and the competence of the 
Civil Law jurisdiction, to oversee his trial 343. Both appeals were unsuccessful. It must be noted 
that Akwanga had been arrested within the Common Law jurisdiction, transferred to a Civil 
Law jurisdiction and tried in a military tribunal. This routine action of the  state underscores its 
distrust of the courts in the Common Law jurisdiction in handling highly charged political 
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cases. That is why most politically charged cases emanating from the Common Law 
jurisdiction are either transferred to Yaoundé where Civil Law is the dominant legal theory344 
or are dealt with by military tribunals.345  
Also, critical in this study is the role of the military tribunal which has been used in several 
cases against civilian political opponents of the regime.346 The military tribunal has frequently 
been used to undermine stringent rules of procedure demanded by the civilian courts. For 
example, in the case of The People v Nyah Henry,347 the judge granted bail and ordered the 
release of the defendants, but five days later the prosecutor ignored the decision and brought 
the defendants before the same judge charging them with two additional counts. The refusal by 
the legal department to respect the court judgement violated the rights of the defendants to the 
presumption of innocence guaranteed in the constitution of Cameroon348 and the Covenant349. 
The judge relied on section 301(1) which   states that where a case is not ready for hearing, the 
court shall adjourn it to its very next sitting and may order the release of the accused on bail, 
with or without sureties. The court may also order judicial supervision.’350 
The structure of Cameroon’s court system does not resolve the conflict between the Civil and 
Common Law systems. This conflict compounds the already complicated problem of access to 
the proper courts handling issues associated with the violation of personal integrity rights and 
the questions of delays associated with the backlog of cases. This conflict has far-reaching 
implications on the overall due process and especially in areas of access to the appropriate 
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courts of competence and the duration such cases may take. And as it is shown below, access 
and backlog of cases are compounded by executive intrusion, the conflict of jurisdictions 
brought about by the tenuous coexistence between the Common and Civil Law jurisdictions 
and the very bureaucratic nature of the court system. 
3.1.7. ACCESS AND DURATION OF CASES 
The Cameroon justice system is structured in a manner that renders access extremely difficult. 
In most cases, complaints about human rights violations are made against public authorities. 
Under the Common Law jurisdiction, the ordinary courts have automatic jurisdiction to deal 
with such cases. On the other hand, in a predominantly Civil Law jurisdiction like Cameroon, 
there are ordinary courts separate from administrative courts which have jurisdiction over such 
human rights cases. The judicial organisation of the courts fails to specify the jurisdictions 
within which human rights cases can be heard. This lack of specification leaves a gap in which 
victims of rights abuse have to resolve before bringing a case for adjudication. Although 
complaints against human rights violations are generally made against public authorities, the 
ordinary courts at both the district, sub-divisional and even divisional levels do not have 
jurisdiction to either hear such complaints or provide a remedy. Only the Courts of First 
Instance at the district level and high courts at the divisional level have the loci to hear cases 
against public authorities in the violation of the rights of people within its jurisdiction. It is 
mainly in the High Courts that cases of habeas corpus are heard. Per Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 
August 1972 that fixes the organisation of the Supreme Court, only the administrative bench 
of that court has the locus to hear cases of administrative dispute against the state and public 
authorities. With a single administrative bench located at the capital, accessibility to ordinary 
victims across the entire country is difficult. In Communication 272/2003 at the African 
Commission on human and people’s rights, Cameroon argued that:  
‘the delays observed in the administration of justice in Cameroon are due to the underdeveloped 




diligent justice system, and not a deliberate desire by the government to hinder the 
administration of justice.’351 
This delay also means that the court must deal with many cases and thus risk being slow. In 
the same case, Cameroon recognised this fact when it argued that “the complaint is still under 
consideration before one of the highest national courts which certainly has a lot of backlog in 
the works…”352. Apart from the usual problems of sorting out the appropriate courts that 
compound access, the desire by both the executive and judiciary to undermine the Common 
Law jurisdiction also possess a huge problem in dealing with human rights cases. 
4. JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 According to the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which 
all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the  state itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.’353 
One of the most important recommendations of the Human Rights Committee in its views in 
individual communications as expressed in the Akwanga case is as follows: 
‘In accordance with article 2, para. 3 (a) of the Covenant, the   state party is under an obligation 
to provide the author with an effective remedy, which should include a review of his conviction 
with the guarantees enshrined in the Covenant, an investigation of the alleged events and 
prosecution of the persons responsible, as well as adequate reparation, including compensation. 
The   state party is under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future”354 
This recommendation puts the judiciary at the centre of both the protection and the 
implementation regimes of state obligations under the Covenant. This section examines the 
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role of Cameroon’s judiciary in both the protection regime and the implementation of its 
obligations under these specific rights. 
4.1. THE PROTECTION REGIME OF CAMEROON’S JUDICIARY 
The right to be protected from torture, deprivation of liberty, detention under inhuman and 
degrading conditions and to have a fair trial including an effective remedy for any infraction 
of these rights is a fundamental human right guaranteed by the constitution and the Criminal 
procedure code of Cameroon. Constitutional guarantees alone do not automatically translate 
into the respect and enjoyment of these rights without the power of institutions like the judiciary 
to be independent and with the powers to continually review the actions of both the legislature 
and executive. In their study on the assessment of national human rights performance, Donnelly 
and Rhoda argue that “society requires the discharge of certain political functions, and large-
scale political organization requires the state. However, the state—especially the modern  
state—also presents particularly serious threats to human dignity”355. That is why internal state 
institutions must function as a cushion against the tyranny of the executive. The Cameroon 
constitution procedurally performs this task and guarantees judicial independence from both 
the legislature and executive356and empowers the Constitutional Council357to review legislative 
and executive actions. Such safeguards notwithstanding, there are foundational theoretical 
flaws that make these guarantees by themselves insufficient in ensuring the protection of these 
rights. The role of the judiciary in the protection of rights in Cameroon has been mostly 
dependent on the theory of the relationship between its domestic law and international law.  
Fombad argues that Cameroon is a dual system consisting of two unique but conflicting legal 
systems, the English Common Law, and the French Civil Law, operating in tenuous 
coexistence.358  While such a legal system is considered as a mixed jurisdiction, Cziment 
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concluded using Palmers nine interim conclusions on shared traits of classical mixed 
jurisdictions that Cameroon is not a mixed jurisdiction.359 The reason, she argues, is that ‘Civil 
Law is retained in the region where it was administered by the French, and Common Law is 
retained in the region administered by the English.’360 Efforts at harmonization have been 
limited causing the  state to continually moved arrested persons from the common to the Civil 
Law jurisdiction where it feels it has more control over judicial proceedings in contravention 
of the spirit of section 584 of the Criminal procedure code. The most recent of such unified 
laws is the Criminal procedure code which went into effect on 1 January 2007. Before then, 
the country operated a dual criminal procedural system reflecting its bi-jural nature; the 
inquisitorial system derived from French Civil Law, and the accusatorial system which 
emanates from English Common Law.  
In July 2005, there were efforts to create a hybrid system, which merged essential aspects of 
the common and Civil Law systems. Before the new Criminal procedure code came into force 
on 1 January 2007, criminal procedure was governed separately. This created a massive 
problem in the interpretation of existing statutes to the extent that the outcomes were dependent 
on whether they were interpreted by French courts or English courts. The case of the People v 
Oben Maxwell illustrated the complexity of the political environment within which the 
judiciary operates and its politically charged construction which renders it ineffective as an 
institution of justice. 
Another fundamental principle that guarantees right protection in every society is the guarantee 
of the right to fair trial. This is manifested by the quality of the courts which is reflected in its 
independence and its access by ordinary citizens. Having dealt with the question of the 
independence and to a specific extent access to the Council, another critical determinant to 
access is the ability of citizens to have the possibility of legal aid. In ensuring access to the 
courts by all, the government passed law No. 2009/4 of 14 April 2009 to organise legal aid 
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aimed at facilitating the material conditions of access to justice. This guarantees to everyone 
the right to apply and to receive legal aid from the moment a case is brought in front of the 
courts until the moment the judgment is executed. The problem with obtaining legal aid lies in 
the fact that the commission charged with determining the application of litigants lacks 
independence. Like the Constitutional Council discussed below, most of its officials which 
include the president of the court concerned, the representative of the legal department of the 
said court and the representative of public authorities are appointed by the executive branch. 
This lack of impartiality is also magnified by a lack of transparency in the judicial process. 
Corruption also affects the subjective dimension of article 14(1) by influencing the neutrality 
of the courts. Political corruption which entails executive or legislative influence in the 
judiciary process is rife in Cameroon. In its 2016 ranking, the World Justice Project (WJP), 
ranked Cameroon in the rule of law index 18th out of 18 countries examined in Africa South of 
the Sahara. It was ranked 109th out of 113 countries and jurisdictions worldwide. The WJP 
performance measures corruption using “44 indicators across eight primary rule of law factors, 
each of which is scored and ranked globally and against regional and income peers; constraints 
on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and 
security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice”361. Key to these was the 
total absence of civil justice and the presence of endemic corruption which makes impartiality 
as a critical ingredient in the protection of these rights impossible.  
One of the principal avenues through which Cameroon has mitigated the effect of corruption 
has been through the transfer of matters from one court to another. This phenomenon ensures 
that in the interest of public policy, the supreme court may withdraw a case from one court and 
transfer it to another court of the same jurisdiction or appoint magistrates within the jurisdiction 
of a different Court of Appeal to hear and determine the matter. 362  For example, in the 
Judgment in Nguemgne Josephine vs. the People and Ngasse Clovis Noël, the Supreme Court 
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justified the transfer of the case by on the grounds that there is reason for legitimate suspicion 
where there is sufficient ground to think that the examining magistrate or the trial court seized 
of a matter is unable to deliver a judgment with impartiality due to the leanings or interests of 
the judges concerned363. While this is explained in a manner that insinuates the protection of 
due process, the mere fact that the executive can intervene in an ongoing judicial matter further 
demonstrates the lack of judicial independence and the extent of outreach of executive power. 
Apart from excessive executive intrusion and control, corruption plays a significant role in 
altering the outcomes of judicial procedures and influencing executive actions 
In the Concluding Observations of its 5th periodic report  
While acknowledging the measures taken by the   state party to combat corruption (Operation 
Épervier), the Committee notes with concern that corruption is endemic in the   state party. 
Also, troubling are reports that public authorities, including those in the police, judicial, tax, 
education and health sectors, often extort money from individuals as a condition for providing 
services. The Committee takes note of the   state party’s anti- corruption measures but is still 
concerned at allegations that these measures are exploited and misused in order to target certain 
prominent individuals, including political figures (arts. 2, 14, 25 and 26)364. 
In the same observation, it recommended that the   state party should: 
 (a) step up its efforts to combat corruption and to ensure that it does not go unpunished; (b) 
ensure that all cases of corruption are independently and impartially investigated and, where 
applicable, that appropriate judicial penalties are imposed on perpetrators; and (c) establish 
strict standards for public officials and ensure that those responsible for acts of corruption are 
subjected to disciplinary action and are prosecuted in court365. 
The autocratic nature of the political and constitutional system makes the judiciary an 
ineffective institution to overrule the actions of the executive on substantive, as well as 
procedural grounds; and even more difficult to interpret and apply the constitution in order to 
overturn rights-abusive statutes, especially in the face of a rigorous and committed repressive 
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regime.366 The structure of the political and constitutional system renders institutional avenues 
of redress almost impossible. Under such a system, civil society actions, external pressure and 
legal actions against deliberative institutional weaknesses become the sole avenues through 
which citizens can safeguard their rights. 
4.2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
Cameroon’s Constitutional Council is a political construct put in place as a compromise to 
political demands for constitutional reforms. Cameroon’s constitutional development have 
seen 5 different constitutional changes, with the most far reaching being in 1996 with the 
introduction of the Constitutional Council. The Federal constitution of 1st September 1961 
provided for a Federal Court of Justice which was vested with the powers amongst others (1) 
to decide conflicts of jurisdiction between the highest courts of the two federated   states367 (ii) 
to decide complaints against administrative acts on grounds of ‘ultra vires’ and could take a 
review of legislative action and give advisory opinions.368 In 1972, a new constitution was 
ushered in which abolished the federal structure of the  state and put in place a unitary 
centralised political structure. As Fombad wrote, insofar as the determination of the 
constitutionality of the law was concerned, the new constitution reproduced the mechanism of 
the previous one with the only exception being the replacement of the Federal Court of Justice 
by the Supreme Court.369 
The constitutional amendment of 1996 introduced for the first time, a Constitutional Council 
in Cameroon’s constitutional history. As per the constitution, “the Constitutional Council shall 
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have jurisdiction in matters of the Constitution, rule on the constitutionality of laws, and shall 
be the organ regulating the functioning of the institutions”370. The constitution guarantees 
judicial independence from both the legislature and executive 371  and empowers the 
Constitutional Council372 to review legislative and executive actions and gives final rulings on 
the constitutionality of laws and the operation of international treaties.  It also rules on the 
actions of the institutions of the  state and whether their actions are consistent with the spirit of 
the constitution.373 Genuine constitutionalism will require a fair system that ensures that the 
spirit of the constitution is respected. Such a system is essential in the implementation process 
of the Covenant as laws must be consistent with the spirit of the constitution and consequently 
with the Covenant. 
The credibility and independence of this process is undermined by the subordination of the 
judiciary to the executive and legislative branches; the limited way with which an imperial 
executive refers matters for review 374  and the partisan nature in the appointment of its 
members375. The implication of these procedures that strips the judiciary of independence 
translates into diminished judicial authority to overturn rights abusing statutes and review 
executive and legislative actions inconsistent with the constitutional protection of human 
rights. Without such powers of substantive review of law, policy, and practice, even the most 
dedicated and independent of judges can act only against wilful or careless violations of human 
rights.376  
The Constitutional Council is inadequately equipped to deal with the task of handling the 
constitutionality of the law. This inadequacy is compounded by issues of access, composition, 
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as well as the perils brought about by a strong executive control of the Council. These 
limitations impact in a very negative way any process that could seek to uphold the respect of 
the Covenant’s rights here considered. Without the powers to declare rights-infringing 
legislation and acts as unlawful, executive excesses in the violation of fundamental rights 
cannot be controlled or curbed. 
5.2.1. ACCESS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
The constitution has created avenues concerning constitutional structures and procedures 
through which to determine the constitutionality of executive and legislative actions. Despite 
the existence of these provisions, Fombad has however   stated that the merits of the Council 
must be determined by their independence from executive control, access by ordinary citizens 
to and its competence in fulfilling its mandate.  Unlike in Cameroon, in the Congo, Togo and 
Uganda ordinary citizens can challenge the constitutionality of the law. In Cameroon only the 
president and other elected officials can refer matters to the Constitutional Council. Such a 
restriction prevents ordinary citizens from directly challenging the constitutionality of laws and 
actions that violate their constitutional rights, especially in areas as critical as the respect of 
personal integrity rights. With a constitution that has been enacted without a broad national 
consensus377 by members of parliament who have been mostly handpicked, elected through 
fraud and some appointed by the executive, the need for citizens to be able to challenge the 
legality of executive or legislative actions is crucial to protect the rights to human worth. 
As a matter of general principle, writing about the Constitutional Council Fombad argued, there 
are two ways of approaching the concept of judicial review. One is available and open to all; 
the other is restricted to specific categories of individuals.378 The Cameroon Constitutional 
Council has adopted the latter approach. Based on the constitution, matters are referred to the 
Council by a specific group of people; the President of the Republic, the President of the 
National Assembly, the President of the Senate, one-third of the members of the National 
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Assembly or one-third of Senators.379  Ordinary citizens are in no position to compel the 
government to respect their constitutional rights, especially in crucial areas like torture, 
deprivation of liberty and the inhuman treatment of detained persons. The inability of ordinary 
citizens to challenge the constitutionality of the law and actions of public authorities under a 
system of immense executive power robs the citizens of the power to compel the  state to 
respect their human rights. This lack of access makes the Constitutional Council another 
institution used by the executive to legitimise itself. Fombad has also   stated that there is no 
evidence in Francophone Africa of any president who ever referred a matter for judicial review 
before the Constitutional Council.380The constitutionality of laws and governmental action 
have never been challenged not only because of the limited way by which it can be referred to 
the Constitutional Council but also because its independence as an institution is questionable. 
4.2.1. INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
Another factor that impairs the relevance of the Council on critical matters is the way its 
members gain their position into the Council. The president designates three of the members 
of the Constitutional Council including the president; the president of the National Assembly 
designates three others; the president of the Senate designates three others, and the Higher 
Judicial Council designates the remaining two.381 The President of the Republic then appoints 
the designated members.  
When considered through the lens of how the Senate and the High Judicial Council are 
constituted, it leaves no doubt about the overarching role of the executive in selecting, 
designating and appointing members of the Council. The weakness of the constitution in 
guaranteeing the independence of the Council in the area of the appointment of its members 
inevitably transfers sovereignty of decision-making from the Council to the imperial executive. 
Executive control is also strengthened by a constitutional provision that allows ex-Presidents 
of the Republic to become ex officio members in the Council for life. The Constitutional 
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Council is not a judicial organ as it functions out of the control of the constitutional mandate 
of the judiciary.382 It is a political body composed mainly of appointees of the president. The 
Council’s primary loyalty in matters of the constitutionality of the law is with the president. 
Consequently, it is not expected for it to challenge the constitutionality of the law of which he 
is the primary source as well as the motivation in their enactment. Fombad thus concluded that 
the reality behind the façade of the Constitutional Council is that the executive (President) still 
pulls the strings.383 Cameroon can thus be seen as a country that lacks an effective judicial 
review process through which citizens can effectively challenge the laws and actions that 
violate personal integrity rights as protected under the constitution. Without such a judicial 
review process, coupled with a vague constitutional guarantee of these rights that leaves a gap 
for a restrictive interpretation of its obligation under both the constitution and the Covenant, 
persistent violations of these rights are inevitable.  
Even in cases where the judiciary can act independently, an imperial executive also has the 
potential to increase the cost of information available to victims of executive abuse, hide 
evidence, deprive litigants of their freedom, and make it difficult for credible evidence to be 
presented to the judiciary.384 This renders effective judicial action against abuse impossible as 
‘information must be subject to the law of evidence’ which are admissible for proper judicial 
action. 
The entire constitutional framework for the implementation of its obligation under the 
Covenant is fraught with inherent limitations associated with the nature of political structure 
and its supportive constitutionalism. One of such limitations is the ease with which the 
executive has amended the constitution in order to prolong its mandate over the people. 
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5.  CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND ITS IMPACT ON RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
Fombad has argued that one of the major causes of political and constitutional instability during 
Africa’s first three turbulent decades of independence was the ease with which post-
independence leaders subverted constitutionalism by regularly amending their countries’ 
constitutions to suit their selfish political agendas. The nature of constitutionalism in Cameroon 
is characterised by many constitutional caveats that render effective constitutional rule difficult 
or impossible. These caveats engineer a systemic problem of constitutional arbitrariness 
reflected in the ease with which they can be amended and special executive procedures that 
create parallel avenues of governance. Fombad further writes that a constitution must be 
regarded as a living document, which is designed to serve present and future generations, as 
well as embody and reflect their fears, hopes, aspirations, and desires. Consequent on this 
assertion is the fact that amendments and revisions to clarify or correct a lacuna or to extend 
the constitution to cover new ideas, new information, or new circumstances that had not been 
anticipated at the time it was drafted seem perfectly in order.   
Constitutionalism in Africa South of the Sahara, as it was during both single party rule and 
immediate post-1990 plural autocratic order, still follows the pattern of amendments to adjust 
constitutions for political gains.385 The desire and ease with which Cameroon seek and get 
amendments to the constitution and specific provisions are indicative of the weakness of the 
principle of constitutionalism and a clear indication of an imperial executive, which survives 
through means beyond its legal powers and authority. Constitutional changes need to be viewed 
as a core part of modern authoritarian projects. Powerful individuals or groups can abuse the 
constitution making process to create constitutional orders in which they face few constraints 
on their power and in which they will be difficult or impossible to dislodge. Constitutionalism 
has been used as an instrument of public relations and coexists with a widening gap between 
law and practice. As   stated earlier, the gap between law and practice widens alongside a vague 
constitutional and political framework that erodes every possibility of the protection of human 
rights and makes protection vague and inaccessible. 
                                                 




In most of the constitutions of Francophone countries, the constitutional court is the structure 
that determines the constitutionality of law and actions. As  stated, in the Togolese constitution, 
 ‘the constitutional court is the highest jurisdiction of the  state in constitutional matters. It is 
[the] judge the constitutionality of the law and it guarantees the fundamental rights of the 
human person and of the public freedoms it is the regulatory organ of the functioning of the 
institutions and of the activity of the public powers’386.  
In a landmark ruling in October 2005, Burkina Faso’s Constitutional Council invoked the 
principle of non-retroactivity of the law to argue that a constitutional revision of the year 2000 
limiting presidential terms to two five-year periods did not apply to former President Blaise 
Campaore.387 In 2014, an attempt to amend the constitution to extend his 27-year rule caused 
an uprising that led to a military takeover. The same approach to constitutional amendment in 
Chad in 2005, approved a change to the constitution, removing a two-term limit, which allowed 
President Idriss Derby to run for a third term in 2006388. The open nature of the constitutional 
language on term limit and the powers vested in the president to amend the constitution 
structurally damage the rigour of the Constitution. A constitutional amendment in 2003 
eliminated presidential term limits and allowed late president Omar Bongo of Gabon to run for 
re-election. The change also increased term length from five to seven years389.  
The Rwandan constitution provides for a seven-year presidential term renewable once. It 
proceeds with a firm stance on the term limit to  state that; under no circumstances shall a 
person hold the office of President of Republic for more than two terms. In December 2015, 
the Rwandan people voted overwhelmingly to eliminate the constitutional presidential term 
limit. The amendments gave current President Paul Kagame the opportunity to run for a third 
term and to continue with an autocratic pluralism hailed as development- and reconciliation-
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oriented, but which masks both a domestic and extra-territorial terror regime bent on 
eliminating his opponents. While the vote was overwhelmingly for the termination of the term 
limit, there is no doubt that it was a setback in constitutionalism in Rwanda and a strong 
reminder of the strong influence of the executive over all other areas of the society. It may also 
be argued that as long as the process of constitutional amendment is anchored in law and due 
process, it is not problematic to have an extension in the number of terms in office. After all, 
did Franklin Delano Roosevelt not serve more than two terms in office? The reason why 
George Washington served two terms and stepped down despite his popularity was to set a 
precedent that the office was more important than the ‘man’. Roosevelt, like Kagame, served 
in unprecedented times and felt like he was the only one capable of stopping the US depression. 
However, the difference between Roosevelt’s situation and those being observed across Africa 
South of the Sahara is that the US had no limit on presidential terms until the 22nd amendment 
of the constitution in 1951. 
The same constitutional manipulation occurred in Cameroon in 2008 when the National 
Assembly amended the 1996 constitution to remove the limit of two presidential terms. It 
should also be noted that the lack of presidential limit exists alongside a constitutional mandate 
that grants the president or his parliament enormous powers to amend the constitution.  It must 
be noted that in Cameroon like in most of the other countries indicated above, amendments to 
the constitution has always resulted in massive protests which has often been suppressed using 
violent means. During the amendment process of 2008, hundreds of people were arrested, 
tortured and others summarily executed. Those detained were kept incommunicado for weeks 
under inhuman and degrading conditions. Most were locked up without charge or trial using 
administrative prerogatives. Constitutional amendments in Cameroon has always been 
arbitrary and has altered the political and constitutional structure of the  state at the expense of 
accountability and rights protection. The silence of the Constitutional Council on the 
constitutionality of the 2008 constitutional amendments that removed presidential term 
limits390 and article 51(1) that changed the term limit of Constitutional Council members 
further raised many questions about its independence.  
                                                 




6.  NATIONAL COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
In his study on the role of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI), Reif describes them as 
“domestic non-judicial institution(s) for the implementation of international human rights 
law’391set up either under an act of parliament, the constitution, or by decree with specific 
powers and a mandate to promote and protect human rights. In determining the effect of NHRI 
on Personal Integrity Rights, Cole and Ramirez concluded that NHRI improves long-term 
physical integrity outcomes and show a positive effect on torture, deprivation of liberty, 
inhuman and degrading conditions and disappearances. They argued that rights outcomes 
rather than organisation structures and powers shape the efficacy of NHRI392. That the high 
level of institutionalisation of physical integrity rights in global human rights discourse has 
given rise to norms and practices that reduce their prevalence. 393 
The creation of a National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms in Cameroon became 
an avenue through which independent human rights “monitoring, evaluation, dialogue, 
concerted action”394 were possible. National human rights institutions are critical national tools 
in promoting and monitoring the effective implementation of international human rights 
standards. They perform core protection issues such as the prevention of torture, cruel inhuman 
and degrading treatment and protection of persons deprived of their liberty. The Cameroon 
National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) plays a pivotal role as defined 
by its law of creation with the protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms. In this 
regard, it is mandated to receive all denunciations relating to violations, conduct inquiries, carry 
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out necessary investigations into alleged violations and study all matters relating to the 
protection and promotion of human rights.395 According to the mandate of the Commission as 
defined by the law of its creation, it plays a vital role in human rights monitoring and 
documentation. To this end, it examines all issues raised relating to human rights, disseminates 
instruments relating to human rights; collaborates with the United Nations Organisation and 
other institutions;396 and, of course, as a matter of executive oversight and control, it informs 
the President.397 
In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of rules and international 
standards designed to guide the work of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) in the 
protection and promotion of human rights. According to the Paris Principles, institutions like 
the NCHRF also have the responsibility to examine: 
‘…any legislative or administrative provisions, as well as provisions relating to judicial 
organizations, intended to preserve and extend the protection of human rights; in that 
connection, the national institution shall examine the legislation and administrative provisions 
in force, as well as bills and proposals, and shall make such recommendations as it deems 
appropriate in order to ensure that these provisions conform to the fundamental principles of 
human rights…’398 
To enhance the work of the NCHRF in Cameroon and to align its activities with the provisions 
of the Paris Principles, the National Committee on Human Rights and Freedoms were 
transformed into the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms,399 by Law No. 
2004/16 of 22 July 2004.  
It was created as an independent institution for consultation, monitoring, evaluation, dialogue, 
concerted action, promotion and protection in the domain of human rights. To enhance its 
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independence, the Commission is described as a legal entity and given financial autonomy; and 
to facilitate access to it, it was said that it would have branches all over the territory of 
Cameroon. 400  However, all of these have also failed because the executive appoints its 
members, and despite legal provisions to the contrary its funding and sustenance are decided 
and micromanaged by the same administration401.  Despite  state guarantee of partial funding, 
the Commission has been cash-stricken and ineffective in independent monitoring and 
reporting of human rights violations.  
6.1  INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMMISSION 
While the work of the Commission is pivotal, it is also undermined by excessive executive 
intrusion in two key areas; that is, its composition and financial independence.  
For example, of the 30 members who make up the Commission, most if not all gain their 
position directly or indirect through presidential appointments. The Commission also runs a 
permanent Secretariat at the helm of which is a Secretary General who is also an appointee of 
the Head of  state.402 It is also   stated in its status that working group chairpersons of the 
Commission can be members of the government, senators, judicial and legal officers, law 
enforcement officers who are mostly appointees of the executive branch.403 
Another clear area of concern that affects the independence and possible effectiveness of the 
Commission is the lack of financial independence. According to its founding laws, its resources 
shall be derived from the  state budget404and its expenditure subject to  state accounting rules.405 
The lack of financial autonomy has translated into some form of executive control of the 
activities of the Committee especially in critical areas of monitoring  state institutions like 
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prisons, investigating claims of torture and the implementation of the views of the Human 
Rights Committee on individual communication. The creation of the Department of Human 
Rights and International Cooperation in the Ministry of Justice to monitor and to implement 
international conventions on human rights and to sensitise personnel of judicial and prison 
services on the standards for the protection of human rights406 seems to be an attempt by the 
government to undermine the NCHRF which is already heavily controlled by the executive 
branch. In reacting to Cameroon’s fourth periodic report on the steps taken to strengthen the 
NCHRF, the Human Rights Committee in its Concluding Observations  stated that “further 
measures could be taken with a view to ensuring the effective functioning of the NCHRF in 
full independence from the Government”407. 
Most institutions created by the government to oversee and/or monitor and cause the 
implementation of its obligation under the international human rights regime are heavily 
micromanaged by the executive. This massive executive intrusion seeks to protect it against 
domestic and internal intrusion since most violations of personal integrity rights are acts of 
executive action. 
7. INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE 
Apart from the regular constitutional framework whose design determines how effective the 
obligations contained in these rights are implemented, the government has created an Inter-
Ministerial Committee for monitoring the implementation of recommendations and decisions 
of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).408  The Prime Minister heads the Committee and is charged with 
the duties of: 
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- ‘listing the different matters brought before the said bodies; 
- monitoring the implementation of the recommendations and/or decisions following 
the different matters thus settled; 
-  proposing responses to the recommendations and/or decisions of the above-
mentioned bodies; 
- monitoring the effectiveness of implementation of the validated proposals; and 
- reflecting and deciding on the internalization of certain observations and 
recommendations of these mechanisms tasked with promoting and protecting 
Human Rights409. 
The broad-base representation of the Committee which is chaired by the Secretary General at 
the Prime Minister’s office includes representatives from 10 other ministries, including 
members of the National Committee of Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF). 410  This 
Committee’s heavy responsibility under the Covenant has included ensuring the 
implementation of the views of the Human Rights Committee on individual communications. 
It has worked to oversee issues of compensation411, especially in the violation of articles 7, 9, 
10 and 14. As it is shown in Chapter 6, it has recorded a less than 10% success rate in its 
operations. 
The political and constitutional structure of any  state is an excellent indicator of its practices 
when it comes to personal integrity rights. As the literature on treaty compliance and regime 
type has determined, torture, deprivation of liberty and inhuman and degrading treatment are 
frequent occurrences under multiparty electoral autocratic systems. In the same token, the 
literature on treaty ratification of these   states also supports the correlation between regime 
type and the high rate of ratification of the Covenant. It is not the object of this study to prove 
this correlation. Instead, as it is shown below, there is a strong correlation between the domestic 
organisation of the constitutional and political structures and the appreciation of these   states 
of their obligation under the Covenant. Despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing the 
                                                 
409 Ibid article 2  
410 Ibid article 3  
411 In Njaru v Cameroon No.1353/2005, views of 19 March 2007, the Committee has engaged 
to ensure that judicial proceedings against persons responsible for poor treatment and arrest of 
Njaru; in Gorji v Cameroon No. 1134/2002 of 14 March 2002, Views of 15 March 2005, the 




protection of these rights, substantive legal, institutional and procedural practices hinder courts 
from being effective in the protection of the rights. How Cameroon interprets and implements 
its obligation not to torture, to treat detainees with humanity, to engage in a fair trial, and to 
provide effective remedy are a direct consequence of the domestic structures that ensure the 
survival of the autocracies. 
The entire process of constitutional amendments can be seen in the backdrop of the nature of 
the regime and the relationship between the executive and the other branches of government. 
It is within this context that constitutionalism and its relation to the protection of articles 2(3), 




























INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM: THE 
REPORTING PROCEDURE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The international legal system has always been factored to “…recognize only   states as the 
primary players in its evolving network of rules and obligations” 412 . The individual has 
gradually become a powerful subject under international law and the Optional Protocol of the 
Covenant,413 which Chapter 6 of this thesis is concerned with, creates an individual complaints 
mechanism whereby individuals in member   states signatory to the Covenant can submit 
complaints otherwise known as communications to the HRC for consideration; a process that 
has created the most complex jurisprudence in the UN international human rights law system.  
It is relevant in human rights accountability and the strengthening of the Human Rights culture 
and alternative avenues of redress far away from domestic institutions. Besides this individual 
complaint mechanism is the  state reporting mechanism which considers regular reports from   
states parties to the Covenant. 
These are reports presented by all   states parties to the Covenant on the specific measures they 
have taken to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant and the progress made 
towards the enjoyment of these rights. Its initial and periodic reports usually includes the 
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measures – including legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures – which they have 
adopted to achieve the enjoyment of the rights recognised in the Covenant. 
According to article 40(1), such reports must be submitted by   states parties within one year 
of becoming a party to the Covenant and at regular periods thereafter. Requests for submission 
of a report under article 40, para. 1 (b), of the Covenant may be made in accordance with the 
periodicity decided by the Committee or at any other time the Committee may deem 
appropriate. According to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee,   states parties 
are usually required to present periodic reports every five years.414 
Hafner and Tsutsui argument about weak institutional mechanisms to monitor and enforce 
regime norms that in turn offers governments the incentive to ratify human rights treaties as a 
matter of window dressing…’415 is an appropriate way to describe the workings of the HRC. 
Such an argument that portrays the lack of or the presence of weak monitoring and 
implementation regime is not unanimously seen as valid. The perceived anarchic international 
monitoring regimes void of an overarching arbiter that leaves the compliance to treaty 
obligations to what may seem as “occasional compliance by nation   states acting out of 
transparent convenience or self-interest”416 does not also reflect the reality of the monitoring 
compliance regime of the Covenant. Despite this perceived anarchic nature, Koh argues that 
international human rights law is enforced in much the same way as domestic laws. These 
international norms of international human rights law, he contends, may be under-enforced or 
imperfectly enforced; but they are enforced through a complex, little-understood legal process 
which he describes as transnational legal processes417 . Koh describes the three phases of 
enforcement as institutional interaction whereby global norms of international human rights 
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law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately internalised by domestic legal systems. To claim 
that this complex transnational legal process of enforcing international human rights law via 
interaction, interpretation, and internalisation exists does not mean they work well418.  These 
processes work through a web of interaction between the international and the domestic 
through processes of treaty construction, accession, internalization, and reporting, monitoring 
and even compensation for breach of obligation.  
The idea of monitoring human rights implementation through review of periodic reports 
originated in a 1956 resolution of ECOSOC which requested   states to submit, every three 
years, reports on progress achieved in advancing the rights enumerated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.419 It was modelled on the International Labour Organisation 
reporting process. According to article 22 of the International Labour Organisation constitution 
from 1919, members were required to make an annual report to the International Labour Office 
on the measures which they had taken to give effect to the provisions to which they were a 
party. ECOSOC’s Resolution 624 B (1956) asked   states to submit a report describing 
developments and progress with respect to human rights initially every three years and from 
1965 on an annual basis. In 1980, the General Assembly terminated the requirement due to the 
incorporation of the procedure in the Covenant and other Human Rights treaties.420 
The  state reporting mechanism has been regarded as one of the best methods of monitoring 
the implementation of the obligations of the Covenant. The reporting procedure as explained 
by McGoldrick is the most widespread and established implementation technique for the 
international implementation of human rights. He further contends that the obligation to submit 
reports is the only obligation which   states parties to the Covenant assume on ratification or 
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accession.421 It was established as a binding the human rights treaty which consisted of a 
voluntary system of self-monitoring by way of reporting that is supervised by six independent 
expert Committees 422 . This mechanism offers the Human Rights Committee with the 
opportunity to scrutinize a   state party’s compliance to the treaty, but unnecessary courtesy has 
led to a lot of missed opportunities to hold   states accountable. It constitutes an essential 
element in the continuing commitment of a  state to respect, protect and fulfil the rights set out 
in the Covenant.  
 state reports are expected to present not only the  state of domestic law and practice, but 
indicate as well “the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation’ of the 
treaty”423. This report gives a   state party in the reporting process the opportunity in the 
constructive dialogue phase to help mitigate the effect of any limitation on the   state party’s 
side to fulfil its obligation under the Covenant. Unlike the Individual Communication under 
the Optional Protocol, the reporting process is mandatory and provides a comprehensive tool 
for examining the general  state of human rights under the Covenant. It also provides the 
Committee with the opportunity to examine the measures necessary to improve   states human 
rights practices and to examine the obstacles a  state faces in fulfilling its obligations under the 
Covenant. As the harmonised guidelines stipulate, reporting is used as “an opportunity to take 
stock of the  state of human rights protection within their jurisdiction for policy planning and 
implementation” 424 . Another objective is to provide an opportunity for “constructive 
engagement with relevant actors of civil society”425. This constructive engagement begins at 
the time of ratification, through the interactive phase of compiling the report and at its 
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conclusive phase provides an opportunity for the delegation of the   state party to be questioned 
on the measures it has taken to fulfil its obligation under the Covenant and the difficulties it 
has or is entering in this process. 
Most major UN treaties supply a monitoring body that monitors compliance. The Covenant is 
monitored by the Human Rights Committee426with a permanent locus standing to consider 
reports from member   states on their compliance with their treaty obligation, adopt general 
comments, and consider individual complaints. The Committee is composed of 18 independent 
individuals of “high moral character and recognized competence with a high level of credibility 
and impartiality even though its mandate might limit its effectiveness”427. Under article 40(4), 
the Committee is permitted to make “...general comments as it may deem appropriate”. Though 
the views of the Committee are not binding to the parties to the Covenant, the Covenant as a 
treaty under international law is binding. In this respect flouting the views of the Committee in 
respect to any obligation under a binding treaty means a violation of international law which   
states must remedy or risk pariah status.  
This chapter analyses the importance of the reporting procedure as an obligatory 
implementation mechanism and how the entire process of compiling and defending reports 
helps Cameroons to fulfil its obligation as defined by article 2(2) of the Covenant. 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REPORTING PROCESS 
Article 40 of the Covenant obliges   states parties to submit an initial report within one year of 
the Covenant coming into force as far as the   state party is concerned on the measures, they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized and, on the progress, made in the 
enjoyment of those rights. The initial report provides information on the implementation of the 
Covenant, while subsequent reports usually include measures taken to implement the 
Concluding Observations of previous reports and factors and difficulties affecting the 
implementation of the obligations of the Covenant. In accordance with the intent of the 
reporting process,   states parties’ reports look beyond the constitutional and institutional 
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safeguards put in place by the  state as discussed in Chapter 4428 but also the difficulties and 
limitations faced by   states in fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant.429 
The  state report is the foundation of the review process. In subsequent reports, the  state 
provides information on the implementation of each provision of the Covenant and on the 
measures taken to implement the Committee’s previous Concluding Observations, as well as 
on progress and developments since the previous report. A few examples of the interactive 
nature of the process shows its importance in altering   states attitude. In its Concluding 
Observation on Cameroon’s third periodic report, the Human Rights Committee wrote: 
The Committee notes that the third periodic report of Cameroon was incomplete and did not 
address all of the concerns expressed by the Committee in its previous concluding observations 
on Cameroon’s second periodic report. It welcomes, however, the updated information, 
including written information and legislative texts, provided by the delegation. It further 
welcomes the willingness of the   state party to make additional submissions in writing with 
respect to particular concerns articulated by members of the Committee 
In its Concluding Observations on its fourth periodic report, the Human Rights Committee 
expressed the following concerns on article 2(3):  
‘the Committee is concerned about the delays in ensuring effective remedies and appropriate 
compensation for violations of Covenant rights in compliance with views adopted by the 
Committee on Communication Nos. 458/1991 (Mukong), 1134/2002 (Gorji-Dinka), 
1353/2005 (Njaru), and 1186/2003 (Titahongo). (art. 2)’430 
The   state party responded by providing details of the compensation packages of most of the 
complainants and the difficulties in providing an effective remedy in the case of 
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communication 1813/08. In this regard, it argued that the complainant has failed to provide an 
interlocutor with whom the   state party could discuss with 
In paragraph 7 of the same observation, the Committee  stated as follows: “the   state party 
should further guarantee the independence of the National Commission of Human Rights and 
Freedoms by providing it with adequate resources to carry out its mandate effectively… 
furthermore, reports publicized by the NCHRF should be widely disseminated and made easily 
accessible”.’ In its response in its fifth periodic report, the   state party responded that ‘the 
NCHRF enjoys greater independence because, as already mentioned, the voting right of 
members representing Government departments has been withdrawn, and its financial 
resources increased.’431 
These examples show a summary of some of the specific aspects of how the reporting process 
works. It is nonetheless exhaustive of the entire process as issues of specific concerns with the 
implementation of the obligations under the various articles are also critical to the report. In 
this regard, in its fourth periodic report, Cameroon argued in the implementation of article 7 
that “the Cameroonian legislator seeks to adequately protect the human person through the 
prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Also, administrative measures 
and court decisions are taken against perpetrators”432. In as much as measures are taken to show 
commitment to the individual rights, the   state party must include information on the  state’s 
constitutional and legal framework that is not provided in the core document. Such is necessary 
to give clarity on the constitutional and institutional framework put in place to support the 
effective enjoyment of the rights in the Covenant. In this regard, Cameroon laid out the legal 
framework for its protection and argued that it has put in place a Penal Code that criminalises 
acts of torture.  
The reporting process does not only indicate steps taken to ensure implementation of a   state 
party’s obligation but also outlines the factors and difficulties affecting the implementation of 
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those rights. 433  This approach is not unique to the Covenant. The Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women is even more exhaustive on the issues of 
obstacles. It demands the explanation of “factors and difficulties affecting the degree of 
fulfilment of obligations under the Convention’ and of ‘the nature and extent of, and reasons 
for, every such factor and difficulty, and should give details of the steps being taken to 
overcome them”434. 
One of the fundamental problems faced by   states parties beyond the institutional framework 
in implementing their obligation is the problem of awareness. That is why the Committee 
expects the   states parties to indicate in their reports the way human rights knowledge is 
promoted at every level of society within that  state. In its fifth periodic report Cameroon 
submitted that 
 with regard to periodic reports, it should be noted that following the presentation of the 4th 
periodic report, the government informed the national community through a press and radio 
release which   stated the major directives of the Concluding Observations, as well as detailed 
sources for access to this information, in particular the Ministry of External Relations 
(Department of the United Nations and Decentralized Cooperation) and the Website of the 
United Nations High Commission for Human Rights.’435 
It is also worth noting that reporting alone, even when the guidelines for reporting are followed, 
does not still lead to its desired outcomes. The quality of the reports also matters. O’Flaherty 
argues that dissatisfied with the quality of many reports, the Committee has resorted to issuing 
General Comments to guide government officials involved in the drafting process, one of 
which is involved with the general process and the other with the specific articles.436 The 
obligations of the   states include undertakings by them not only to respect, but also to actively 
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ensure all the rights mentioned in the Covenant to individuals within their territory.437 These 
guidelines on reporting have been extremely useful in improving on the quality of reports and 
increased scrutiny on  state actions during the review process. 
The Committee’s procedure is derived from practice and the rules of procedure of the 
Committee which follows an established procedure in consideration of  state reports. 
Proceedings usually begin with oral submissions from the   state party, followed by the 
intervention of Committee members through questions or comments. The proceeding is then 
suspended for one day, followed by a response section from the   state party and general 
remarks and comments from Committee members.  
These reports which are often supplemented by NGO presentations are subjects of public 
scrutiny with the representatives of the  state Parties.438 The Committee also usually requires   
states Parties to facilitate the participation, through an appropriate consultative process of civil 
society organisations, in the preparation of reports. Such a process encourages and facilitates, 
at the national level, public scrutiny of government policies and a constructive engagement 
with relevant actors of civil society. The process is usually conducted in a spirit of cooperation 
and mutual respect, with the aim of advancing the enjoyment by all the rights protected by the 
relevant convention. 
After consideration of  state reports, the Committee proceeds to draft and adopt 
its comments comprising a critique of the report, noting positive factors, drawing attention to 
matters of concern and making suggestions and recommendations. It is based on these 
recommendations that the next report is made. 
The examination of these reports provides a medium of conversation between Committee 
members and   state party representatives and lays the framework for promoting   state party 
compliance with Covenant obligations. As Conte et. al. have argued, upon completion of the 
process, the Committee issues its Concluding Observations which may note its concerns 
regarding aspects of the   state party’s implementation of obligations or it may make 
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suggestions and recommendations to help the   state party become more effective in 
implementing its obligations under the Covenant. 439 The entire reporting process is a 
conversation between stakeholders and relevant actors in the protection regime. It’s importance 
in ensuring that   states implement their obligations under the Covenant cannot be 
overemphasised. This process would be irrelevant without the quality of the report itself 
presented by the   states parties. That is why the Committee has issued specific guidelines on 
how this report should be compiled and presented. 
2.1 GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING  STATE REPORTS AND REPORTING 
The guideline is divided into common core and section specific documents which are further 
divided into four sections. Section 1 addresses the purpose of the reporting process. Section II 
provides guidance on the format in which reports should be submitted. Section III addresses 
the content of  state reports, consisting of a common core document submitted to each treaty 
body in tandem with a document specific to that treaty body. The common core document 
forms the initial part of each report to each treaty body and includes a constitutive substantive 
provisions information. The treaty-specific document constitutes the second part of the report. 
Individual guidelines on the content of the treaty-specific document are drafted once the 
content of the common core document has been finalised. The objective of the core document 
is to facilitate the implementation of reporting obligations by   states parties by reducing 
repetition and overlap in the information submitted to several treaty bodies. Full information 
on the general framework for the protection and the promotion of human rights in the  state is 
included in the common core document, as this provides the setting within which the provisions 
of the all human rights treaties are implemented. 
2.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORTING PROCESS 
The primary objective of the reporting process as the principal tenet of the Covenant’s 
monitoring instrument of   states party’s implementation of their obligation is to indicate the 
measures   states have adopted which give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant and 
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on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights. It is possible to conclude on seven 
functions of reporting which can be outlined as initial review, monitoring, policy formulation, 
public scrutiny, evaluation, acknowledging problems, and information exchange. 440 These 
objectives were reaffirmed mainly in the harmonised guidelines published in 2006.441  As   
stated in the first chapter of the guidelines, they are simply intended to guide   states in fulfilling 
their obligations under article 40 of the Covenant. In as much as the guidelines do not seek to 
alter the attitude of the  state, they provide a road map that helps   states to engage in an 
interactive process between the main stake holders within its territory. 
Another critical objective of reporting is to provide a regular and periodic comprehensive 
review by a   state party of the  state of implementation of human rights, progress achieved, 
and obstacles encountered. This gives an opportunity to reflect on the measures necessary to 
improve the human rights situation and a reaffirmation by the   state party of its continuing 
commitment to respect and ensure observance of the rights set out in the treaties to which it is 
a party. As   stated in the harmonised guidelines, reporting is intended to provide a coherent 
framework within which   states can use to meet their reporting obligations under all the 
international human rights treaties to which they are a party using a coordinated and 
streamlined process.442 The constructive dialogue in the process of preparing their reports for 
the treaty bodies permits   states Parties not only to fulfil their international obligations but also 
provide an opportunity to take stock of the  state of human rights protection within their 
jurisdiction for policy planning and implementation.443 
2.3 PREPARING  STATE REPORTS 
The guidelines for the preparation of  state reports requires   states to consider setting up 
appropriate institutions for the preparation of their reports. These institutional structures which 
could include an inter-ministerial drafting Committee and focal points on reporting within each 
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relevant government department should support all the  state’s reporting obligations under the 
international human rights instruments and could provide an effective mechanism to coordinate 
follow-up to the concluding observations of the treaty bodies.444 Such structures should allow 
for the involvement of sub-national levels of governance where these exist and could be 
established on a permanent basis. The  state concerned is required to hold national consultations 
with civil society, national human rights institutions and human rights experts in line with the 
principle that the Universal Periodic Review ought to ‘ensure the participation of all relevant 
stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and national human rights 
institutions.445 
Cameroon set up an Inter-ministerial Committee charged with the preparation of its report. The 
drafting of its report since the creation of this Committee has been overseen by the Inter-
Ministerial Committee for monitoring the implementation of recommendations and/or 
decisions arising from regional and international mechanisms for the promotion and protection 
of human rights under the Prime Minister, Head of Government. The guidelines on the 
reporting process reflect a participatory approach where a draft report is prepared by a team 
including representatives from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of External Relations, based on contributions from various administrative units. It is 
after that that it is submitted for pre-validation to national stakeholders. The national 
stakeholders are drawn from the regions of Cameroon which are mostly governmental 
institutions working under ministerial departments in the various regions. The resulting draft 
is then proposed for review to civil society organisations during a consultation meeting 
organised by the NCHRF 446 before its final validation during a workshop including all 
stakeholders. During these phases, various aspects of the draft are fine-tuned, including the 
strategic, normative and institutional framework for human rights promotion and protection. 
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Many treaty bodies rely on additional information from other sources to corroborate the 
information of the   state party. This is where both domestic and international non-
governmental organisations play an important role. In Cameroon for example, the NCHRF 
which has often been criticised by the Committee for lack of independence, has increasingly 
become more robust. Other non-governmental organisations like the now defunct Human 
Rights Defence Group (HRDG) of the late human rights activist, Albert Mukong submitted 
counter reports to the Committee in the past. During the fourth periodic review process, 
International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (FIACAT) and 
Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT) presented a report emphasising 
Cameroon’s noncompliance with its Criminal procedure code on the arrest and detention of 
criminal suspects. ACAT argued that officers continue to execute arrests without any warrant 
and have exercised administrative powers of preventive detentions without any judicial 
procedure, in violation of the CPC. Both organisations drew the attention of the Committee of 
the fact that (la torture physique est encore utilisée dans des cas isolés. C’est la torture 
psychologique qui a pris le pas, les agents ne voulant pas laisser de traces) while physical 
torture is only used in isolated cases, psychological torture is now the norm because the 
authorities do not want to leave a trace.447 
The importance of NGO reporting emphasises their role in advocacy, monitoring, strategic 
litigation and most importantly education. These counter reports shed more light in areas like 
torture, deprivation of liberty, and inhuman and degrading treatment in detention. These are 
vital areas which autocracies like Cameroon never give detail consideration to in their reports 
This process thus offers a forum wherein national consultation and dialogue between the 
government and people through national and regional human rights institutions can take place. 
This dialogue facilitates and encourages public scrutiny and discussion with civil society and 
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NGOs about treaty implementation and government policies.448 In this way, the process can 
bring different domestic stakeholders together and encourage communication between them 
and at the same time raises awareness about the treaty. The process, hence, aims ‘to promote 
social mobilisation.’  
3. AN OVERVIEW OF CAMEROON’S FIRST THREE REPORTS 
Cameroon acceded to the Covenant in 1984 and, according to the premise of the Covenant, its 
first report was due in June 1985.449 Its first report was submitted in August 1988, three years 
behind schedule. Though the Committee welcomed the report of Cameroon, it never the less 
expressed regret that it had been submitted late and that it did not provide sufficient details on 
the measures taken to assure the practical implementation of the Covenant and that it did not 
contain any statistical data.450 The Committee questioned Cameroon about the independence 
of the judiciary. It raised concerns about the way judges are recruited, appointed and 
promoted. 451  In its response, Cameroon argued that it doesn’t matter who makes the 
appointment, but what mattered was the quality of justice dispensed.452However, as has been 
seen all through the years from Mukong to Akwanga, the quality of the justice dispensed has 
highly been influenced by executive preferences and actions. The Committee also questioned 
the competence of military courts to try civilians. Despite this criticism, 5 years after the first 
report and 20 years after, Mukong and Akwanga respectively were still tried by a military court. 
Cameroon’s second periodic report was due 26 September 1990 but was only submitted three 
years later in 1993. It was more detailed than the initial report and came at the heels of political 
liberalisation and the holding of the first ever multiparty presidential elections which led to 
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massive human rights violations. The report also detailed the institutional changes that arose 
from the political liberalisation and the legal framework that undergird them. For example, 
Cameroon elaborated on the role of the constitution and the judiciary in the protection of human 
rights. It argued that  
In Cameroon, the main role of the judiciary is to guarantee to all citizens and residents respect 
for the rights recognized by the legislature, to protect them in their person, property and honour, 
to settle any disputes between them, and to track down offenders so that they can be brought 
to justice and punished453 
Cameroon also argued that “violence, brutality or physical assaults’ against a detainee or any 
other individual is punishable from six months to five years’ imprisonment”454. So to make the 
implementation of these provisions more effective, the Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
for every individual to be examined by a doctor of his choice before entering and upon leaving 
prison.  
In examining Cameroon’s initial and second periodic reports, one notices a significant disparity 
in the content and quality of the report especially in the areas of the constitutional, political, 
legal institutions. The initial report was presented at a time of single-party rule and less political 
competition while the second periodic report offers more depth of knowledge about the legal 
and institutional framework for the protection of human rights. By the time the second periodic 
report was presented, the National Committee of Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF)455 
had been created. The creation of the NCHRF added more value to Cameroon’s human rights 
culture even when it had only an advisory role. Despite this institutional development, 
Cameroon’s second periodic report according to the concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee was more of a summary and more theoretical rather than substantive. 
Torture according to the Committee was practiced in a systematic way resulting in the death of 
victims. It also deplored the fact that such brutality is practised in prisons, as well as non-
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respect for the provisions of article 10 of the Covenant in detention centres where men and 
women, convicted and non-convicted prisoners, adult and juvenile offenders are held in the 
same, generally insalubrious, cells.456 
One of the most important recommendations of the Committee was asking that “Cameroon 
avail itself of the constitutional reform to incorporate in the national legal system all the rights 
guaranteed by the Covenant, and that each article of the draft be systematically checked against 
the provisions of the Covenant”457. This recommendation has never been fully implemented. 
The Cameroon constitution vaguely refers of these Covenant rights in its preamble and though 
the preamble is considered an integral part of the constitution, the details about these rights 
have been left to secondary legislation. 
While its second periodic report focused on explaining the nature of its legal framework for 
civil and political rights, its third periodic report that was due in 1995 but submitted two years 
later, focused on the recommendations and critics of the concluding observations of the second 
periodic report. In this report, Cameroon stressed the importance of the independence of the 
NCHRF and its unique responsibilities in receiving and investigating human rights violations 
and referring such findings to the president458. The problem with this approach lies in the fact 
that the very executive branch that receives recommendations from the NCHRF is both the 
main authority responsible for violating personal integrity rights and the guarantor of the 
existence of the NCHRF. The lack of independence of the NCHRF has been a great source of 
concerned to the HRC as shall be seen in subsequent List of Issues Prior to reporting and 
concluding observations of subsequent periodic reports. 
Cameroon’s third periodic report also dealt with the right to liberty and security of persons, the 
humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty and the right to a fair trial. As raised in 
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the concluding observations of the second periodic report, the Human Rights Committee 
expressed its concerns about the detention of men and women, minors and adults and convicted 
and non-convicted persons in the same cells459. Cameroon responded that  
‘with regards to infrastructure, police stations do not have enough lockups, which are cramped 
and unhealthy and provide no separation between men, women and minors. Most of them were 
built during the colonial period for up to 50 persons, but they now house a prison population 
that is far beyond their capacity’460.  
Cameroon has always complaint of the lack of resources. It is a pattern that will be analysed in 
a more detail in the consideration of subsequent reports in violation of its obligations under 
article 10 of the Covenant and the Mandela Rule. 
4. CONSIDERATION OF CAMEROON’S FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT 
Cameroon’s fourth periodic report was considered at a time of serious human rights challenges 
in the country and a seismic institutional change which saw the introduction of a new 
constitution which brought in significant constitutional changes. These changes have been dealt 
with in chapters 3 and 4 
The massive anti-government demonstrations of 2008 and 2009 that led to the death of 
hundreds and the detention and torture of hundreds more have been considered all through this 
study. Cameroon’s fourth periodic report was concluded like most other reports with a 
Concluding Observations which formed the basis of its fifth periodic report. Cameroon’s fourth 
periodic report was supplemented by 11 civil society reports including those Redress Trust and 
Amnesty International. These civil society reports addressed issues of impunity, prison 
conditions, gay and lesbian rights and even implementation of the views of the Committee. 
Since its accession to the Covenant, Cameroon has submitted five reports and its attachment to 
the spirit of article 40 of the Covenant is expressed by the HRC in its fourth Periodic Report as 
of great importance. After the consideration of its initial, first, second and third periodic reports 
in section 3, the subsequent analysis is based on Cameroon’s fourth periodic report by the HRC 
which took place at its 103rd session that held in October 2009 and submitted under its 
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obligation in accordance with article 40(1a, b) of the Covenant and its fifth periodic report 
submitted in 2016. This analysis reviews the fourth periodic report and the way its Concluding 
Observations were taken into consideration to give effect to its obligation under articles 2(3), 
7, 9, 10 and 14 in the fifth report. 
The approach of this analysis follows that of the Committee with the consideration of specific 
aspects of  state compliance regime beginning with its institutional framework. Also, important 
to note that in compiling its fourth periodic report, Cameroon extensively dealt with the 
Committee’s concerns and recommendations raised in the concluding observations after the 
third periodic report.  
On the Committee’s specific concern about extrajudicial executions by security officers and a 
what it perceived as a culture of impunity that has led to the death of persons under custody 
Cameroon responded that;  
The fight against impunity is a major concern of the Cameroonian Government. This fight 
focuses on almost all cases of human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture 
and other inhuman and degrading treatment especially where such violations were perpetrated 
by agents of the  state or  state authorities. Judicial and administrative sanctions are meted out 
on prison administration personnel, policemen, gendarme officers, other civil servants and 
traditional rulers when they are found guilty of such violations. 
Cameroon then cited several cases where disciplinary measures have been taken against 
security personnel. Some of these cases are dealt with below in consideration of individual 
articles of the Covenant. 
4.1 THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
At the conclusion of the consideration Cameroon’s Fourth Periodic Report, the Committee 
concluded that “since the last report, significant progress has been made in Cameroon to 




human rights contained in the Covenant”461. On some of the specific merits of Cameroon’s 
submission, and specifically on its legal framework, the Committee noted that some changes 
in the domestic laws ‘enacted in recent years have progressively strengthened and enhanced 
the protection of rights in the constitution...and bringing Cameroon’s legal system in line with 
its international obligation under the treaty. Cameroon’s report outlined the constitutional 
guarantees of the  state’s obligations under the Covenant as discussed in Chapter 5. Cameroon   
stated its commitment to the respect of human rights in general and the Covenant rights in 
particular. This commitment it argued is reflected in both the constitutional safeguards which 
proclaimed its commitment to human rights through national legislation which protect civil 
and political rights. This commitment is emphasised in the 1996 Constitution as amended by 
Law No. 2008/1 of 14 April 2008462 with the preamble as discussed in chapter 4 being an 
integral part of the constitution and proclaiming the attachment of the people of Cameroon to 
the right to fair trial, guarantee of freedom and security of each individual and other rights. 
On the specific legal framework, the report outlined several national instruments enacted in 
recent years which have progressively strengthened and enhanced the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Constitution. 463  On the institutional framework for the promotion and 
protection of these rights as laid down by the constitution, these institutions comprise 
democratic political institutions, an independent judiciary, a Constitutional Council and a 
national human rights institution with reinforced prerogatives. These legal and institutional 
frameworks are critical in supporting the domestic protection of citizens from torture, inhuman 
and degrading treatment and ensuring that those whose rights are violated can seek and receive 
a remedy from such violations. 
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4.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES 
While the implementation of individual rights is dealt with in the next chapter, the  state 
Reporting mechanism also offers a significant opportunity to present the  state’s views on how 
its obligations under these rights are given effect to in a practical way. The most fundamental  
state responsibility is the establishment of the institutional and legal frameworks to conform to 
international standards for the protection and promotion of human rights to all its citizens and 
all those within its jurisdiction. As noted earlier, these institutions are deficient in the scope 
and approach to fulfilling their obligations as both guarantors of these rights and a check on 
the tyranny of the  state. 
In its argument on article 7, Cameroon cited several cases in which evidence obtained through 
torture were not considered in court. Of importance are The People vs. Tanfack Julienne and 
Kamdem Robert,464and The People vs Mengue Junette and Djessa Jean Dennis465cases. The 
Committee concluded on the subject of torture that ‘the above cases, and many others, illustrate 
that the  state of Cameroon stands against the use of torture in police investigations.’ Despite 
this positive conclusion, an alternative report by the NGOs, Federation de l’action de Chretien 
pour l’abolition de la Torture (FIACAT), and Action Against Torture (ACAT) concluded that, 
‘...during the events of late February 2008, many individuals were subjected to torture. Those 
responsible for law and order used violence to arrest several people in the streets and 
swoops.’466  
These conclusions were also reflected in the concluding observations of the 2014 Committee 
Against Torture report that  stated that, ‘…torture seemed to be a prevalent practice in 
Cameroon and expressed concerns at reports that this situation still exists. It is troubled by the 
sharp contradictions between consistent allegations of serious violations of the Convention and 
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the information provided by the   state party.’467 The Committee declared its serious concerns 
about “reports of the systematic use of torture in police and gendarmerie stations after arrest; 
and the continued existence of extreme overcrowding in Cameroon’s prisons, in which living, 
and hygiene conditions would appear to endanger the health and lives of prisoners and are 
tantamount to inhuman and degrading treatment”468. 
In a 2006 visit to Cameroon, the special rapporteur on torture, Manfred Novak investigated the 
implementation of the recommendations of the previous visit in 1999 by the late Sir Nigel 
Rodley and concluded that; 
a recommendation that Cameroon makes a public denunciation of torture and also issue an 
internal memo that   states that any public official found guilty of any in act of ill-treatment or 
torture or who condones it will immediately be dismissed and prosecuted has never been done. 
s Such a public denunciation should demonstrate the countries commitment to its 
obligations469.  
While the government provided information attesting to disciplinary measures taken against 
employees who engaged in or condoned torture, the special rapporteur indicated in his report 
that NGO reports about such disciplinary measures are either rare or non-existent and that 
authors of such acts do so with impunity.470Also, on the recommendation that the government 
provides sufficient funds and an independent commission of inquiry to investigate acts of 
torture, the special rapporteur’s 2006 visit establish through NGO reports that any such 
commission will be compromised by excessive executive intrusion and influence on other 
branches of government.471  
On the respect of article 9 of the Covenant which guarantees the right to liberty and security of 
persons the Committee cited the preamble of Cameroon’s constitution which upholds that, 
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“freedom and security shall be guaranteed to everyone, subject to respect for the rights of others 
and the higher interests of the  state’ as a positive tone in this area. The Committee also noted 
that habeas corpus”472 is guaranteed under sections 584 to 588 of Cameroon’s Penal Code, even 
as it cited the decision in Nyo Wakai and 172 others v. The People, the administrative 
authorities in charge of law and order,473 in illustrating that, cases of habeas corpus abound. 
The Committee further noted that remand in custody, according to Cameroon’s Penal Code 
shall be legal if expressly authorised by the  state Council’ and such shall not be ordered 
according to section 119(4) on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays.  
On the guarantees against illegal and arbitrary arrest, Cameroon submitted that the “training 
and monitoring of detentions are measures taken to ensure the effective enforcement of the 
guarantees contained in the Criminal procedure code against illegal and arbitrary arrest”474. 
While it claimed that sanctions are meted against violations against the right to freedom and 
security, it also  stated that the commission to consider such claims for arbitrary detentions is 
not operational.  
The Committee also frowned at the fact that under article 2 of Law No. 90/024 (19 December 
1990), provincial governors and the minister of territorial administration can extend the 
detention of detainees indefinitely and called on Cameroon to bring its laws in compliance with 
article 9 paras 3 and 4 of the Covenant. The fact that persons detained under executive order 
cannot appeal the decisions or make any application to habeas corpus is a significant violation 
of the obligation of Cameroon under the Covenant. In Cameroon, administrative detentions by 
a senior divisional or divisional officer can last for 15 days renewable once for another 15 days. 
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Any extension will need explicit authorisation from the Governor or the Minister of Territorial 
administration which is still executive organs.  Such detentions have given rise to issues under 
article 10 of the Covenant. 
On the respect of the obligation to treat persons in detention with humanity under article 10(1), 
Cameroon argued that  
measures are taken to ensure compliance with the provisions of the CPC by both the judicial 
and penitentiary authorities ‘mastering the provisions of the CPC is the central concern of the 
annual meeting of Heads of Court of Appeal which allows an evaluation of its application and 
discussions on the difficulties of its implementation475 
It outlined a series of measures it has taken to ensure a) that the sanitation situation in its 
detention centres meets some basic minimum standards. For example, the building of one 
borehole in each of the ten prisons in the country. When one considers the number of persons 
under detention at every one moment across prisons in Cameroon, one borehole does not solve 
the problem of the lack of descent and hygienic condition under which prisoners live. In almost 
all the prisons and detention centres, prisoners still used buckets placed in their living quarters 
to defecate.476  
On the respect of the right to fair trial as grounded in article 14 of the Covenant, the Committee 
cited a vague reference to the constitution of Cameroon which   states that “the law shall ensure 
the right of every person to a fair hearing before the courts” and other sections of judicial 
organisation as testimony to the  state’s commitment to fair trial. Judicial guarantees by the 
constitution are undermined by article 37(3) of the same Constitution of the  state that vests the 
guarantee of judicial independence in the hands of the president of the republic who is also 
vested with enormous executive powers to appoint and dismiss judges without any legislative 
oversight. The US  state Department 2007 report477gives more clarity on the enormity of 
presidential powers.  
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The positive tone of the Committee’s observation reflects the constructive dialogue approach 
which is also a reflection of Chayes and Chayes ‘managing’ compliance approach.  Jane 
Connors describes this “constructive dialogue managing compliance approach as non-
contentious and non-adversarial…and no open accusations of human rights violation”478. It is 
this non-adversarial concluding observation that sets the tone and content of the next report. 
The Committee has no  stated rule on how reports should be prepared other than a porous 
general guideline guaranteed under what according to the Committee supersedes and overrides 
every previous guideline. Chapter 7 invariably shows that the constructive dialogue approach 
to questioning Cameroon’s commitment in upholding its obligation under the Covenant, 
especially with a convention riddled with ‘exceptional clauses’, numerous and consistent 
patterns of systemic violations as proved by its own special rapporteurs, Amnesty International 
and other  state reports and a constitutional tyranny vested in one person and run by decrees, is 
flawed. This is seen in the Concluding Observations of the Committee which forms the basis 
of the fifth periodic report. 
5. CONSIDERATION OF CAMEROON’S FIFTH PERIODIC REPORT 
In 2016, the Human Rights Committee considered Cameroon’s fifth Periodic Report pursuant 
to article 40 of the Covenant. The report, initially due for 2013, like most of its previous reports 
was submitted three years late. In the report, Cameroon  stated that the innovations since the 
presentation of the fourth Periodic Report consist in setting up an Inter-Ministerial Committee 
chaired by the Secretary General at the Prime Minister’s Office, to monitor the implementation 
of recommendations and decisions taken by the international and regional Human Rights 
promotion and protection mechanisms. Another innovation since the fourth Periodic Report 
has been the setting up of the Senate. The role of the Senate is important because it represents 
the regions and the customary practices relevant to the protection of human rights. Like the 
national assembly, its primary mandate is to debate legislation adopted at the national for the 
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purposes of passing the bill, amending it or rejecting all or part of the bill.479As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the Senate has become another rubber stamp institution and an extension 
of the executive. 
The Concluding Observations of Cameroon’s fourth Periodic Report forms the basis of its fifth 
periodic report and the basis of this analysis which focuses on the specific Covenant articles 
under consideration in this research. 
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 2(3) 
An effective remedy for human rights violation is an essential element in any rights protection 
regime. The normative framework for the provision of a remedy for human rights violations is 
defined under article 2(3) of the Covenant. In the case of the violation of the Covenant,   states 
are obliged to ensure that: 1) victims have effective remedy, 2) victims’ right to have their 
claims determined by a competent judiciary, administrative or legislative authorities or any 
other competent authority is respected, and 3) the competent authorities enforce such remedies. 
The justiciability of rights has increasingly granted courts the powers to strike down legislation 
that infringes on the ability of citizens to enjoy their rights. It may take the form of a review of 
administrative or legislative acts. The former involves the review by the courts of 
administrative actions in the determination of their conformity with the law.480Judicial review 
of acts of the administration and especially the executive in an autocratic country like 
Cameroon is particularly important, considering that the executive is the primary institution 
that causes legislation to be enacted and the most powerful institution that has always ensured 
its selective execution. Landau argues that competitive authoritarian regimes tend to possess 
democratic-looking constitutions with structural features such as the separation of powers but 
take simple measures to neutralize the value of those checks.481These perceived democratic 
institutions and procedures mask a harsh reality that can be seen in the way the process of 
effective remedy is achieved. Dworkin argues that “democracy requires that the power of 
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elected officials be checked by individual rights and the responsibility to decide when those 
rights have been infringed is not one that can sensibly be assigned to the officials whose power 
is supposed to be limited”482.  
Beyond being vested with the powers483 to declare rights abusive legislation unlawful, the 
courts can also provide remedies as required under article 2(3) of the Covenant.  This is a firm 
prescription of the Covenant: anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall 
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay 
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful,484and 
article 9(5) continues to argue that anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or 
detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation485. Consequently, the courts can 
conclusively determine whether an administrative act that violates the Covenant rights is 
consistent with the law or not. It can, therefore, move to declare such acts unlawful. Its 
jurisdiction ends in the determination of the lawfulness of administrative acts and not the 
constitutionality of the law; this is left to the Constitutional Council already discussed earlier. 
While the preamble of the Cameroon constitution outlines and entrenches certain rights, it is 
silent on the concept of effective remedy as outlined in article 2(3) of the Covenant. The 
absence of any constitutional provision constitutes a breach of good faith in compliance with 
its obligation to ensure that victims of violations are compensated, and those responsible 
brought to justice. Despite the silence of the constitution on issues of remedy for violation of 
human rights generally, this guarantee is entrenched in Cameroon’s Criminal procedure code 
(CPC).486 It clearly outlines rules on the compensation of persons whose rights under article 10 
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have been violated.487 Subsection 1 of the CPC allows for, “any person who has been illegally 
detained may, when the proceedings end in a no case ruling or an acquittal which has become 
final, obtain compensation if he proves that he has actually suffered injury of a serious nature 
as a result of such the detention”.  In subsection 3, the Code clarifies the authority in charge of 
such compensation and how the defaulting individuals or departments shall be held 
accountable. Victims of violation of article 9 of the Covenant are supposed to benefit from 
compensation under very stringent conditions as defined in section 236(2) a and b of the CPC. 
Cameroon has in certain situations demonstrated its compliance with this section in many 
cases, including in Mukong v Cameroon. It submitted in its fourth periodic review to the HRC 
that it had “…compensated Albert Mukong adequately488. The Committee was concerned 
about the delays in ensuring effective remedies and appropriate compensation for violations of 
Covenant rights in compliance with the views adopted by the Committee. It further 
recommended that: 
 ‘…the   state party should take appropriate measures, including training of law enforcement 
personnel, to ensure effective implementation of guarantees set out in the Criminal procedure 
code and to ensure that persons subjected to illegal and arbitrary detention are able to report 
such violations and are afforded effective judicial redress and compensation. The   state party 
should ensure that the claims commission set up under article 237 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure become operational without delay’489. 
The Penal Code also stipulates that, any person who violates individual freedoms may be 
prosecuted for false arrest 490  and oppression 491 . Furthermore, the trial court may award 
damages to victims who file civil actions. Despite these provisions, in practice, the very 
security and intelligence agencies highly reputable for violation of these rights are rarely 
prosecuted. The US  state Department’s 2011 country report on human rights practices 
emphasises this point as follows: “abuses by security forces were subject to internal 
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disciplinary investigations and criminal prosecution by the Ministry of Justice, but this rarely 
occurred. The government generally neither investigated nor punished effectively those who 
committed abuses”492. 
In a letter written by Cameroon’s Minister of Justice, Laurent Esso, and addressed to the 
Secretary General at the Presidency about implementing the recommendations of human rights 
treaty bodies, the former addressed the recommendations of the Concluding Observations of 
the fourth periodic report. In the letter, the Minister of Justice indicated that in Mukong v 
Cameroon, there has been ‘an equitable satisfaction’. Other cases previously dealt with by the 
Committee according to the Minister’s letter have also been handled. In Gorji v Cameroon, the 
letter indicated that ‘negotiations have been concluded and it is simply left to disburse the 
amount that has been decided by the President of the Republic.’493 In Njaru v Cameroon, 
Cameroon offered a compensation package of 40 million FCFA which was rejected by Mr. 
Njaru494.  
In the jurisprudence of the HRC, for a remedy to be effective, it must not only be available, but 
it must also be adequate. A remedy in the case of violation of article 9 would require restitution 
of liberty and possible reparation of harm caused during periods of detention. The need to 
ensure that such infractions do not occur again is vital to the realisation of Covenant rights. In 
its General Comment on effective remedy, the Committee   states that: 
…the purposes of the Covenant would be defeated without an obligation integral to article 2 to 
take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the Covenant. Accordingly, it has been 
a frequent practice of the Committee in cases under the Optional Protocol to include in its 
Views the need for measures, beyond a victim-specific remedy, to be taken to avoid recurrence 
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of the type of violation in question. Such measures may require changes in the   state party’s 
laws or practices.495 
The deficiency in Cameroon’s approach to the implementation of its obligation in guaranteeing 
effective remedy is its limited application of that concept and the extensive delay associated 
with actual compensation of victims, amending of laws or even punishing those responsible for 
violations. Cameroon’s record at effective remedy has been focused on the financial 
compensation aspect of remedy. In the Mukong case the Committee urged the   state party to 
grant Mukong appropriate compensation for the treatment he was subjected to; to investigate 
his allegations of ill-treatment in detention; to respect his rights under article 19 of the 
Covenant; and to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. Mukong received a 
compensation package of 200,000 US dollars after article 19 had internationalised the case for 
many years. Mukong was never provided with any other assistance associated with his mental 
or physical suffering. He died a few years later without effective remedy being totally fulfilled 
by Cameroon. According to a 2017 Redress Trust submission to the Human Rights Committee 
during its 121st session on the failure of Cameroon to implement the Committee’s views under 
individual communications, as of 2017, 13 years after Mukong’s death, the follow-up dialogue 
is ongoing496. 
There is no known record of anyone having been prosecuted for the torture, illegal deprivation 
of liberty and inhuman and degrading treatment. The structural conditions that made Mukong’s 
arrest and incarceration possible remain in place as is shown in Akwanga v Cameroon and 
subsequent cases. The conditions of detention have remained the same. While some of the laws 
have changed, the practice has remained virtually the same as has been shown in subsequent 
cases since Mukong’s arrest and incarceration. 
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5.2  IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 7 
The constitution of Cameroon seeks to adequately protect the inherent dignity of the human 
person through the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In the 
preambular section of its constitution, the right to the protection of the physical integrity of a 
person is guaranteed as part of the general guarantee of the right to life. It states that, ‘every 
person has a right to life, to physical and moral integrity and humane treatment in all 
circumstances. Under no circumstances shall any person be subjected to torture, to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.’497 The inviolability of the human body and the protection of 
individuals from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, as outlined in the 
preamble, is given additional accent through secondary law.  
Once it internalised the Covenant, it amended its Penal Code (PC) in line with the Covenant’s 
obligation to criminalise violations of these rights and it promulgated law No. 97/009 of 10 
January 1997 to modify certain provisions of the Code by revising former sections 132 and 133 
relating to torture to meet up with international standards. It is on this basis that the definition 
of torture as per its Penal Code fully reflects that coded in article 1 of the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT)498. As per the PC,  
Torture shall mean any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted by or at the investigation of a public official or with his express or tacit 
consent on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or putting pressure on him or a third person, or for any other 
motive based on any form of discrimination whatsoever. It shall not include pain or suffering 
arising from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions499 
Torture is specifically criminalised according to section 277 of its Penal Code. The CPC also 
forbids the inhuman treatment of detainees by proscribing any acts of “physical or mental 
constraints, or torture”500. Even without the explicit codification within the CPC, the pyramid 
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of the hierarchy of norms grants constitutional provisions superior status over other legislative 
enactments. The Cameroon Criminal procedure code and Penal Code forbid the use of torture 
and all other acts that violate human dignity and personal integrity. A subsequent amendment 
of the Penal Code criminalises certain acts which should constitute a violation of the integrity 
of the person. The new Penal Code, as amended, supplements certain old provisions with more 
clarity and robustness. Section 277(3) states: ‘(1) Whoever involuntarily causes death by 
torture shall be punished with life imprisonment.501 (2) Where, as a result of torture the victim 
is permanently deprived of the use of the whole or any part of a limb, organ or sense, the 
punishment shall be for from ten to twenty years. (3) Where torture results in illness or 
industrial disablement of more than 30 days, the punishment shall be imprisonment for from 
five to ten years and a fine of from 100,000 to 1,000,000 francs. (4) Where torture leads to 
illness or incapacity to work for up to thirty days or pain or psychological or mental illness, the 
punishment shall be imprisonment for from 2 (two) to 5 (five) years and a fine of from 50,000 
to 200,000 francs.  
In its 2016 submission to the Committee Against Torture, Cameroon argued in para 1(6) and 
1(7) that the definition of torture introduced in the criminal procedure code article 132 bis is 
consistent with that in article 1 and 4 of CAT and submits in para. 7 that the ‘legislator has 
introduced penalties proportional to the seriousness of the acts committed’502 
It submitted that ‘in accordance with the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Cameroon has established torture as an offence 
under Act No. 97-009 of 10 January 1997’. In its annex 1 to its report Cameroon presented the 
details of the law discussed and adopted by its National Assembly and promulgated into law 
by the President. In its article 132(1) for example, anyone who causes death by torture is 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
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The Penal Code also rejects any justification of torture based on exceptional circumstances 
such as a state of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency. 503 The courts 
and other competent authorities effectively apply the provisions mentioned above. For instance, 
section 277 (a) (7) is reflected in the decision of the Supreme Court of Cameroon in judgment 
No. 4 of 7 October 1969 wherein the court stated that,  
 state agents or civil servants cannot invoke orders from their superiors as justification or 
excuse; similarly, an accused may not invoke the orders of his employer to justify an offence, 
where such facts are established, they do not absolve the accused and personal acts are not 
expunged unless it was a case of force majeure.  
Preliminary inquiries in cases of torture are carried out by the examining magistrate who is a 
magistrate of the bench. This is an innovation brought by the CPC. At the close of the inquiry, 
where the examining magistrate finds that the facts constitute an act of torture, he makes a 
committal order forwarding the case before the competent court for trial. Whenever the court 
finds that torture has been perpetrated, it punishes the offender accordingly.504 ‘Any individual, 
or any agent of the state, culpable of such acts, either on their own initiative, or on instruction, 
will be punished in accordance with the law’. This is a grey area in Cameroon’s penal law when 
we square the actions of state security agents, administrators and top law enforcement officials 
who have acted with impunity on the population and instead received rewards in terms of 
promotion. The case is true of Oben Peter Ashu who, as Divisional Officer for Ndu subdivision, 
oversaw the rape and torture of dozens of women during months of anti-government 
demonstrations. Despite international outcry, he was promoted to the position of Governor of 
the South West Region. Mr. Oben Peter Ashu died in 2015 without ever having been charged 
or tried505. 
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Cameroon has also argued that Judicial and administrative sanctions are meted out on prison 
administrative personnel, law enforcement officers, gendarme officers, other civil servants and 
traditional rulers when they are found guilty of acts of impunity. In its 2010 submission under 
the periodic review process of the Human Rights Committee, it cited several cases of judicial 
actions taken against law enforcement officers including that of The People v. Police Constable 
Mandjek. The accused was prosecuted for torture, breach of trust, as well as grievous and 
simple harm. By a judgment of 30 November 2005, this matter was considered discontinued 
as a result of the death of the accused in the course of the proceedings506. In its concluding 
observation to Cameroon’s fourth periodic report,  
The Committee noted the commitment expressed by the state party to eliminate torture, 
including through the establishment in 2005 of a Special Division for the Control of Services 
to ensure “the policing of the Police”. However, the Committee is deeply concerned that torture 
remains widespread in the   state party. Reviewing information provided by the   state party on 
disciplinary sanctions against law enforcement personnel in cases of torture, the Committee is 
concerned that penalties handed down in these cases are insignificant compared to the damage 
caused to the victims and are much weaker than those established in the Criminal Code for the 
crime of torture. The Committee was also concerned that victims of torture by law enforcement 
and prison personnel in some cases are unable to report such violations and that confessions 
obtained under torture are still taken into consideration during court hearings, notwithstanding 
the explicit provision on the inadmissibility of confessions obtained under duress under the 
Criminal procedure code. (arts. 7 and 10)  
The Committee recommended that 
The   state party should ensure that (a) victims of torture, those held in detention, have easy 
access to mechanisms to report violations; (b) impartial and independent inquiries are carried 
out to address such allegations of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment; and (c) 
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perpetrators are appropriately punished. The punishment handed down and compensation 
provided to victims should be proportionate to the gravity of the crime committed.507 
Similarly, in its concluding observation on Cameroon’s fourth periodic review issued in 2010, 
the state party was required to ensure that victims of torture held in detention should have easy 
access to mechanisms to report violations. Also, to ensure that impartial and independent 
inquiries are carried out to address such allegations of torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment, and perpetrators are appropriately punished, and the punishment handed down, and 
compensation provided to victims should be proportionate to the gravity of the crime 
committed.508 
In its fifth periodic report following the Human Rights Committee 2010 Concluding 
Observations, Cameroon reported a dozen investigations of cases of torture and disciplinary 
actions taken against security and civilian authorities and compensation paid to victims of 
torture. For example, in 2012, judicial services opened five investigations which resulted in 
five prosecutions and one acquittal. At the National Gendarmerie, 12 law enforcement officials 
were investigated for torture, assault, the threat of life or arbitrary detention. In Judgment No. 
42/CRIM of 13 March 2012, the Military Tribunal, Yaoundé sentenced a gendarme officer to 
eight years imprisonment with a fine of CFA 200,000 for torture, assault, and false arrest.509 
While these cases are significant, they fall far short in comparison to the number of victims of 
security officials.  
Contrary to the positive tone in Cameroon’s submission, the concluding observation of its 
report to the Convention Against Torture in the same period draws a very different conclusion. 
The Committee  stated its concerns about credible reports from a variety of sources alleging 
that security forces have carried out against adults and children, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary 
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detention, acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and violations of the right 
to a fair trial.510 The Committee then asked Cameroon to take effective measures to put an end 
to the harassment, arbitrary arrest, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and death 
threats to which journalists and human rights defenders are exposed, and to prevent further acts 
of violence.511 
Also, in its 2013 fifth periodic report submitted almost three years late, it also   stated the cases 
of 64 police officers of all ranks who received disciplinary measures ranging from written 
warning to three months’ suspension for torture, assault or other inhuman treatment. During 
the period 2012-2013, the DGSN received complaints on torture and poor treatment. 
Investigations resulted in the following:  
• two prosecutions for torture, one of which resulted in an acquittal for want of evidence;  
• 15 prosecutions for poor treatment broken down as follows: four cases of false arrest, two 
cases of oppression, four cases of slight harm, three cases of simple harm, and two cases of 
murder. 80 Police officers, be they convicted or acquitted, were punished for proved cases of 
torture or inadequate treatment.512 
In its concluding observation to the 5th report, the:  
Committee takes note of the state party’s efforts to prosecute persons who have committed acts 
of torture but remains concerned about the persistence of such acts. In the context of counter-
terrorism, the Committee is particularly concerned at the alleged existence of: (a) numerous 
cases of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment perpetrated in places of detention 
used by the rapid response brigade and the intelligence service, in which victims have 
reportedly been killed or left with severe disabilities; and (b) secret detention facilities that are 
not subject to oversight of any kind (arts. 2 and 7). The   state party should: (a) ensure that 
alleged acts of torture and ill-treatment committed by agents of the  state, including the rapid 
response brigade and the intelligence service, are thoroughly investigated, and see to it that 
suspected perpetrators are prosecuted and, if found guilty, duly punished, and that victims are 
compensated and offered rehabilitation services; (b) prohibit and punish secret detention and 
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detention in unofficial facilities; and (c) establish a national mechanism for the prevention of 
torture513 
Unfortunately, as it has always been the case with Cameroon, no concrete measures were ever 
taken to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee. In its next Concluding 
Observations in its 2015 periodic report submitted in 2016, the Committee found it ‘regrettable 
that the recommendations on the use of pretrial detention and the harassment of journalists and 
human rights defenders, which had been identified for follow-up in the previous concluding 
observations, have not yet been implemented.’514 
In its 2018 report submitted under the UPR, Cameroon emphasised its commitment against 
impunity to engage in disciplinary actions against those found guilty. Even as it argued that “in 
2016, proceedings were brought against 175 law enforcement officers, and 14 convictions were 
handed down by the military courts for offences relating to the violation of the right to life 
and/or the right to protection from physical and mental injury”515, the Netherlands expressed 
concerns at reports of discrimination, violence, torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest and 
detention in the English-speaking regions of the state, deterioration of the overall situation of 
human rights, aggravated by anti-terror laws516. Finland was encouraging Cameroon to give 
access to international human rights mechanisms, including with respect to those held in 
detention517 and the Committee against Torture recommended that Cameroon put an end to the 
practice of incommunicado detention and ensure that no one is detained in secret or 
                                                 
513 Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations pursuant to its report submitted under 
article 40 of the Covenant p.5 para. 17 in UN Doc. CCPR/C/CMR/CO/5 (2017) 
514 Consideration of Reports submitted by  state parties under article 19 of the Convention, 
Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture para 8 at 2 U.N. Doc 
CAT/C/CMR/COS/5/2015 (2017) 
515 National report submitted in accordance with para. 5 of the annexes to resolution 16/21 of 
the Human Rights Council pp 5-6, para. 25 UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/30/CMR/1 (2018) 
516 Human Rights Council, report of the working group on the Universal Periodic Review para 
52 UN Doc. A/HRC/39/15 (2018) 




unauthorized places, including unlisted military detention centres518. These statements and 
recommendations show the slow progress 34 years since Cameroon acceded to the Covenant. 
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 9 
There are four critical components in article 9 which are central to its fulfilment. Apart from 
the negative obligation that are forbidden in section 1, the other three sections prescribe positive 
obligations that must be taken by states parties to ensure their fulfilment. Being informed at the 
time of the arrest of the reasons for the arrest; promptly brought before a judge to be tried or 
released, right to challenge the legality of any detention and the right to compensation for any 
illegal arrest or detention are four important component of article 9. These obligations have 
been translated into law under Cameroon’s Penal and Civil Procedure Codes. Critical to the 
deprivation of liberty, is the right to habeas corpus which grants detained persons the right to 
challenge the legality of their detention.  
It is also noted that most cases in which administrative detention orders have been invoked in 
the name of public order and national security are those that have challenged the tyrannical 
nature of governance. The preamble of the constitution of 18 January 1996 stipulates that 
‘freedom and security shall be guaranteed to each individual, subject to respect for the rights 
of others and the higher interests of the state. The same preamble further provides that ‘no 
person may be prosecuted, arrested or detained except in the cases and according to the manner 
determined by law. The CPC defines detention as detention by the judicial police officer in 
disrespect of the provisions of sections 119 to 126 of this Code519 and detention by the state 
counsel or the examining magistrate.520 
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The right to habeas corpus has been codified under the Cameroon Criminal procedure code 
section 584-588. It provides safeguards aimed at redressing cases of illegal arrest or detention. 
Section 584 of the CPC states: 
 1. The president of the High Court of the Place of arrest or detention of a person or any other 
judge of the said court shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for immediate release based 
on grounds of illegality of arrest or detention or failure to observe the formalities provided by 
law 2. He shall also have jurisdiction to deal with applications filed against administrative 
remand measures 3. The application shall be filed either by the person arrested or detained or 
on his behalf by anyone else. 
Also, any administrator who illegally deprives someone of his/her liberty may be punished 
under section 291 of the Penal Code. Section 291 provides: ‘(1) whoever in any manner 
deprives another of his liberty shall be punished with imprisonment of from five to ten years 
and with fine of from twenty thousand to one million francs.’ 
Any violation of these rights is sanctioned under the PC. Section 271 of the PC reads as follows:  
“Any person who violates individual freedoms may be prosecuted for false arrest”.521 This 
prosecution and punishment may be made depending on the length of the deprivation. Where 
the deprivation of liberty lasts for more than a month; accompanied with physical and mental 
torture, the punishment will be for from 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment.522 
Apart from the prosecution and punishment of those who violate the premise of article 9, a 
remedy is also provided for in the CPC. According to Section 236(1) of the CPC, ‘any person 
who has been illegally detained may, when the proceedings end in a no-case ruling or an 
acquittal which has become final, obtain compensation if he proves that he has actually suffered 
injury of a particularly serious nature as a result of such a detention’. The compensation 
according to Section 236(3) is paid by the state and recovered from the judicial police, the state 
counsel or examining magistrate, depending on which institution was responsible for the 
detention.523 
The detention periods are determined by the length of time it takes to investigate a matter and 
establish evidence whether the case should proceed to trial or not. Under this system, human 
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rights defenders and political activists have been detained for long periods while purported 
investigations on their alleged crimes are conducted. It is during such periods that evidence is 
extracted from them through torture, incommunicado detentions and other forms of rights 
deprivation.524 Two cases illustrate this scenario. In June 2015, Numvi Walters and four other 
persons were arrested by secret agents of the government and detained at the judicial police of 
the town of Bamenda. They were denied access to their families and lawyers as the government 
conducted its secret investigations. Numvi Walters was subjected to torture and detained in 
isolation from the others in four different locations. A writ of habeas corpus525 filed by their 
lawyers one month after their arrest and detention have never been heard because of the 
government’s claim that the case was still under investigation. The refusal to hear this case 
violates the right to the presumption of innocence explicitly guaranteed by the criminal 
procedure code526. It is also an indication of the conflict of jurisdiction that continues to mar 
the effectiveness of the judiciary and exacerbating the clash between common and Civil Law 
jurisdictions. The abuse of process by the executive is indicative of its huge influence on 
judicial matters. Keith has argued that ‘the writ of habeas corpus protects individuals against 
arbitrary or political imprisonment in that the government is usually required promptly to 
present evidence sufficient to justify holding a prisoner and to make known the charges brought 
against a prisoner.’527While highly charged political cases have seen the writ to habeas corpus 
overtly violated by the executive, there have been some cases concerning high profile executive 
officers in which habeas corpus has been granted. In Etengeneng v South West Region 
Governor and Anor,528 the judge granted the right of the applicant when the respondents, the 
governor of the South West region and the provincial chief of national security, failed to file a 
counter motion challenging the writ to habeas corpus. Under its Civil Law system, the right to 
habeas corpus is seriously undermined by administrative detention powers of executive 
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officers. Such powers account for the high level of pre-trial detentions and consequently 
overcrowded prisons which have severe implications on the way it upholds its obligations 
under article 10. As Sir Nigel Rodley, the late UN Special Rapporteur for torture observed, it 
is common knowledge that in Cameroon pre-trial detention is widely used by the executive 
(police and prosecuting authorities) as a form of punishment rather than for its primary goal of 
upholding order and security or facilitating investigations. This is disturbing and has already 
been justly condemned elsewhere.529 In its fifth periodic report submitted to the Committee 
Against Torture, Cameroon quoted article 221 of its Criminal procedure code which  states that 
persons placed in pretrial detention by an investigative judge must be released or referred to 
the competent court once the judicial investigation has been completed or the pretrial detention 
order has expired’ 
Despite the presence of a Criminal Procedure Code that spells out the obligation of the state in 
dealing with violations of personal integrity rights, the right to habeas corpus ensures that the 
criminal law does not become an arbitrary instrument of oppression in the hands of the state, 
and especially the executive530. The harmonised Criminal procedure code and the constitution 
have clearly stated the conditions under which anyone suspected of any crime may be arrested 
and detained. If such an arrest takes place, the president of the high court of the place of arrest 
or detention of a person or any other judge of the said court shall be competent to hear 
applications for immediate release on the grounds of illegality of arrest or detention or failure 
to observe the formalities as provided by law.531 Habeas corpus thus presents to the victim of 
rights violation the opportunity to challenge the legality of both the actions and the law invoked 
to justify that action. While this right is spelled out and guaranteed under the CPC, amongst 
the tools used by Cameroon and its agents to legitimize the egregious violations of the rights 
to habeas corpus are the use of the judiciary, the police, gendarmes and administrators.  In 
Wakai and 172 others v Cameroon, despite a successful challenge by the defendant of the 
legality of their detention, the executive branch refused to respect the court order demanding 
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their release. This method was also discernible in the abduction and trial of Akwanga Ebenezer 
in 1997 and later trial by the Military Court in Yaoundé. In Mukong v Cameroon, it was noted 
that the author’s lawyer twice applied to the High Court of Bamenda for writs of habeas corpus, 
all of which were rejected on the grounds that the case was before a military tribunal and that 
no writ of habeas corpus lies against charges to be determined by a military tribunal.532 The 
executive has constantly used administrative measures to circumvent judicial decisions and 
extend detention periods and has used the military court as an extension of executive power 
over the court system. 
In its 2009 report to the Convention Against Torture, Cameroon submitted that it had taken 
specific measures to improve on its prison conditions by the formal introduction of action on 
habeas corpus or immediate release533 and by reducing overcrowding in prisons by reducing 
the number of persons in pre-trial detention. It also submitted that it had taken measures 
through its criminal procedure law that prohibits the subjection of suspects to torture and the 
obligation to treat them humanely.534In its response to similar concerns, the Human Rights 
Committee argued that safeguards against illegal and arbitrary arrests provided for in the CPC 
are often not implemented in practice, including the time limit for legal detention.535 
Cameroon’s much-proclaimed CPC, an intercourse between the French Civil Law and English 
Common Law systems, along with customary law, emerged in an effort to address the common 
practice of arbitrary and unlawful arrests, secret detentions, and the prejudice of criminal 
proceedings. The Code, which is said to offer an efficient, reliable and legally sound set of 
structured rules and guidelines to facilitate criminal proceedings, instead offers a legal 
straitjacket within which the parties, particularly the defence, are obliged to operate.536 
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In its 2010 concluding observations on Cameroon’s fourth periodic report, the Committee 
decried the lengthy pre-trial detention periods which, it argued, was in contravention of section 
221 of the CPC and accounts for the high level of overcrowding observed in Cameroon’s 
prisons. The Committee also expressed concerns that safeguards against illegal and arbitrary 
arrest provided for in the Criminal procedure code are often not implemented in practice, 
including the time limit for legal detention in police custody, and that accused persons are often 
not adequately informed about their rights.537 
What has been clear about Cameroon’s enforcement approach of its obligation under article 9 
is the way it interprets its civil status and the administrative prerogatives in the arrest and pre-
trial detentions which are not subject to any judicial oversight. A restrictive interpretation has 
led to arbitrary actions by overzealous political administrators. Part of section 236(1) of its 
Criminal procedure code reads thus: ‘any person who has been illegally detained may, when 
the proceedings end in a no-case ruling or an acquittal which has become final…’; This means 
that illegal arrests can only lead to compensation if there is no ruling on the substantive reasons 
for the arrests. 
In its 2010 concluding observation of the Committee Against Torture, the Committee expressed 
its deep concerns about the high number of persons held in pretrial detention – 14,265 
compared with 8,931 convicted prisoners in 2009. It has also expressed concerns that the 
maximum period of pretrial detention provided for under article 221 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 12 months in the case of ordinary offenses and 18 months for serious offenses, is 
not observed as   stated in its article 2.538 It rejected Cameroon’s submission in its fourth 
periodic report on the provisions of its criminal procedure code on habeas corpus and 
recommended that the   state party should revise its Code of Criminal Procedure to allow 
anyone with a writ of habeas corpus to be released immediately and should also activate the 
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claims commission without delay.539 In its fifth periodic report to the Committee Against 
Torture, Cameroon used the example of the case of Christophe Kamdem to illustrate its 
commitment to the writ of habeas corpus. Cameroon argued that Kamdem released pursuant to 
Ordinance No. 0011/OHC/CAB/PTGI/Mifi of 22 October 2014 when it was established that 
he was placed under pretrial detention for three months with appearing before a judge. A habeas 
corpus judge found the period of detention to be unnecessarily long540.  
Under its legal system and the Civil Law tradition which it holistically inherited from France, 
the presumption of innocence is fluid. There is the general tendency reflected in the way 
security officers treat those arrested, to presume guilt and put the burden of proof on the 
arrested. This approach to securitisation has led to massive overcrowding in detention centres 
because of thousands of pretrial detentions. These detention periods are determined by the 
length of time it takes to investigate a matter and establish evidence whether the case should 
proceed to trial. So first you are arrested, determined by law to be culpable and then detained 
before evidence is established to go to trial. Under such a regime of justice human rights 
defenders and political activists have been detained for long periods while purported 
investigations on their alleged crimes are conducted. It is during such periods that evidence is 
extracted from them through torture, incommunicado detentions and different forms of rights 
deprivation.541  
Under the Common Law system that operated in Southern Cameroons, the presumption of 
innocence formed the cornerstone of its legal foundation. The legal implication of this rule is 
that pre-trial detentions become an exception regulated by law rather than the rule. Although 
the harmonised CPC has adopted this principle, its actual interpretation and implementation by 
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the magistrates and judges still hinge very much on the ascent of political interpretation of 
statutes. The clash of the inquisitorial and adversarial systems lends credence to Cziment’s 
assertion that Cameroon is not a mixed system. The consequence of such interpretation is that 
more than half of the persons in detention are pre-trial detainees on whom the writ of habeas 
corpus has never been exercised. This conflict of jurisdiction formed the central argument in 
the preliminary submission in the Numvi et al v The People case. In their notice of objection 
in limine litis, the lawyers for the defendants argued inter alia ‘that there is a conflict of 
jurisdiction given that the application for habeas corpus which was filed on behalf of the 
accused persons since the 25th of May 2015 is still pending adjudication before the High Court 
of Mezam Division’542 The delay in hearing cases of habeas corpus  has compounded the 
situation of those detained as thousands are kept under inhuman and degrading conditions due 
to overcrowding in jails caused by lengthy pre-trial detentions. This has compounded the 
conditions of detention of thousands of inmates resulting in the death of many. This is reflected 
in the Concluding Observations of Cameroons fifth periodic report. The Committee submits 
that: 
The Committee remains concerned at reports that there have been many arbitrary arrests, made 
in particular by the rapid response brigade in the context of counter-terrorism. It regrets that 
the commission set up to examine compensation claims submitted in relation to arbitrary arrest 
is not yet operational, even though its members have been appointed. Further, the Committee 
is concerned about the excessive length of judicial proceedings and the large number of persons 
placed in pretrial detention (arts. 9, 10 and 14)543.  
It then recommended that 
The   state party should take steps to see to it that: (a) no one is arbitrarily arrested or detained 
and all the legal rights of detainees are respected, in compliance with articles 9 and 14 of the 
Covenant; (b) all cases of arbitrary arrest are investigated and those responsible are subjected 
to disciplinary action and/or judicial proceedings; (c) all victims of arbitrary arrest are accorded 
compensation by the commission set up to examine compensation claims submitted in relation 
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to arbitrary arrest; and (d) the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the permissible 
length of pretrial detention are observed544. 
In its Concluding Observations of Cameroons fourth Periodic Reporting, concerning article 9, 
the Committee  stated that it was deeply concerned about long pre-trial detention periods which 
often exceed the limits set for such detention in article 221 of Cameroons Criminal procedure 
code and about the high number of persons held in pre-trial detention, accounting for 61 percent 
of the total prison population of 23,196 according to 2009 statistics.545 
In the review of its Fifth Periodic Report, Cameroon argued that it had taken steps to reduce 
illegal and arbitrary arrests which have included training and monitoring of detentions 
undertaken to ensure the effective enforcement of the guarantees contained in the CPC against 
illegal and arbitrary arrests. It also argued that sanctions are imposed for violation of the rights 
to freedom and security. While it has also created a Committee to monitor illegal and arbitrary 
arrests, the Committee is yet to go operational. 
Many aspects of article 9 are not fully implemented by Cameroon as has been shown in Oben 
Maxwell v the People, Nyo Wakai and 172 others v The People and is shown below in the 
Akwanga v Cameroon cases. Most of these persons were arrested and detained without fully 
being informed of the reasons for their arrest, were never brought promptly before a judge. 
Akwanga was detained incommunicado for 19 months without being brought before a judge. 
Oben Maxwell spent almost two years in jail before being arraigned to court. Most of them 
could not also challenge the legality of their detention, and in the case where it was possible as 
was with Nyo Wakai and 172 others, a court order ordering their release was ignored by the  
state, and the detainees were moved to another jurisdiction. 
In the Committee’s Concluding Observation on Cameroon’s fifth periodic report, it expressed 
concerns that Cameroon’s rapid intervention unit also known as BIR continue to engage in 
arbitrary arrests under Cameroons anti-terrorism campaign. It also regretted that despite the 
creation and appointment of members of the commission to establish compensation claims 
                                                 
544 Ibid para. 34 
545 Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observation of Cameroon’s fourth Periodic Report 




associated with the violation of article 9, it remains non-operational. It recommended that the   
state party take steps to see to it that no one is arbitrarily arrested and that all cases of arbitrary 
arrests are investigated, and the perpetrators are subjected to disciplinary actions or judicial 
proceedings. Also, and most importantly that all victims of arbitrary arrest are accorded 
compensation by the commission set up to examine compensation claims submitted concerning 
arbitrary arrest; and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the permissible length 
of pretrial detention are observed546. 
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 10(1) 
All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. This compelling prescription of the Covenant is the 
weakest link in Cameroon’s protection regime. The constitution recognises that detainees are 
entitled to treatment that ‘upholds their dignity, their physical and mental health, and which 
helps their rehabilitation into society. It emphasises the cardinality of the humane treatment of 
detained persons, one which must be consistent with the protection of human dignity and in a 
way, that maintains their physical integrity.’547 This is consistent with the minimum standard 
rule under international law. Despite this explicit constitutional provision, it is not matched by 
budgetary allocations to ensure such protections. 
The relationship between articles 9 and 10 is evident in the fact that the more article 9(1) is 
violated, the more people populate the prisons and the more people we have in jail, the higher 
the risk of overcrowding, poor hygiene, poor feeding and the higher the likelihood of the 
contravention of their rights under article 10(1).  This vicious circle is difficult to break because 
of a culture in Cameroon of administrative detentions which prevents habeas corpus challenge 
and legally justified in the name of public order.  
Prisons in Cameroon have always been overcrowded, and the treatment of detainees has not 
met the minimum standards for the treatment of persons in detention. In its 2010 Concluding 
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Observations on its fourth periodic report, the Committee stated that ‘the state party should 
ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person and that conditions of detention comply with the 
Covenant and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners. The 
conditions of detention have been questioned and condemned by numerous human rights 
reports.  
In its 2009 report to the Committee Against Torture, Cameroon indicated that it had taken 
specific measures to improve on its prison conditions by the formal introduction of action on 
habeas corpus or immediate release548 and by reducing overcrowding in prisons through the 
reduction of the number of persons in pre-trial detention. It also submitted that it had taken 
measures through its criminal procedure law by prohibiting the subjection of suspects to torture 
and the obligation to treat them humanely.549 In its response to similar concerns, the Human 
Rights Committee retorted that safeguards against illegal and arbitrary arrests provided for in 
the CPC are often not implemented in practice, including the time limit for legal detention.550 
It also argued in its 2010 submission to the Human Rights Committee that the situation of 
overcrowding is gradually being redressed, especially with the adoption of Law No. 2005/007 
of 25 July 2005 on the CPC that came into force on 1 January 2007. The CPC, it argued, re-
establishes the position of the examining magistrate who henceforth is a magistrate of the bench 
contrary to the system instituted by Ordinance No. 72/4 of 2 August 1972 on the Judicial 
Organisation of the state which conferred judicial inquiry on the legal department. These 
measures should have the effect of speeding up cases the submission continued. 
In the same submission, it argued that the recruitment of more personnel has allowed for the 
redeployment of judicial staff, resulting in the prompt treatment of procedures in general and 
preventive detention matters. Furthermore, to curb the problem of overcrowding in the prisons 
and poor detention conditions, the government has taken measures to regularly transfer 
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convicts from overpopulated to less populated prisons, and to ensure the humane treatment of 
detainees it has engaged in the sensitisation of prison personnel on the promotion and 
protection of the rights of detainees by opening up to associations and non-governmental 
organisations which ensure human rights protection through talks, communication and 
presentations551. 
These measures, however, have not reduced overcrowding in prisons and detention centres. 
Cameroon has resorted to justification based on its economic situation. In Akwanga v 
Cameroon, the Committee rejected the lack of resources as enough reason to justify the 
condition of detention and non-segregation of detainees552 and found a violation of articles 
10(1) and (2). In a similar case, Chisala Mukunto v. Zambia,553 the   state party held that due 
to its economic constraints, it could be held accountable for the conditions of detention the 
author suffered since these were common to all prisoners and the author was not explicitly 
singled out.554 
In its jurisprudence on article 10, the Committee has been consistent in arguing that the 
minimum standard in the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty cannot be argued away 
based on economic situations. Despite these assurances and changes both in policy and laws, 
Cameroon’s prisons remain overcrowded, and detainees continue to be treated with impunity 
and neglect. It has argued that the lack of resources accounts for the overcrowded nature of its 
prisons and the inhuman way in which detainees are treated. The Committee reflected this 
reality again in the concluding Observation of Cameroons 5th periodic report when it submits 
that 
The Committee is concerned to note that conditions are poor in almost all prison facilities in 
the   state party and that this situation has apparently led to riots. Of particular concern are: (a) 
the very high rate of prison overcrowding; (b) deaths in detention and violence among 
prisoners; (c) the failure to segregate accused persons from convicted persons and to segregate 
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juveniles from adults in many institutions; and (d) the difficulties encountered by families 
wishing to visit their relatives in prison, including the requirement to obtain permission from 
the military prosecutor in the case of persons sentenced by military courts (arts. 6, 7, 10 and 
23)555. 
It then recommended that  
The   state party should: (a) continue its efforts to improve the living conditions and treatment 
of prisoners; (b) continue to take steps to address prison overcrowding, in keeping with the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela 
rules); (c) pursue its efforts to use non-custodial penalties as an alternative to deprivation of 
liberty; (d) take the necessary steps to separate prisoners according to age, sex and detention 
regime; and (e) ensure that families are routinely allowed to visit their relatives in prison556. 
The Committee further expressed its concerns with overcrowding in detention centres and 
prisons, as follows: 
…the Committee remains concerned about the continuing problem of severe overcrowding and 
grossly inadequate conditions in prisons. In addition to concerns about inadequate hygiene and 
health conditions, inadequate rations and quality of food, and inadequate access to health care, 
the Committee notes that the rights of women to be separated from men, of minors to be 
separated from adults, and of persons in pre-trial detention to be separated from convicts are 
often not guaranteed. The Committee is of the view that there is a need for a stronger oversight 
of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. 
In its Program to improve detention conditions and the respect of human rights (PACDET), 
Cameroon stated that the second phase has helped improved detention conditions at various 
levels and has also allowed for the rehabilitation of all 10 central prisons, as well as the 
extension of the central prison.  It has also achieved the separation of men from women, minors 
from adults and convicts from those awaiting trials. 
In its General Comments 21 that replaced General Comments 9,  
‘The Committee indicated that reports should specify what concrete measures have been taken 
by the competent authorities to monitor the effective application of the rules regarding the 
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty.  state parties should include in their reports 
information concerning the system for supervising penitentiary establishments, the specific 
                                                 
555   Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations pursuant to its report submitted 
under article 40 of the Covenant”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CMR/CO/5 (2017) para. 29 




measures to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and how impartial 
supervision is ensured’. 
Despite these changes, Cameroon seems to continue in the path of inhuman and degrading 
treatment of detainees as stated in the 2015 Amnesty International Report:  
Prison conditions remained poor: chronic overcrowding, inadequate food, limited medical care, 
and deplorable hygiene and sanitation. The wave of arrests of individuals suspected of 
supporting Boko Haram further aggravated these conditions. Maroua prison houses 1,300 
detainees, more than three times its intended capacity (350), and over 40 detainees died 
between March and May. The population of the central prison in Yaoundé is approximately 
4,100, for a maximum capacity of 2000.’557 
The non-respect for article 10 gives rise to issues of articles 2(3) and 14 none of which has 
been adequately dealt with by the Cameroon state. Detainees continue to suffer indignity due 
to overcrowding, poor sanitation, poor feeding and even abuse by prison guards and other 
inmates. No one has been held accountable, and no compensation accorded any of the victims 
of deliberate state policy that contravenes its obligation under the Covenant. 
5.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 14 
Article 14 is vital in safeguarding the other rights under consideration. Although it is not a non-
derogable right ‘the guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of 
derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights.’558 As article 7 is also 
non-derogable in its entirety, no  statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence 
obtained in violation of this provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered 
by article 14.559 In Cameroon the right to fair trial is guaranteed in both specific and general 
terms under the constitution and Civil Procedure Code. On a general perspective, the guarantee 
of the right to fair trial is entrenched in the preamble of the constitution in the following terms: 
‘The law shall ensure the right of every person to a fair hearing before the courts; every accused 
person is presumed innocent until found guilty during a hearing conducted in strict compliance 
with the rights of defence560. It is a right reflected in its Civil Procedure Code. ‘Any person 
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suspected of having committed an offence shall be presumed innocent until his guilt has been 
legally established during a trial where he shall be given all necessary guarantees for his 
defence and this shall apply to every suspect, defendant and accused.’561 
The divide between theory and practice lies in the actual protection of such explicit provisions 
as it is usually silent or insufficient to promote and protect fair trial in the courts as an 
accusatory system, which reflects the civil criminal legal structure. The right to a fair trial also 
remains a function of the institutions designed to ensure its respect. As far as the Cameroon 
constitution is concerned, judicial independence which is critical to a fair trial is guaranteed 
from both the legislature and executive 562  branches and the Constitutional Council 563  is 
empowered to review legislative and executive actions. These guarantees are quite critical to a 
fair trial even though Fombad argues that there exists no evidence in Francophone Africa of 
any president who ever referred a matter for judicial review before the Constitutional 
Council.564 
The constitutional entrenchment of rights is only the first step in the realisation of a state’s 
obligation under the Covenant; the judiciary must be able to enforce these constitutionally 
entrenched rights. Based on Cameroon’s constitution, the guarantee of judicial independence 
as a restraint to executive action is questionable. A lack of independence hinders the courts and 
their structures in enforcing Covenant obligations. The lack of independence was evident in 
the Human Rights Committee report of 2011 which argued that presumption of innocence is 
flouted by judges and administrative detention with detainees not having the possibility of 
challenging the legality of their detention has become the norm.  
This was the case in 2008 when about 100 people were reportedly shot and killed by security 
forces with over 1500 arbitrarily arrested and detained. Some were severely tortured, while 
others were charged and summarily tried without minimum guarantees of a fair trial as 
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stipulated in its Criminal procedure code and in the Covenant. (arts. 6, 7, 9 and 14)565. These 
arbitrary actions were in contempt of the legal principle of due process and a violation of article 
9 and article 9 read in conjunction with articles 6, 7 and 14 of the Covenant. 
 Reference should be made here again to the case of Justice Wakai and 172 others v The People 
in which 173 applicants were arrested during post-election violence in 1992.566 Despite a High 
Court decision ordering the release of the detainees on bail, the legal department ignored the 
order and transferred the detainees to Yaoundé, which operates a Civil Law system. 
The constitutional entrenchment of these rights and obligations accompanied by secondary 
legislation has created an environment of rights protection. However, there is a huge gap 
between these constitutional entrenchments and the actual enjoyment of these rights. This is 
mitigated by what the government claims are mechanisms and procedures for implementing its 
obligation under the Covenant. One of such mechanisms which it has highlighted is the Inter-
Ministerial Committee chaired by the Secretary General at the Prime Minister’s Office, set up 
to monitor the implementation of recommendations and/or decisions taken by the international 
and regional human rights promotion and protection. This Committee is particularly charged 
with the implementation of the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee. It 
has also highlighted procedures for implementing the views adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee in both individual Communication and state reporting procedures. In this regard, 
the views of the Committee are sent to the different administrations concerned. Their opinions 
are obtained and discussed by the above-mentioned Inter-Ministerial Committee. The 
Committee then makes proposals on measures to be taken and monitors their implementation. 
As has been demonstrated above, the constitutional protection coexists with a weak 
implementation approach of the obligation of the state under the Covenant. The prevalence of 
such a situation coupled with a weak international enforcement regime overseeing a vague and 
weak domestic constitutional safeguard leaves only a competent and independent judiciary in 
the position to play an essential role in mitigating state abuse. Beyond these institutional and 
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codified approaches to implementing its obligation, the judiciary also plays a vital role through 
specific judicial procedures in the implementation process. 
In its Concluding Observations on Cameroon’s 4th periodic report 
The Committee is deeply concerned about reported cases of human rights violations related to 
the social riots which took place in February 2008, triggered by high fuel and food prices, 
during which reportedly more than 100 persons died, and more than 1,500 persons were 
arrested. The Committee regrets that, more than two years after the events, investigations were 
still ongoing and that the   state party was not able to give a fuller account of the events. The 
explanation provided by the   state party’s delegation that security forces shot warning shots 
and that rioters were trampled to death as they tried to escape contrasts with NGO reports 
according to which the deaths were mainly attributed to excessive force applied by security 
forces. The Committee is concerned that the   state party’s delegation dismissed allegations 
made by NGOs of cases of torture and ill-treatment of persons who were detained during the 
riots and of summary trials contrary to the guarantees set out in the Criminal procedure code 
and in the Covenant. (arts. 6, 7, 9 and 14)567 
The Committee then recommended that Cameroon should ensure that allegations of serious 
human rights violations related to the social riots in 2008, including allegations of excessive 
use of force by security forces, of torture and ill-treatment of persons detained, and of summary 
trials are adequately investigated and that perpetrators are brought to justice568. 
In its Concluding Observations on Cameroon’s 5th periodic report, on the independence of the 
judiciary and the administration of justice, the Committee observe as follows: 
The Committee remains concerned about persistent allegations of corruption and interference 
by the executive branch with the judiciary. Of particular concern is the fact that the 
independence of the judiciary is not sufficiently guaranteed in law and in practice, especially 
with regard to: (a) procedures for the selection of judges; (b) disciplinary measures against 
judges; and (c) the retention of section 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for 
intervention by the Ministry of Justice or the Attorney General to terminate criminal 
proceedings in certain instances. It is also concerned about: (a) reports  of violations of the right 
to a fair trial, which have been substantiated by the opinions adopted by the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention in the cases of Paul Kingue, Christophe Désiré Bengono and Marafa 
Hamidou Yaya; and (b) the continued jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians, which was 
extended by Act No. 2017/12 of 12 July 2017 on the Code of Military Justice (para. 14)569. 
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The Committee then recommended that Cameroon 
Should take all necessary measures to safeguard the independence of the judiciary in law and 
in practice and, in particular, to: (a) eliminate all forms of interference by the executive branch 
in the judiciary and effectively investigate allegations of such acts; (b) intensify its efforts to 
combat corruption in the judicial system and to prosecute and punish perpetrators, including 
judges who may be complicit therein; (c) consider reviewing the composition and functioning 
of the Judicial Service Commission to ensure the impartiality of the justice system; and (d) 
reform its legislative framework to ensure that civilians cannot be tried by military courts570. 
Concerning the jurisdiction of military tribunals on civilians, the Human Rights Committee in 
its view in many cases571 has challenged the veracity and competence of the military tribunal 
in handling civilian cases. In its Fifth Periodic Report, Cameroon argued that  
‘Since the review of the last Periodic Report, the jurisdiction of Military Tribunals resulting 
from Law No. 2008/15 of 29 December 2008 relating to military justice and establishing the 
rules of procedure applicable before military tribunals has not changed. Military Tribunals in 
Cameroon are neither court martials nor courts of exception. They are courts of special 
jurisdiction. Therefore, about jurisdiction rationale personae, military tribunals have 
jurisdiction over offences committed by both the military, as well as civilians’572. 
The implementation of article 14 is mostly dependent on the independence of the judiciary 
which, as has been shown already, is largely absent. The judiciary is mainly under executive 
control and thus works to protect executive actions by civilian and security officials.  
As was earlier stated in this chapter, the purpose of the reporting procedure amongst others is 
to ensure that   states parties undertake a comprehensive review of national legislation, 
administrative rules, and procedures to assure conformity with the Covenant. This chapter has 
analysed this procedure as a method of implementation of the obligation under the Covenant 
as the primary mode of interaction between a   state party, the Human Rights Committee and 
other relevant domestic and international actors. The constructive dialogue strengthens such an 
interaction both at the stage of preparing reports at the domestic level, defending this report at 
the Committee level and making a follow up of its Concluding Observations. Cameroon has 
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not been punctual in the submission of its report as was seen in its initial report submitted three 
years late and the delay in submitting its fifth Periodic Report. Apart from the delay, the quality 
and scope of Cameroon’s fourth and fifth periodic reports did not provide the detailed steps it 
was taking to strengthen the legal and institutional framework that ensures the implementation 
of its obligations under the Covenant. It has also fallen short in guaranteeing the independence 
of domestic institutions relevant in preparing such reports and ensuring the follow-up 
implementation of the Committees Concluding Observations. The constitutional framework is 
void of details on rights protection which is left to secondary legislation from the executive to 
clarify. This executive intrusion has had a adverse effect on the adequate protection of citizens 
from torture, illegal administrative action in the detention of citizens. 
In the Concluding Observation of its fifth periodic report, the Committee stated that it was  
‘…concerned at reports that the Commission is not perceived as a fully independent body and, 
in particular, about: (a) the process for selecting its members, which is not inclusive or 
transparent; (b) the fact that the Commission’s membership includes members of Parliament 
and senators, who have voting rights; and (c) reports that the Commission’s funding is limited 
and its access to certain places of detention is restricted .’573 
It recommended that Cameroon should: (a) review Act No. 2004/016 of 22 July 2004 to ensure 
that the process for selecting and appointing the Commission’s members is transparent and 
independent and to include a provision on the conflict-of-interest rules that apply to those 
members. 
If commitment to the Covenant is to have a genuine impact in the protection of human rights 
the reporting process as the sole obligatory instrument of monitoring effectiveness of domestic 
implementation regime must be taken seriously both in the quality of reports submitted and the 
respect of the deadlines in submitting such reports. According to the Human Rights Instruments 
report of 2017, as at 1 March 2017, 36 of the 196   states parties to different international 
treaties were fully compliant with their reporting obligations under the relevant international 
human rights treaties and protocols. That was equivalent to 18 percent of   states 
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parties. 574 Cameroon has two overdue reports with one being an initial report under the 
Convention on the Right of the Child and one overdue periodic report under the Convention 
Against Torture. According to the same instrument, the noncompliance rate of the Covenant 
stands at 36% while that of CAT is 40%. Cameroon has a high rate of untimely compliance 
with the Covenant with an average delay of three years in the submission of reports.  
At this rate of untimely compliance coupled with the low quality of the report submitted, the 
process of periodic review cannot be an adequate method of monitoring the implementation of 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF   STATE PARTY’S OBLIGATION UNDER THE 
INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION PROCEDURE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of the international human rights regime under both the UN and regional 
systems has crystallised into binding obligations and the creation of treaty bodies that monitor 
the implementation of   state party obligations. The shift in emphasis from theory to practice 
and from the mere existence of international obligations to a focus in actual compliance means 
implementation and accountability are given more value than ratification and accession. These 
aspects are increasingly being strengthened by a shift in focus from the state as the principal 
actor to the individual once considered a peripheral actor. In sum, the result is a steady 
penetration of the international system by individuals. Still, this access is designed by 
traditional international actors and therefore has serious structural limitations.  Under 
autocracies, the individual is limited by the very design of the state as a tool of the executive 
as discussed in Chapter 2. Apart from standing and justiciability requirements contained in the 
text of the Covenant, the very nature and design of the Human Rights Committee as the main 
body that oversees the implementation of state obligation under the Individual Complaint 
mechanism challenges the efficacy of the entire implementation regime. 
Before the individual became a vital actor and had legal personality under international law, 
International law was the exclusive preserve of   states as the only legal subject recognised as 
adjudicators.   states treated cases of individuals based on article 2(7) of the UN Charter as 
matters of domestic jurisdiction. Individuals and even corporate bodies have been recognised 
as possessing ‘legal personality’. An entity has legal personality if it has direct international 
right and responsibility and can be heard and prosecuted in a national tribunal or any other 




Justice (ICJ)575. This is due to the recognition of the unique status of individuals as potential 
targets of state or state-sponsored retaliation or repression. 
The individual as a subject under international law was strengthened in the Amadou Diallo 
case. In an unprecedented case brought by Guinea against the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in respect of a dispute concerning ‘serious violations of international law’ allegedly committed 
‘upon the person of a Guinean national’. Guinea submitted that its national Mr. Ahmadou Sadio 
Diallo, a businessman, was unjustly imprisoned by the authorities of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, after being resident in that  state for thirty-two (32) years, despoiled of his sizable 
investments, businesses, movable and immovable property, and bank accounts, and then 
expelled.576 While the DRC challenged the standing of Guinea’s legal right to initiate the 
proceedings, the ICJ conceded Guinea’s standing with regards to the protection of Mr. Diallo’s 
rights as an individual. 
This case strengthened the premise that international rules apply both to   states, individuals 
and corporate bodies and their behaviours.  
The Individual complaint mechanism guaranteed under the Optional Protocol of the 
Covenant577has become an instrument that strengthens the individual against the state-centric 
approach to human rights protection. It is not contained in its main body; instead, it is in the 
Optional Protocol of the Covenant and binding on state parties upon ratification and ascension. 
As   stated in Chapter 1, Cameroon acceded to the Covenant and Optional Protocol in 1984 and 
had since been faced with numerous individual complaints from persons claiming a violation 
of their rights under Covenant articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10(1),14 and others.  
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By enabling individuals to bring formal complaints alleging state abuse, Cole argues, the 
Optional Protocol illuminates the long shadow that sometimes falls between the idea and the 
reality of human rights.578 Also, as Donnelly argues, the Optional Protocol provides a genuine, 
if limited an instance of international monitoring, which, in at least a few cases, has altered 
state practice.579 
Despite this access given to individuals, as a principle under international law that reinforces 
the concept of sovereignty and harmonises the international and domestic jurisdictions, 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is central to maintaining the balance between the domestic 
and international jurisdictions and reinforcing the role of the  state as the primary guarantor of 
human rights. The exhaustion of domestic remedies requirements is critical for access to the 
Human Rights Committee. On the other hand, under an autocratic system like Cameroon, 
access to justice is hampered at the domestic level by executive interference and at the level of 
the Human Rights Committee by unnecessary delays which increase the backlog of cases.  
In the former, the Committee has frequently argued that availability of remedy alone is not 
enough but that they must also be effective. So in cases of the absence of effectiveness, the 
Committee has always declared complaints as admissible to enable the substantive examination 
of the claims of the complainants. This is discussed below in the cases of Akwanga, Mukong, 
Gorji and others. In the latter, the backlog of cases speaks of the slowness of the process. It 
takes the Committee an average of 2.5 years to deal with an individual case. It took 3 years for 
the Committee to deal with Akwanga v Cameroon in Communication 1813/2008 and it has 
taken 7 years and the   state party is yet to respect the views of the Committee; In Mukong v 
Cameroon in Communication 458/1991, it took 3 years for the Committee to adopt its views 
and it took another 8 years for Mukong to receive financial compensation. 
On the other hand, the quasi-judicial nature of the Committee makes it a weak institution in the 
overall oversight scheme. It lacks the enforcement power of an ordinary state judiciary relying 
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on the goodwill of the state in complying with their obligations and its views. These two 
structural limitations have cast much doubt on the effectiveness of the individual complaint 
mechanism as far as an oppressive system with no domestic accountability system is 
concerned. 
As this chapter shows, although the individual communication mechanism under the Optional 
Protocol of the Covenant is instrumental in altering the relationship between the state and the 
individual, there still exists a wide gap between theory and practice as far as procedural and 
substantive aspects associated with this procedure is concerned. The most important aspect of 
this procedure lies in the individual being able to hold a state accountable for its domestic 
infractions. Even though monetary compensation and other forms of remedy are crucial 
elements in this process, the overriding consideration lies in the individual’s ability to jump 
jurisdiction and to hold their state accountable. This novelty in international law is yet to alter 
the way Cameroon implements its obligations under the considered rights and obligations. 
Chapter 5 has considered one aspect of the implementation process of the Covenant. The 
reporting process has mainly been focused on the regularity rather than the quality of the reports 
and implementation of the CO issued after each session. With special reference to the five 
articles under the Covenant, this chapter focuses on another procedure of implementation that 
gives individuals the possibility to challenge state actions at the international level due to the 
failure of national authorities and domestic legal systems to vindicate their rights. This chapter 
examines how Cameroon implements its obligation to the Covenant using the individual 
complaint procedure as an implementation technique. Through this examination, it is possible 
to observe how Cameroon interprets and fulfils its obligation to the complainant under the 
different procedural and substantive stages of the mechanism. 
Part 1 describes the individual complaint mechanism established under the Optional Protocol 
of the Covenant and discusses the justiciability requirements of the Covenant.  Article 2 of the 
Protocol stipulates that individuals aggrieved by   states must first exhaust all possible domestic 
remedies before petitioning the HRC. Once a communication is filed, the HRC determines its 
admissibility, assesses its merits, affords the claimant protection (if deemed necessary), and 
renders a decision catalogue as the views of the Committee. In addition to the domestic recourse 
provision, the HRC also considers the personal, territorial, temporal, and procedural 




Part II reviews and analyses all of the cases filed against Cameroon since its accession with a 
more detailed and comprehensive analysis of communication 1813/2008. Communication 
1813/2008 deals with all the articles of the covenant considered in this thesis and reflects in 
content and procedure all the other cases brought against Cameroon since its accession. It 
captures in a specific way the underlying problems of implementation face by Cameroon. This 
section explores the substantive arguments by Cameroon concerning articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10(1) 
and 14, intending to understand how it interprets and implements its obligation to these rights 
as established under the Covenant 
Part III reviews the views of the Committee 
Part IV analyses the implementation of those the views in terms of remedy. Inherent in the 
notion of a remedy is the idea that it offers the complainant a timely and practical solution. It 
might also impact the laws and attitude of domestic jurisdiction in a positive way580. 
2. BACKGROUND OF INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE COVENANT  
The purpose of an individual complaint mechanism within a human rights treaty is to allow an 
individual, or the individual’s representative, or, in some circumstances, a group of individuals 
to complain to the treaty Committee regarding alleged violations of the human rights contained 
within the terms of the treaty.581Violations of Covenant provisions automatically generate  state 
obligations under article 2(2) which a   state party is obliged to respect. Once a victim has 
exhausted all domestic remedies in ensuring their rights are respected, they can then take a case 
to the Human Rights Committee as the last instance of adjudication of their rights under the 
Covenant. 
For a complaint to be considered against a country, the country must be a state party to the 
Covenant, accept the competence of the Committee to receive and consider Communication 
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from and individuals subject to its jurisdiction.582 A state party to the Covenant that becomes a 
party to the Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
Communication from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a 
violation by that   state party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.583 The Committee 
shall receive no communication if it concerns a   state party to the Covenant which is not a 
party to the Protocol. Such complaints from individuals who claim that any of their rights 
enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available domestic 
remedies are submitted as a written communication to the Committee for consideration.584 
Under the terms of the Covenant Protocol, jurisdiction to consider complaints from individuals 
who assert that they have been victims of violations of human rights guaranteed under the 
Covenant is vested in the Human Rights Committee.585 It considers the personal, territorial, 
temporal, and procedural jurisdiction of a case when evaluating its admissibility. Once the 
Committee deals with the issue of admissibility, it then proceeds to evaluate the claims merits. 
The Committee authoritatively determines whether there has been a violation, and the state 
concerned has an obligation to give effect to the treaty body’s finding(s); it can also issue 
interim measures in urgent cases to preserve a situation until they make a final decision on the 
matter586. This interim measure will stay in place until the decision is made; decisions of human 
rights treaty bodies can go beyond the circumstances of the individual case and provide 
proactive guidelines to prevent a similar violation occurring in the future.  
An important advantage of submitting a complaint to the Committee is that, once a   state party 
has made the relevant declaration under the treaty, it should comply with its obligations under 
that treaty, including the obligation to provide an effective remedy for breaches of the treaty. 
This is an essential determinant in a states’ commitment to its obligation, and this procedure 
provides a clear implementation avenue for the state to demonstrate that. While implementation 
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of the Committee’s views has been problematic, the entire process provides an important 
interactional medium between the state on the one hand and the Committee and complainant 
on the other. As examined below, implementation of the Committee’s views also takes a life 
of its own as this phase of interaction equally generates necessary procedural and substantive 
issues which can help alter the behaviour of the state and even its laws. 
3. EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES 
The primacy of the state as the principal guarantor of human rights means that before 
complaints are filed to the Committee, attempts must have been made to seek redress at the 
domestic level. This is a key procedural requirement that reinforces the state-centric approach 
to human rights protection. Domestic judicial procedures are viewed as more accessible and 
more efficient at resolving a claim. The exhaustion of domestic remedies that are available and 
giving rise to the complaint is a vital admissibility criterion for anyone or any group with 
standing to file a complaint to the Committee. It requires the use of all available domestic 
procedures to seek redress about the violations of Covenant rights and protection from future 
human rights violations and to obtain justice for past abuses. Local remedies can range from 
making a case in court to lodging a complaint with local police and getting a satisfactory redress 
consistent with international standards. 
In its jurisprudence, the Committee has emphasised that remedy must not only be available and 
sufficient but must be effective. Cesare calls such a statement vague. “The considerable 
statutory vagueness of the domestic remedies admissibility criterion has, thus, left international 
human rights bodies with a large area in which to manoeuvre”587. Yet beyond simply being 
available and effective McGoldrick in emphasising the approach of the HRC argued that, the 
general approach of the Committee has been that a communication would not be considered 
inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies unless the   state party gave details of the 
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particular remedies available in the circumstances of the case588.  This basically means that the 
burden of proof whether a remedy was exhausted does not only lie with the author of a 
communication but also with the   state party. In P.L. v Germany, the Committee   stated that 
authors must also avail themselves of all other judicial remedies, including constitutional 
complaints in order to fulfil the requirement of exhaustion of all available domestic remedies, 
insofar as such remedies appear to be effective in the given case and are de facto available to 
the author.589 The Committee has also   stated that failure to seize the relevant jurisdiction 
would amount to a violation of the rules of procedures. In declaring inadmissible Kandem v 
Cameroon, the Committee referred to its jurisprudence in communication No. 1511/2006 
where it   stated that “although it is not necessary to exhaust domestic remedies when they have 
no chance of being successful, merely doubting their effectiveness does not absolve the author 
of a communication from the obligation to exhaust those remedies”590. On the other hand, in 
reference to para 3b Nowak emphasises that the availability of a domestic procedure is not 
enough; all persons who avail themselves of a corresponding remedy have a right to a decision 
by that competent domestic authority591. 
The availability of remedial possibilities as a prerequisite to any complaint cuts across different 
human rights regimes at both regional or international levels. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) system to which Cameroon is also a signatory has also   
stated that within the meaning of Article 56(5) of the African Charter, local remedies must be 
‘available, effective and sufficient.’ The Commission clarified the meaning of these criteria as 
follows: A remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment, 
it is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success, and it is found sufficient if it can redress 
the complaint. 
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In the Jawara case, the Commission emphasised that the existence of a local remedy must be 
sufficiently specific, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the 
requisite accessibility.592 In Mbiankeu Geneviève v. Cameroon, the Commission was of the 
view that remedies can exist legally and in practice without necessarily being accessible to a 
complainant. There is, therefore, the need to make a distinction between the existence and 
availability of local remedies. 593  The considerable statutory vagueness of the domestic 
remedies admissibility criterion has, thus, left international human rights bodies with a large 
area in which to manoeuvre. 594  Such vagueness has given the Committee the chance to 
elaborate over the years on the exact scope of the rule and, even more so, on its exceptions, 
resulting in a sizeable amount of jurisprudence.595 
On the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies as required by article 5(2) of the 
protocol, Cameroon argued that Akwanga did not engage any internal procedures before 
approaching the international institution.596 In his response, Akwanga argued that during his 
arrest and incarceration, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) political party and other non-
governmental organizations like Amnesty International petitioned for his release but all of the 
petitions were ignored. He also submitted that because he escaped from jail, he can’t return to 
the country to exhaust domestic remedies597 and that a pending arrest warrant as indicated in 
the  state’s preliminary submission will also mean that he will have to be immediately arrested 
and detained under the same inhuman and degrading condition which he has complained about 
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with the likelihood of facing the same procedural hurdles which he has explained prevented 
him from being able to prepare for his defense at the military tribunal effectively. He also 
argued that while in detention, one of his defense lawyers who was part of his defense team 
during his trial at the military court in 1999, Barrister Nkafu, submitted that it is procedurally 
challenging to complain about torture and other ill-treatment suffered in detention in 
Cameroon. In his initial submission, Akwanga argued that Nkafu has set out the theoretical 
procedure for somebody to follow to complain about torture and other abuses suffered in 
detention and how it gets nowhere whether it is brought while the person is still in detention or 
afterward.598Apart from the procedural difficulties associated with gaining access to the actual 
courts, inadequate laws or the absence thereof, institutional barriers, the credibility of the courts 
also remains in doubt because of their lack of independence. These situations are highlighted 
by a May 2009 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights ruling, in communication 
266/03 brought by Dr. Gumne Ngwang of SCAPO for himself and the Southern Cameroons. 
In this case, the Commission amongst others recommended that Cameroon should reform its 
Higher Judicial Council, by ensuring that it is composed of personalities other than the 
President of the Republic, the Minister for Justice and other members of the Executive 
Branch.’599 
The Human Rights Committee in its jurisprudence on the question of the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies held that the requirement does not apply where the remedy in question will 
be ineffective.600 In defending the availability of such remedies, Cameroon argued that,  
the author could have brought an application to the competent criminal court (‘tribunal répressif 
compétent’) on the basis of article 132b of the Criminal Code to complain about the torture he 
had suffered, or on the basis of article 332 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure to request 
that the proceedings be annulled because of the absence of an interpreter and of generally fair 
trial guarantees’.601 
                                                 
598Ibid p. 5 para. 15. 
599Gumne et. al v Cameroon No.266/203, para. 215 (1) (vii). 
600Kamdem v Cameroon No. 2325/2013 




In his response, Akwanga argued that the   state party’s assertion that he did not engage any 
domestic procedures is incorrect and contradicts the   state party’s previous assertion that he 
had lodged an appeal in which a decision was finally handed down in 2005. Cameroon had 
argued in its observation to Akwanga’s response to its initial deposition that Akwanga’s appeal 
to the Supreme Court in 1999 challenging the initial verdict of the military tribunal was 
rejected. It further stated that according to article 427 of the Criminal procedure code, Akwanga 
had a right of appeal. Cameroons’ contention is that Akwanga failed to exhaust all available 
domestic remedies. Akwanga’s objection here ties up with the jurisprudence of the Human 
Rights Committee that while there might exist possible remedies, they are not effective as 
demonstrated by the six-year delay in his appeal and the difficulties associated with accessing 
the courts. 
In his preliminary submission, Akwanga also argued that in the exhaustion of domestic remedy 
where a complainant has no prospect of success, access to domestic remedy alone does not 
constitute an effective remedy and that there is no precedence that the Penal Code of the 
respondent has ever been invoked successfully to litigate against the state. In order to exhaust 
domestic remedy within the spirit of article 5 (2) (b), one needs to have access to those 
remedies.  In this specific case, Akwanga was detained for two years and denied access to a 
court of law. In addition, he was constantly tortured and was traumatized by the death of many 
of those detained with him. He was interrogated without a legal representative and the 
withdrawal of one of his lead counsels in protest against an unfair and prejudiced judicial 
process that provided Akwanga no legal aid and treated his dossier in French when he spoke 
no French, meant the exhaustion of domestic remedies was a near impossibility. Akwanga also 
argued that even if domestic remedies were accessible and effective, he is unable to return to 
the country to seize it because of the threat of arrest, imprisonment and/or torture. It is a claim 
substantiated by Cameroon’s action when in its 2009 response to Akwanga’s submission it 
argued that « … le requérant est conscient de sa qualité de condamné, recherché suivant un 
mandat d’arrêt, lequel devrait être exécuté s’il revient au Cameroon, sans ignorer que son 
extradition pourait être demandée pour qu’il vienne purger sa peine… »602 
                                                 





Cameroon cited several other cases that were dismissed by the Committee for lack of the 
exhaustion of domestic remedy. Two of the communications cited were Castro v 
Colombia,603and Khan v Canada.604 The two cases illustrate cases with two different domestic 
jurisdictions. While Colombia is relatively unstable and politically polarizing, Canada is 
relatively stable and democratic, and both countries have established rules for the alteration of 
power. In Castro v Colombia, the complainant failed to seize the relevant domestic institutions 
for remedy because he believed they would be ineffective. In dismissing the case, the 
Committee argued that the author of the communication ‘does not deny that judicial remedies 
offered in the ordinary labour courts were available to him, nor does he explain why such a 
remedy would have been ineffective in his case. These doubts about the effectiveness of 
judicial remedies do not absolve an author from exhausting them.’605 In Khan v Canada, the   
state party argued successfully that the complainant failed to avail himself to the fullest of the 
domestic remedies available to him and in cases where he did, he failed to raise or present 
evidence which was subsequently presented to the Committee606. Unlike in Castro, despite 
Akwanga’s believe that the remedies available were ineffective, he tried to exhaust the readily 
available domestic remedies Akwanga argued that while remedy was available in his case, it 
was not effective as exemplified by his unheard appeal at the Supreme Court and problems of 
access. 
Cameroon further argued that the complainant was empowered by relevant provisions of its 
Criminal procedure code to appeal against his claim of torture which it argued is suppressed 
by article 132(b) of its CPC of the law No.97/009 of 10 January 1997 or an appeal to have his 
conviction overturned in accordance with article 332 of its CPC which was applicable then. It 
also dismissed the argument advanced by Akwanga that the inability to be visited by a lawyer 
impeded any legal procedure he could have engaged against the   state party for acts of torture 
or unfair trial. Cameroon submitted in response that, ‘... rather than putting these moments of 
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supervised freedom to use and have his injuries recorded and engage the applicable procedures, 
the complainant escaped from the Hospital to Nigeria.607 
On the failure to exhaust domestic remedy, the Committee concluded that:  
‘… during the author’s detention from 24 March 1997 to 9 July 2003, he was allegedly held 
incommunicado, a fact that the   state party has refuted with the general statement that no 
instructions had been given to the competent authorities to refuse visits to the author. In the 
present case, the Committee considers that the remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure 
was de facto not available to the author.’608 
The Human Rights Committee has concluded admissible similar communication when the 
authors have argued that it was impossible for them to exhaust domestic remedies especially 
because of procedural bottlenecks or the ineffectiveness of the procedure. In the case of Gorji-
Dinka v Cameroon, the HRC.  
‘... takes note of the author’s argument that, following his escape from house arrest in 1988, he 
was not in a position to seek redress at the domestic level, as a person who was wanted in 
Cameroon. In the light of its jurisprudence that article 5, para. 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol 
does not require resort to remedies which objectively have no prospect of success, and in the 
absence of any indication by the   state party that the author could have availed himself of 
effective remedies, the Committee is satisfied that the author has sufficiently demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness and unavailability of domestic remedies in his particular case.’609 
ln dismissing the   state party’s objection to the failure to exhaust domestic remedy in Mukong 
v Cameroon, the Committee argued, 
‘…that the   state party had merely listed in abstracto the existence of several remedies without 
relating them to the circumstances of the case, and without showing how they might provide 
effective redress in the circumstances of the case. This applied in particular to the period of 
detention from 26 February to 23 March 1990, when the author was allegedly held 
incommunicado and subjected to threats. The Committee concluded that in the circumstances, 
it could not be held against the author if he did not petition the courts after his release and that, 
in the absence of further information from the   state party, there was no further effective 
domestic remedy to exhaust.’610 
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In the same communication, the Committee further   stated that it is uncontested that the case 
which the   state party itself considers relevant to the author’s situation has been pending before 
the Supreme Court of Cameroon for over 12 years. In the circumstances, the Committee 
questioned the relevance of the jurisprudence and court decisions invoked by the   state party 
for the author’s particular case. 611 In conclusion, the Committee found that, “for purposes of 
admissibility, the author has sufficiently substantiated his claims under articles 7, 9, 10 and 14, 
of the Covenant and therefore proceeds to its consideration of the merits”612 
In Titiahonjo v Cameroon, the author claims that because her husband’s detention involved the 
executive and the military, she could not sue, or act domestically, as required under article 5, 
para. 2(b), of the Optional Protocol.613 While Cameroon failed to cooperate with the Committee 
on the said Communication, the Committee concluded that the author filed a complaint on 
behalf of her husband and that the state prosecutor’s order to release her husband was never 
implemented. And that in the absence of any other pertinent information from the   state party, 
the Committee decided to proceed with considering the communication under article 5, para. 
2(b) of the Optional Protocol.614 
In Mukong v Cameroon, Mukong argued that, ‘there is no domestic remedy for him to exhaust 
and that he should be deemed to have complied with the requirements of article 5 para 2b.’615 
He argued that there was no domestic procedure through which he could challenge the 
incompatibility of domestic law with international human rights standard; further explaining 
that fundamental human rights are only guaranteed in the preamble of Cameroon’s constitution 
which was not considered an integral part of the constitution. It should be known that following 
the 1996 amendment of the Cameroon constitution, the preamble is now an integral part of the 
constitution and both the civil procedure codes and the criminal code has criminalised acts 
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inconsistent with the Cameroons obligation under the Covenant. Mukong alleges a violation of 
articles 7, 9, 12(4), 14(1) and 19 of the Covenant. 
In Engo v Cameroon, in November 2005, Cameroon challenged the admissibility of the 
communication on the grounds that the delay experienced in the author’s case has been due to 
‘numerous pleas and release applications, which have acted as a brake on the proceedings and 
caused considerable delays’616. 
On its part, the Committee stated that the author has substantiated his claims under articles 9, 
10 and 14 sufficiently for the purposes of admissibility and therefore declares them admissible 
These views highlight the gap between theory and practice in Cameroon’s interpretation and 
implementation of its obligation.  It also shows Cameroon’s focus on procedural rather than 
substantive commitment. The availability of institutions to protect these rights alone does not 
translate into their protection and enjoyment. Domestic remedies must not only be available, 
but they must also be accessible and effective. Also, as has been shown above, in most cases 
they are not available, and even where they are, they are not effective. 
Another conditionality in submitting a complaint is the notion of victimhood. In this case, the 
individual who claims to be a victim must sufficiently substantiate that they are a victim by the   
state party to any of the rights   states set forth in the Covenant. It continues that usually the 
communication should be submitted by the individual himself or by his representative…when 
the victim is unable to submit the application himself. 617  The Committee can receive a 
complaint from anyone who ‘claims to be  a victim(s) of a violation by that   state party of any 
of the rights set forth in the Covenant.’ 618  The Committee’s Rules of procedure permits 
complaints from the representative of an alleged victim,619even when it considers as more 
‘effective’ when actual victims get direct access to the Committee. This was emphasised in 
Antonaccio v Uruguay when a request from the victim’s wife for her husband who was detained 
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incommunicado to be given the right to submit the communication himself.620  In another 
situation, a complaint can be brought by a representative of a victim with a written consent in 
the form of a ‘power of attorney’. In some circumstances, a victim is simply unable to submit 
or authorise the submission of a complaint. For example, the victim may be dead or in 
incommunicado detention. In this case, a close family connection will normally suffice. This 
was the case in Titiahonjo v Cameroon, in which the deceased wife brought a complaint against 
the   state party for ‘arbitrary arrest and death in custody, inhuman and degrading condition of 
detention,’ amongst others.621 
A complaint cannot also be submitted under conditions of anonymity 622  ‘or what the 
Committee considers to be an abuse of procedure and incompatible with the provisions of the 
Covenant.’623 It cannot also be pending before another international body or be the subject of 
a settlement as determined by an international body.624These requirements and others are tested 
below in Communication 1813. 
4. INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST CAMEROON SINCE ACCESSION 
This section reviews all the complaints submitted at the Human Rights Committee against 
Cameroon and pays detailed emphasis to communication 1813/2008. This specific 
communication captures the processes presented in the other chapters and exposes both the 
domestic and international limitations of Cameroon’s approach to implementing its obligations 
under the Covenant rights herein considered. It also captures in a specific way and consistent 
with all other previous complaints, the   states party’s interpretive doctrine in both its positive 
and negative obligation under articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10(1) and 14. Since it acceded the Covenant, 
Cameroon has had to deal with a dozen or more complaints. It has failed to respond to most of 
the communication, instead of allowing the Committee to handle both the procedural and 
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substantive aspects of the complaints. These complaints have shed light on Cameroon’s 
domestic legal and institutional framework and most especially on how it interprets and 
implements its obligations under articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10(1) and 14. 
4.1. REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED AGAINST CAMEROON 
According to the Human Rights Committee data base, 11 complaints have been filed against 
Cameroon since its accession to the Covenant and its Optional Protocol in 1984. Considering 
the massive human rights violation by the   state party, one would safely say that very few 
Cameroonians are informed about the Covenant and the possibilities it presents through its 
Optional Protocol to victims of domestic rights violation to engage with the Committee. So 
why are there very few communications from a country classified as autocratic, repressive and 
engages in systematic violence? There are many reasons why this is the case, but three reasons 
stand out. Executive control of governance apparatus means that the very system that tortures, 
engages in illegal deprivation of liberty, subject people to inhuman and degrading treatment is 
the very system that is expected to adjudicate the wrongfulness of these acts. As earlier stated, 
the government can effectively prevent the accusers from having access to such information 
through denial of their presence or through hiding such information or the accusers and 
government interests are at variance.625 This brings us to the second problem. The population 
is not aware of these opportunities. The government has also failed in its role of disseminating 
information that should educate the population on their rights and procedures available to them 
to ensure these rights are protected. The few who are aware lack the expertise to submit 
individual communications without passing through costly lawyers on corrupt domestic 
NGO’s. Most of the cases which have been taken to the HRC has been done so by foreign 
NGOs. The absence of success stories also leaves much to be desired as the governments 
delaying tactics in implementing the views of the Committee has also discourage both victims 
and litigants to seize on the Committee’s jurisdiction.  
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4.1.1.  COMMUNICATION 458/1991, MUKONG V CAMEROON 
The first complaint against Cameroon was filed seven years after the treaty entered into force 
for the   state party. In communication 458/1991, the author complaint that he was arrested for 
granting a BBC interview critical of the government. Also, while under detention following his 
arrest in June of 1988, he was subjected to cruel inhuman and degrading treatment. He was 
detained with common criminals in a cell without windows and was not allowed to wear his 
cloths. He was released 9 months later after falling ill but rearrested in February 1990 and 
detained without access to a lawyer or his family members. Albert Mukong claimed that he 
was intimidated and subjected to mental torture and physically assaulted by prison guards. 
Cameroon accepted that Mukong was arrested but justified the arrest on the basis that 
Mukong’s interview over the BBC was subversive and an ‘intoxication to national and 
international public opinion’. 
On the question of admissibility, Cameroon argued that Mukong failed to initiate judicial 
proceedings against those responsible for his treatment. The Committee declared the 
communication admissible on the basis that by merely stating the availability of remedies in 
an abstract form without relating the availability to Mukong’s claim does not make the 
remedies accessible. 
On the merits, the Committee found Cameroon in breach of article 7 for the combination of 
incommunicado detention, a threat of torture and for particularly singling out Mukong for cruel 
inhuman and degrading treatment; article 9(1) for arbitrary detention and article 19 for 
curtailment of the right to freedom of expression. The Committee urged the   state party to 
provide Mukong with an effective remedy including appropriate compensation and the 
investigation of his ill-treatment in detention. 
4.1.2 COMMUNICATION 630/1995, ABDOULAYE MAZOU V CAMEROON 
Abdoulaye Mazou,626 a second-grade magistrate in Yaoundé was arrested and charged with 
sheltering his brother who took part in an attempted coup d’état in April 1984. The military 
tribunal sentenced him to five years imprisonment, and three years later, a presidential decree 
                                                 




removed him from his job. Following his release in 1990, he was placed under house arrest and 
only released a year after. Despite his released, and despite all judicial attempt to get back his 
job, he was not re-instated in his job until 1998. He asked the Committee to find Cameroon in 
breach of its obligation under article 2(3), 14 and 25(c) of the Covenant. 
Cameroon never contested the admissibility of the communication and the Committee declared 
the communication partially admissible. It declared inadmissible the claim under article 14 
because the author failed to provide evidence when he brought a complaint to the ministry of 
justice and thus the Committee found this to be inconsistent with the principle of the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. 
On the merits, the Committee recognised that by the time of its views the author of the 
communication had been re-instated as a second-class judge and retroactively paid his salary. 
The author confirmed this in reaction to the   state party’s comment on the merits. However, 
the author argued that the   state party had an obligation to pay damages for injuries suffered 
from the wrongful dismissal. The Committee thereby found the   state party in breach of article 
2(3) and requested the   state party to ensure that the author of the communication is provided 
with an effective remedy.  
4.1.3 COMMUNICATION 1134/2002, FONGUM GORJI DINKA V CAMEROON 
Fongum Gorji Dinka was the former president of the Cameroon Bar Association. He claimed 
that  
his detention from 8 October 1981 to 7 October 1982 and from 31 May 1985 to 3 February 
1986, as well as his subsequent house arrest from 7 February 1986 to 28 March 1988, were 
arbitrary and in breach of article 9, para. 1, of the Covenant. The conditions of detention and 
the ill-treatment suffered during the second detention period amounted to violations of articles 
7 and 10, para. 1, while the fact that he was initially kept with a group of murder convicts at 
the BMM headquarters, upon his re-arrest on 9 June 1985, violated article 10, para. 2 (a). He 
further claims that the restriction on his movement during house arrest and his current de facto 
prohibition from leaving and entering his country amount to a breach of article 12 of the 
Covenant627. 
Cameroon failed to submit to the Committee information on both the admissibility and merits 
of the communication. Concerning admissibility, the Committee considered that the author had 
                                                 




made attempts to avail himself of domestic remedies which were neither available and where 
available were not effective. It declared its incompetence in considering claims of the violations 
of article 1 of the Covenant and declared that part of the communication inadmissible. It also 
declared inadmissible ratione temporis the part of the claim of the violation of article 9(1) 
starting the events occurred before the Covenant into force in Cameroon and that the author 
has provided no evidence to show that the injury he suffered then continued after the Covenant 
came into force in 1984. The Committee also declared inadmissible for lack of substantiation 
the authors claim under article 2 the failure of the   state party to provide him with compensation 
for unlawful detention in 1981-1982.  The Committee declared admissible issues arising under 
articles 7, 9(1), 10 (1, 2a), 12 and 25(b) 
On the merits, the Committee declared that Gorji’s detention between May 1985 and February 
of 1986 was lawful but failed to meet the reasonableness and necessity test and thus arbitrary 
in violation of article 9(1) of the Covenant. The Committee also found a violation of article 
10(1) for detention in a wet, dirty cell without a bed, table or any sanitary facilities and article 
10(2) for detention with hardened criminals. 
Acting under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol of the Covenant, the Committee found 
Cameroon’s actions in breach of articles 9(1), 10(1,2a) and required the provision of effective 
remedy under article 2(3), including appropriate compensation and to take measures to avoid 
similar violations in the future. 
4.1.4 COMMUNICATION 1353/2005, AFUSON PHILIP NJARU V CAMEROON 
Philip Afuson Njaru was a journalist, and well-known human rights advocate in Cameroon. 
Since 1997, he claimed to have been a victim of systematic acts of persecution by various 
agents of the state. 
He claimed to have been assaulted and beaten to unconsciousness by elements of the Brigade 
mixed mobile. Njaru also accused the   state party of unlawful and arbitrary arrest and cruel 
inhuman and degrading treatment while in detention. The   state party failed to cooperate with 
the Committee. 
On the subject of admissibility, the Committee noted  
…that the state party has not contested the admissibility of any of the claims raised. In addition, 
it notes the information and evidence provided by the author on the complaints made to several 




Committee considers that it is not precluded from considering the communication by the 
requirements of article 5, para. 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol’628 
On the merits, the Committee found a violation of article 7 alone and in conjunction with article 
2(3) of the Covenant based on the detailed submission of evidence of alleged physical and 
mental torture which were not contested by the   state party. It also found a violation of article 
9 alone and in conjunction with article 2(3) for three arrests without a warrant and without 
being informed of the reasons of arrest. 
The Committee then concluded that; 
The Committee is of the view that the author is entitled, under article 2, para. 3(a), of the 
Covenant, to an effective remedy. The   state party is under an obligation to take effective 
measures to ensure that: (a) criminal proceedings are initiated seeking the prompt prosecution 
and conviction of the persons responsible for the author’s arrest and ill-treatment; (b) the author 
is protected from threats and/or intimidation from members of the security forces; and (c) he is 
granted effective reparation including full compensation. The   state party is under an obligation 
to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future’629 
4.1.5 COMMUNICATION 1397/2005, PIERRE DÉSIRÉ ENGO V CAMEROON 
Pierre Désiré Engo was a former director of Cameroon’s National social security fund (CNPS) 
who was arrested in 1999 and charged for corruption, fraud, favouritism and attempted 
misappropriation of funds. He went through five different trials and was sentenced to 15 years 
imprisonment. Engo submitted 
‘that his right to liberty and security of person (article 9 of the Covenant) has been violated. He 
contends that he was arrested without a warrant and was arbitrarily detained in poor conditions, 
in violation of article 10, para. 1, of the Covenant, and without being informed of the charges 
against him in the various cases’630. 
Engo further contended that his right to fair trial under article 14 para 2 and 3(a)(b)(c) 
About the exhaustion of domestic remedies, Engo submitted four different applications 
between 1999 and 2001 to both the minister of justice and the  state prosecutor for release 
pending trial and to complain about the unreasonable delay in his proceedings and the length 
of time spent in pretrial detention. According to Engo’s complaint to the Committee, none of 
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these submissions ever received any response from the   state party. Consequently, as he argued, 
‘all domestic remedies have been exhausted.’631. 
In considering the merits of the complaint, the Committee based its views on the written 
submission of both parties. On the violation of article 9, the Committee rejected the authors 
claim of arbitrary detention and argued that ‘the author was placed under a detention warrant 
on 3 September 1999, following a complaint accompanied by the lodging of an application for 
criminal indemnification, the initiation of a judicial inquiry and questioning’ 632  and thus 
considered that ‘the author was therefore deprived of his liberty on grounds and in accordance 
with the procedure set out in the law’633. It however considered a violation of article 9(3) 
because the author was detained from 1999 until 2006 before an initial judgment was handed 
down after his first trial. The Committee therefore considered a seven-year detention without 
any judgment as unnecessarily long. The Committee also found a violation of article 9(2) for 
the   state party’s failure to promptly inform the author of all the charges against him. Article 
10(1) requires that all detained persons shall be treated with humanity and with respect to their 
inherent dignity. For failure to provide the author with appropriate medical care ‘appropriate 
to the author’s condition’ despite his request is deemed to have been in breach of the premise 
of article 10(1). The Committee also found a violation of article 14(2) because the   state party’s 
media had already been publishing articles portraying the author as guilty violated the 
presumption of innocence guaranteed under the Covenant. The Committee also found a 
violation of article 14(4) for a delay of several months for the author to be informed of the 
charges against him and to be provided access to the case files. 
The Committee found a violation of article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3, article 10, para. 1, and article 
14, paragraphs. 2 and 3 (a), (b), (c) and (d), of the Covenant and required the   state party to 
provide effective remedy including the provision of adequate ophthalmological treatment to 
the author. 
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4.1.6  COMMUNICATION NO. 1962/2010, S.N.A V CAMEROON 
SNA was a journalist who was arrested on three separate occasions, subjected to torture and 
detained under conditions that could amount to cruel inhuman and degrading treatment. While 
covering an event on October 1, 2001, he was arrested without a warrant by gendarme officers 
who tortured, stripped and threw him into an unventilated cell, where he remained for more 
than 24 hours without food or access to a lawyer. During one such detention in 2001, he slept 
on a cold cement floor that smelled strongly of faeces and urine because detainees urinated and 
defecated directly on the floor’634. On 30 December 2006, he was transferred to the criminal 
investigation service, where he was held with a dozen other detainees. He was held in prison, 
in conditions that he characterized as inhuman, until 3 January 2007. During his detention, he 
was not given any blankets or sheets and slept directly on the floor. 
The author considered that the   state party has violated his rights under articles 1, 7, 9, 10, 17 
and 23 of the Covenant. 
On the subject of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author claimed to have reported 
these violations of his rights to the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms, 
which was unable to obtain compensation. As he considered that the judiciary was merely an 
extension of the executive branch and was therefore not independent of it, the author did not 
bring the matter before the courts. 
The Committee declared the communication inadmissible for failure in the exhaustion of 
domestic remedy arguing that although ‘it has recognized in its jurisprudence that it is not 
necessary to exhaust domestic remedies when they have no chance of being successful, merely 
doubting their effectiveness does not absolve the author of a communication from the 
obligation to exhaust those remedies’635. 
4.1.7 COMMUNICATION 2388/2014 ERIK PAUL KINGUE V CAMEROON 
Kingue was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Njombe-Penja. On the 28 February 2008, 
he was suspended from his position by the government of Cameroon ‘irregularities in the 
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management of public funds’ and arrested the same day by a contingent of the rapid response 
battalion and the gendarmerie. He was taken to prison and detained for more than 20 days under 
‘in inhuman and degrading conditions that included placement in a solitary confinement cell. 
He was also required to sleep on a bare wet floor without the ability to communicate with 
family members, a lawyer or a doctor. He was also bound and shackled and subjected to regular 
insults and physical threats.’ 636 The author was tried the first time and sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment. He was acquitted on appeal 9 months later. In a second case, the author was 
prosecuted for ‘unlawful assemblies, gatherings and demonstrations, conspiracy to block and 
obstruct public thoroughfares, and aiding and abetting gang looting’637. He was sentenced to 6 
years imprisonment, but the judgement was annulled on appeal at the supreme court. The third 
trial for misappropriation of funds saw the author received a life sentence, but the supreme 
court once more annulled the decision. Following these cases, the author applied to the 
administrative authorities as required by law for compensation for five years of pretrial 
detention and subsequent acquittal. The author complained that the administrative authorities 
have never responded to him. Based on this the author   stated as grounds for his communication 
a violation of articles 2 (3) and 9 (5) of the Covenant. The author assessed the injury for such 
violations at 10.815 million dollars.638 
The state party argued that the author’s arrest was based on  
‘lawful grounds, in conformity with due process of law and in recognition of the guarantees set 
forth in article 9 of the Covenant for persons deprived of their liberty. In accordance with the 
foregoing, the author was informed of the reasons for his detention and was brought promptly 
before the trial court, which issued its judgment without undue delay’. 
In considering the admissibility of this communication, the Committee took into consideration 
the fact that the   state party failed to comment on the admissibility of the communication and 
consequently based its decision on the argument of the author when he argued that; 
‘that domestic remedies have been exhausted because there is no effective remedy to repair the 
injury that he suffered as a victim of arbitrary arrest and detention. The compensation 
commission created for this purpose under the Code of Criminal Procedure has reportedly not 
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yet been set up, and recourse to the administrative courts would be pointless since settled case 
law excludes from the jurisdiction of these courts issues of compensation for injury attributable 
to the functioning of the public justice system and since a subsequently adopted law confirms 
this exclusion’639. 
The Committee found a violation of article 9 (1), (3) and (5) for unlawful and arbitrary arrest 
and detention, failure to be brought promptly before a judge and tried within a reasonable time 
and failure by the   state party to pay compensation for unlawful arrest and detention. 
4.1.8  COMMUNICATION 2764/2016, ZOGO ANDELA AND ACHILLE BENOIT ZOGO V CAMEROON 
The author of the communication, Mr. Benoit Zogo is the son of the victim. His father, Andela 
Zogo was the Chairman of the National Maritime Leasing Corporation of Cameroon. He was 
accused of failing to fulfil a contractual agreement between National Maritime Leasing 
Corporation (SCLM) and the autonomous sinking fund of Cameroon. According to the author’s 
submission, 
‘Mr. Zogo Andela was accused of the fraudulent withholding of property belonging to the state 
of Cameroon, following the misappropriation of 20 ships acquired by the  state at a cost of 30 
billion CFA francs. He was reportedly also charged with failure to pay the Treasury the 
proceeds of the use of the above-mentioned trawlers, for whose management he was 
responsible’640. 
On the 29 March 2011, he was arrested at his home in Douala and transferred to Yaounde 
where he was arraigned the following day at the Mfoundi High Court. He was charged and 
detained initially for six months and extended two times consecutively. Before the end of his 
legal detention, he challenged both the jurisdiction of the court based on the lack of jurisdiction 
ratione loci and ratione materiae and the statutes of limitation applicable in the case. The 
Cameroon Criminal procedure code requires that a court shall have jurisdiction over a case 
when it is: (a) The court of the place of commission of the offence; or (b) The court of the place 
of residence of the accused; or (c) The court of the place of arrest of the accused.’641 He argued 
that the events occurred in 1996 while preliminary investigations began 12 years later in 2008. 
Under Cameroonian law, the statute of limitations is 10 years. His appeal was rejected and a 
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subsequent appeal at the Supreme Court has never been heard. A writ to habeas corpus appeal 
following the expiry of his legal detention period of 18 months was also rejected. Five years 
after his remand custody and investigated, he has not been tried. The author further complaint 
that the father’s health situation has deteriorated since his incarceration and has been denied 
medical attention and care since 2013. 
The author therefore claims a violation by Cameroon of his father’s rights under articles 2 (3); 
7; 9 (1), (3), (4) and (5); 11; 14 (1), (2), (3) (c) and (5); 15 (1); 16; and 26 of the Covenant. The 
Optional Protocol entered into force for the   state party on 27 September 1984. 
The   state party challenged the admissibility of the communication arguing that the author had 
not exhausted domestic remedies and questioned the validity of the authors’ claims. 
The Committee declared inadmissible the authors’ claim under articles 2(3), 7, 9(5) and 11 and 
declared admissible the authors claims under articles 9(1)(2)(3) and (4) and 14(1)(2) 
On the merits of the communication, the Committee ‘is of the view that the facts before it 
disclosed a violation by the   state party of article 9 (1), (2), (3) and (4) and of article 14 (3) (c) 
of the Covenant in the case of Mr. Zogo Andela’642. 
5 COMMUNICATION 1813/2008, EBENEZER AKWANGA V. CAMEROON 
Ebenezer Akwanga seized the Committee in 2008 through the London-based NGO, Redress 
Trust, 643  to consider his complaint against the state of Cameroon. Ebenezer Akwanga’s 
complaint and the response of Cameroon forms the basis of this in-depth analysis. 
The first part investigates the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedy. This lays the 
foundation for understanding how the merits phase of the communication is argued. The next 
section analyses the substantive part of the communication involving the victim’s complaint, 
the responses of the state party, the views of the Committee and how the views are implemented 
by the   state party. 
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5.1  BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
Ebenezer Akwanga was born on 18 November 1970 in the town of Tiko in the territory of the 
former British Southern Cameroons. He is married, and a father of three children all currently 
reside in the United   states of America. He was enrolled at the University of Buea in 1993 and 
in 1994 became the first Students Union president of the University. He was expelled from the 
University in 1994 after organizing and leading a student’s strike action against an increase in 
tuition fees. In 1995, Akwanga and others formed the Southern Cameroons Youth League 
(SCYL)644 of which he became the chairman. In 1997 he was arrested in the city of Jakiri, 300 
kilometers away from Cameroon’s capital of Yaoundé, alongside Julius Ngu Ndi,645 and almost 
300 others. They were all transported from their places of arrest within the common-law system 
to Yaoundé where Civil Law is practiced.  In 2008, he solicited the services of the London-
based non-governmental organization, Redress Trust, to file a complaint to the HRC alleging 
a violation of the complainant’s rights under articles 7, 9, 10, and 14 of the Covenant. 
5.2 CLAIMS OF THE COMMUNICATION 
Akwanga made the following claims: that (i) On 24 March 1997, he was arrested in Jakiri by 
a group of uniformed and plain clothed security officers of Cameroon, (ii) during his arrest he 
was assaulted with the booth of a gun which left a hole in his chin and knocked him 
unconscious, (iii) at the Jakiri gendarmerie station he was doused with stinking water and 
beaten on the soles of his feet with a new machete, (iv) subsequently he was stripped naked in 
front of female officers who fondled his penis, (v) he was forced to dance barefoot on sharp 
sand, singing ‘Biya before God’, (vi) the security officers dropped hot molten plastic on his 
bare body which have left his body with indelible scars, (vii) he was denied water and 
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medication during the early days of his arrest, (viii) he was detained in overcrowded and 
unhygienic conditions with hardened criminals, (ix) he was poorly fed, (x) he was kept 
incommunicado for 18 months, (xi) he was interrogated for long periods of time while standing, 
(xii) he was assaulted by hardened criminals on the instruction of the  state security agents (xiii) 
he was put through a kangaroo military trial process in which he was denied proper 
representation, and tried in a language (French) he did not understand, (xiv) his prison 
condition, torture, cruel and degrading treatment resulted in him having partial paralysis and 
constant diarrheal and optic problems. Despite all of this, he was denied proper medical care. 
Akwanga alleged that all of this amounted to: 
1. Torture or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment which are a violation 
of article 7 of the Covenant which prohibits torture and other cruel treatment. 
2. Violation of the right to security of persons in contravention of article 9 of the ICCPR. 
3. Violation of the right to the protection of inherent dignity in contravention of article 10. 
4. Violation of his right to fair trial in contravention of article 14. 
In the light of all the above, Akwanga requested the HRC to: 
1. Declare that Cameroon had violated articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant. 
2. Recommend that Cameroon adopts all necessary action to: 
a) Fully investigate the circumstances of the torture or ill treatment...and to take 
appropriate measures against those responsible for that treatment. 
b) Adopt measures to ensure that Akwanga receives full and adequate compensation for 
the harm he has suffered (Complainant 2008). 
5.3  FULFILLING PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS 
This section begins with the procedural requirements as outlined by the Optional Protocol of 
the Covenant and rule 93 of the rules of procedure of the Human Rights Committee. This lays 
out the requirements that must be fulfilled before someone claiming to be a victim of the 
actions of a   state party files a complaint to the Committee. Both the Covenant and Optional 




competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider Communication from 
individuals who claim to be victims of violations of their rights under the Covenant.646 
The protocol also requires complainants to fulfil specific basic procedural requirements 
amongst which and most importantly is the exhaustion of all domestic remedies. This 
procedure expresses the subsidiarity of the international mechanism to the primacy of the  state 
in the protection of the rights as outlined in the Covenant. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is a 
principle under European law that gives priority to domestic jurisdiction in the adjudication of 
the claims of human rights violation including criminal liability. International arbitration is 
designed to complement national jurisdiction. This is taken seriously by the HRC. There is, 
however, some flexibility in the interpretation of this rule as is shown in the analysis below.  
The communication by Akwanga alleges crimes that occurred647  after the respondent had 
ratified the Covenant. The alleged crimes also occurred within the administrative jurisdiction 
as determined by article 1 of the Optional Protocol. Akwanga fulfils the premise of article 3 of 
the protocol as he has submitted a non-anonymous communication and the language used in 
the original communication as submitted by Redress is anything other than an ‘abuse of the 
right of submission.’ 
Based on Akwanga’s submission, Cameroon raised two procedural objections to admissibility 
based on article 5 of the Optional Protocol. Cameroon cited article 5(2)648 to object based on 
para. a) whether the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies and b) the same 
matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement.  
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5.4 LITI PENDITI 
In submitting that he is working in accordance with article 5 (2) (a) of the protocol, Akwanga   
stated that ‘this complaint is not being examined (and has never been examined) by another 
procedure of international investigation and settlement and thus complies with the requirement 
under article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol.’649 Article 5(2) (a) precludes the admissibility of 
claims that are concurrently being handled by another international jurisdiction comparable to 
the HRC. In its submission of July 2009, Cameroon argues that Akwanga’s lawyer had filed a 
case on his behalf and 17 others in the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in 
2004. Cameroon thus argues that the ACHPR is a quasi-judicial international body of 
adjudication and so comparable to the HRC. It cited Kollar vs. Austria,650which was rejected 
by the HRC based on the rule of ‘Ratione Temporis.’ In examining the Kollar case, it is 
observed that the communication was rejected subject to an Austrian reservation on article 5(2) 
(a) of the OP on its accession. The reservation spelt out that  
On the understanding that, further to the provisions of article 5 (2) of the Protocol, the 
Committee provided for in Article 28 of the Covenant shall not consider any communication 
from an individual unless it has been ascertained that the same matter has not been examined 
by the European Commission on Human Rights established by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms651. 
It must be noted that Kollar’s application to the European Commission was declared 
inadmissible on both procedural and merits grounds. The Committee then decided that another 
competent jurisdiction has thus considered the case. Cameroon, on the other hand, has made 
no such reservations concerning the Covenant or it Optional Protocol. In essence, the 
connotation the of ‘same matter’ as defined by article 5(2) (a) of the OP was given clarity in 
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the Fanali v Italy case.652The Committee   stated that the principle of the ‘same matter’ had to 
be understood as ‘...including the same claim, concerning the same individual and submitted 
by him or someone else who has the standing to act on his behalf...’653.In the Fanalli, the co-
defendant of Mr. Fanalli had filed a complaint at the European Commission of human rights 
which involved the same issues raised by Fanalli at the Human Rights Committee. 
Cameroon argued that on 25 November 2006, during the Commission’s 40th session, the case 
was heard; however, a decision remains pending.654Akwanga rejected this claim by arguing 
that 
…he is not aware of any complaint submitted on his behalf to the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights. He notes that he never authorized any lawyer to submit such a 
complaint. He further notes that the   state party has not submitted any documentation in this 
regard and that the alleged complaint is not available in the public domain.’655 
Cameroon dismissed Akwanga’s defence and restated its claim by citing a statement made by 
a certain Lawyer Titanji at the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). 
Akwanga responded by arguing that the statement at the 40th session of the Commission was 
‘...apparent that, the case is concerned with torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment that the plaintiffs were subjected to during their arrest or detention in March and 
April 1997 as well as violations of the right to a fair trial during the proceedings conducted 
against them and the trial before the Yaoundé military tribunal.’  
Cameroon further asserted that the similar nature of both communication (HRC and ACHPR) 
suggest that the case is being currently handled at the ACHPR. Writing on the merits of this 
argument, Akwanga restated that since his arrest and detention in 1997 until the response by 
the state party to his allegations, he has never given any power of attorney to any individual 
except Redress to act on his behalf at any regional or international jurisdiction against 
Cameroon. He then argued that ‘...in the absence of the state party producing a copy of any 
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power of attorney or equivalent document in this regard that grants Titanji the authority to act 
on his behalf, the exception should be dismissed.’656. 
Akwanga proceeded to argue that lawyer Titanji had no power of attorney or his consent to act 
on his behalf. The failure of Cameroon to produce any evidence to the contrary or any detail 
reference that can be corroborated by investigation leaves a massive loophole in its claim. 
Secondly, even if the claim submitted by Lawyer Titanji included ‘the same claim’, in the 
absence of a power of attorney, he will lack the ‘standing’ to act on Akwanga’s behalf, and the 
ACHPR could not have seized on the issue. 
The Committee rejected Cameroon’s request for the case to be dismissed on the ground of Liti 
penditis restating its jurisprudence that the Optional Protocol cannot be so interpreted so as to 
imply that an unrelated third party, acting without the knowledge and consent of the alleged 
victim, can preclude the latter from having access to the Human Rights Committee.657With the 
rejection of Cameroon’s objections on admissibility, the Committee proceeded to consider the 
merits of the case. 
5.5 ON THE SUBJECT OF TORTURE AS IN ARTICLE 7 
Cameroon dismissed Akwanga’s claim that he has been tortured and argued that the state’s 
investigations (of the alleged acts of the complainant) led to the following findings; 
‘...deaths, grievous bodily harm, and important material damages were carried out in 
observance with the rules in place at the time on criminal procedure. It was in no way arbitrary 
in regard to the legislative procedure that was in place to fight against the use of torture by 
police officers or the jurisprudence.’658 
It cited Kouidis v. Greece659 to argue that it was up to the state which oversaw the investigation 
of Akwanga’s infractions to decide the manner of carrying out an investigation as far as the 
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process was not arbitrary. In this case, Kouidis challenged the evidence presented by Greece 
which led to his conviction and argued that the state should have interviewed his landlord to 
corroborate their claim of having found drugs in his house. On the other hand, Akwanga 
accused Cameroon of having used torture and other forms of ill-treatment to extract confessions 
from him. The way in which Cameroon conducted itself in the investigation was arbitrary in 
scope and thus the Kouidis v Greece argument cannot be invoked to justify its approach. 
It further contended that because torture and cruel, inhuman treatment are penal offenses, the 
burden of proof lies with Akwanga. In this claim, Cameroon failed to recognise the fact that 
because torture has attained a peremptory norm status under international law, the onus is not 
only on Akwanga to prove that he was tortured while in the custody of the state but as the HRC 
had previously determined, the state has a duty to show that the allegations are false. Cameroon 
also asserts that in the absence of evidence presented by Akwanga proving that he was tortured, 
it could not be found guilty of unsubstantiated allegations. It dismissed the medical certificate 
presented by Akwanga, stating that it was only established after his escape from jail and that 
the medical certificate was issued by a Nigerian doctor who   stated that Akwanga was 
diagnosed with stomach ulcer and diabetes which it claims has nothing to do with 
torture.660Apart from the medical reports submitted by Akwanga to support the allegations of 
torture, his predicament as a victim of torture was a subject of numerous publications by groups 
like Amnesty International, Trauma Centre,661the Human Rights Defence Group (HRDG),662 
and other NGOs. Most of these reports indicated that Akwanga and many of his fellow inmates, 
a good number of whom later died in jail, were tortured and Akwanga, in particular, suffered 
from partial paralysis due to torture. He also developed visual problems which were directly 
related to the conditions under which he was detained. It must also be noted that the approach 
of the HRC on the standard and burden of proof is initially on the complainant but at the 
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admissibility phase, the complainant must merely provide sufficient evidence to constitute a 
prima facie case. This has been done by Akwanga. In its jurisprudence and specifically in the 
de Bouton v Uruguay case, the Committee argued that ‘a refutation by a   state party of these 
allegations in general terms is not sufficient.663  
Cameroon also stated in its 2009 response to the HRC that it was thanks to the cooperation and 
confessions of Akwanga that the government was able to uncover and stopped his violent plans 
and to retrieve stolen explosives and the names of his accomplices. This cooperation could only 
have been obtained through torture, and the confessions obtained through such methods 
constituted degrading treatment since it was against Akwanga’s ‘will and conscience.’ Apart 
from the oral submission and medical evidence of torture presented by Akwanga, the gorge on 
his chin still visible 19 years after the report presented in Jeune Afrique Economie (JAE),664 of 
1-14 September 1997 which   stated on page 84 that information was extracted from Akwanga 
‘de façon musclée’ (through forceful methods) only added to mounting evidence that Cameroon 
employed torture to gather the evidence it used to try and convict Akwanga. This ‘façon 
musclée’ is the kind of cooperation which Cameroon referred to in its 2009 response to the 
Committee. 
In the jurisprudence of several treaty bodies, torture may be considered a combination of many 
methods or a single method practiced over a sustained period. Sometimes a singular technique 
applied alone without persistence even when it constitutes ‘severe pain’ (CAT) or mere ‘pain’ 
(IACHR) might not amount to torture but persistent application in combination with other 
similar techniques reaches the level of aggravated pain that reaches the point of insanity, and 
that could be seen as torture. Beatings on the soles of his feet and incessant blows which of 
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course left no visible scars, no skin lesions or permanent recognizable marks except the marks 
left by melting plastic would constitute nothing other than torture. Cameroon may argue that 
none of those techniques amounted to the level of severe pain referred to in the CAT definition 
of torture. It is also worth considering the decision of the European Commission on Human 
Rights in the Ireland v. UK case that dismissed the allegation of torture based on similar 
arguments. On the other hand, if Akwanga was subjected to beatings alone, this argument 
would not still be acceptable under the HRC jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the persistence and 
combination of the acts from gun-booting, dancing barefoot on sharp sand (excruciating pain) 
and singing ‘Biya before God’ (degrading treatment and against his will and conscience) should 
make these acts amount to torture.  
Akwanga also alleged acts of gross humiliation like being stripped naked and female 
gendarmes fondling his penis, which all amount to degrading treatment; his transportation to 
Yaoundé during which he was chained on both legs and arms, forced to lie on his back 
throughout the journey of close to 300 kilometers; and denied water,665 will all amount to 
inhuman treatment which Cameroon has not answered in its response. If torture can then be 
viewed as degrading and inhuman treatment perpetrated to achieve a purpose which Cameroon 
admitted was to foil the plot, then it would be argued beyond reasonable doubt that Cameroon 
acted in violation of article 7 of the Covenant. 
Cameroon contested Akwanga’s claim that it bears full responsibility for the treatment he 
received from other inmates while in custody. It, however, admitted that while Akwanga was 
in detention in the Mfou prison, he was subjected to torture by other inmates but invoked the 
redundant argument of the vertical nature of human rights and public authority argument to 
attempt to absolve itself from responsibility. Apart from the negative obligation imposed by 
international law on   states not to torture, it also imposes positive obligation on these   states 
to exercise ‘due diligence’ in ensuring that those within their jurisdiction are not subjected to 
torture even by non- state actors. In its General comment 20 on of article 7, the Covenant 
                                                 




stressed that in the case of torture, the principle of ‘due diligence’ obliges   states to protect 
everyone through legislation666. 
Cameroon failed in recognizing that any act that was based on negligence does fall within 
article 1 of the CAT definition of torture as intentional. It is true that CAT provides that torture 
must be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or person acting in official capacity (article 1), but failure to act to stop torture could 
be seen as acquiescence. For all persons deprived of their liberty, the prohibition of treatment 
contrary to article 7 is supplemented by the positive requirement of article 10 (1) of the 
Covenant that they shall be treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity. 
Cameroon acquiesced to the fact that Akwanga was tortured by other inmates when they heard 
of what he did, and this torture occurred in an institution it controls and should, therefore, bear 
full responsibility for the security of all persons detained in its institutions. The HRC in the 
cases Dias v Angola,667  and Delgado Paez v Colombia,668  observed in the latter that the 
Colombian authorities had not taken steps to ensure his ‘… right to security of person’, and in 
the former that Mr. Dias’ right to the security of person was violated since it was the Angolan 
authorities themselves who were alleged to be the sources of the threats he faced. 
The detention of a political detainee with hardened criminals could amount to negligence or 
deliberate behavior which led to ill-treatment and, therefore, imputes the state’s responsibility. 
Cameroon therefore failed in both its positive and negative obligations under the Covenant to 
secure and to refrain from infringing on article 7669. 
5.6 ON THE SUBJECT OF LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSONS AS IN ARTICLE 9 
In his deposition to the Committee, Akwanga argued that he was detained in four different 
places and ‘was never informed at the time of his arrest of the reasons for his arrest. He was 
not brought promptly before a judicial body and that he was severely tortured and deprived of 
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his liberty for more than two years before being brought before a military court and during 
which time he had no opportunity to challenge any aspect of his detention.’ In response, 
Cameroon argued that ‘we attract the attention of the Committee to the fact that the SCNC is a 
secessionist Movement for whom all demonstrations are illegal. Akwanga cannot, therefore, 
claim that he was running a peaceful campaign.’670In a more specific note and in response to 
accusations of violation of article 9(2), Cameroon submits that ‘Akwanga was arrested and 
deprived of his liberty, for reasons and procedures in conformity with the law and that not only 
were the reasons of his arrest explained to him, he had to explain himself.’671  
Cameroon’s response to accusations of the violation of articles 9(1)(2)(3) has been to 
emphasize its political position with regards to the Southern Cameroons National Council 
(SCNC). It is a position that has shaped Cameroon’s domestic policy concerning the structure 
of the state, the construction, interpretation, and application of the law and the way it deals with 
advocates for the independence of Southern Cameroons. This type of politically couched 
response informs its approach to its obligation under the Covenant and goes contrary to the 
jurisprudence of the Committee when it   states that ‘arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with 
‘against the law’, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of 
inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.672 On the other hand, 
even if the SCNC is a secessionist Movement, Cameroon was still obligated to inform 
Akwanga at the time of his arrest or immediately after, of the specific reasons for his arrest, 
which it failed to do and thus acted in violation of article 9(1,2) of the Covenant. The claim by 
Cameroon that Akwanga knew the reasons for which he was arrested is also insufficient and 
presumptuous. There is also no correlation between SCNC as an illegal secessionist Movement 
and the right to be promptly informed of the reasons of Akwanga’s arrest. By also painting 
Akwanga as a member of an illegal secessionist Movement whose activities are all illegal, 
Cameroon seems to evoke certain justifiability in its actions of illegal arrest, torture, cruel, 
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inhuman and degrading treatment and a long and tormenting two-year pre-trial deprivation of 
liberty during which time Akwanga was detained incommunicado for 18 months. In the Tomasi 
v. France’s case, 673  France invited the European Court of Human Rights to take into 
consideration the ‘particular circumstances’ obtaining in Corsica at the time and what it said 
was the ‘...existence and persistence of serious indications of the guilt...’ The court rejected 
this argument, stating that they could not justify in the case of Tomasi four years of pre-trial 
detention. By arbitrarily arresting Akwanga and failing to notify him of the reasons of his arrest, 
Cameroon acted in breach of article 9(1) and (2). By keeping him in custody for close to two 
years without charge or trial, it acted in breach of articles 9(3) and 9(4). By also failing to 
protect him from torture by other prisoners, Cameroon was in breach of article 9(1) which 
obliges it to the protection of the liberty and security of Akwanga. 
The Committee in its views in the Akwanga case in 2011 echoed the views that   
‘nothing suggests that at the time of arrest, the author was informed of the reasons for his arrest, 
that he was ever brought before a judge or judicial officer, or that he ever was afforded the 
opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest or detention. In the absence of relevant   
state party information on these claims, the Committee considers that the facts before it 
indicates a violation of article 9, paras 2, 3 and 4, of the Covenant.’674 
In the Gorji case, Cameroon failed to cooperate with the Committee. The Committee argued 
on the question of the allegations of violation of article 9 that remand in custody must not only 
be lawful but reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances. For example, to prevent flight, 
interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime675 and consequently was of the view that 
the author’s detention between 31 May 1985 and 3 February 1986 was neither reasonable nor 
necessary in the circumstances of the case, and thus in violation of article 9, para. 1, of the 
Covenant.676  
In the Mukong case, the   state party rejected accusations of the violation of article 9(2) by 
claiming that the complainant was never arrested but rather was detained based on a Committal 
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Order. It argued that there is a difference between a warrant of arrest (‘mandate d’arret’) and a 
Committal Order (‘mandat de depøt’). A ‘mandat de depot’ is a detention order issued by 
administrative authorities which can cause the detention of anyone for two or more weeks 
without the right to the writ of habeas corpus. This response highlights the problem of 
Cameroon’s implementation regime; one that employs narrow interpretation of its obligations 
to justify its decisions. 
5.7 ON THE SUBJECT OF THE HUMANE TREATMENT OF PERSONS UNDER DETENTION AS IN ARTICLE 10 
On the allegation by Akwanga that he was detained in an overcrowded prison infested with 
cockroaches and rats and that he was poorly fed, Cameroon argued that the prison conditions 
‘pre-existed Akwanga’s detention and were not designed to inflict suffering on him’. While 
acknowledging the problems of detention conditions in its prisons, in particular dilapidation, 
overcrowding, criminality and a lack of means to finance the construction of new prisons, it 
further contends that it has been aware of the bad conditions of detention for many years which 
it has taken steps with support from foreign governments to fix. It could be argued that the poor 
conditions constituted part of the dehumanization process that transformed Akwanga into an 
object and triggered the loss of his inherent dignity which made cooperation in the extraction 
of confessions possible, as claimed by Cameroon. Cameroon also rejected Akwanga’s 
accusation about poor feeding and deliberate malnourishment and blamed it on the lack of 
resources. This claim is at odds with the premise of the basic minimum standards for the 
treatment of detainees which argues that: 
‘the application of this rule, as a minimum, cannot be dependent on the material resources 
available in the   state party and of course continued that this rule must be applied without 
distinction of any kind such as language, political or other opinion which is what the respondent 
claims the petitioner holds.”677 
In Griffin v Spain, the author invoked article 7 to charge the   state party concerning his 
condition of detention in a prison which he argued was infested with rats, lice, cockroaches and 
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diseases and in which there were 30 persons per cell. ‘The living conditions in this prison are 
said to be ‘worse than those depicted in the film ‘Midnight Express”“; a 500- year old prison, 
virtually unchanged…’678In its admissibility decision, the HRC noted that although the author 
had invoked article 7 in respect of his allegations concerning the events and conditions of the 
prison, it found, however, that the facts as described by the author fell rather within the scope 
of article 10.679 In the case of Akwanga, apart from invoking article 7 to describe his treatment 
in Jakiri, Banso, Bamenda, Mfou, and Kondengui, he also clarified in the initial communication 
to the HRC in para. 49 of the supplementary roles of article 10 in understanding article 7. The 
same would be said of the case of Titiahonjo v Cameroon in which the deceased’s wife alleged 
violation of article 7 because of a) the general conditions of detention, b) the beatings the 
husband was subjected to, c) the deprivation of both food and clothing in detention at the 
gendarmerie cell and in the Bafoussam prison.680Unlike in Griffin v Spain, the Committee in 
its views of 27 October 2007, found violations under article 7 without making any clarification 
whether the general conditions of detention and deprivation of food should be considered under 
article 10. Cameroon’s argument that inmates receive food rations that ‘can be supplemented 
by visitors’ fails to conform to the minimum standard outline in General Comment 21 which 
dismisses any defence base on the material resources available to the   state party. It also falls 
short of the minimum standard rules which require that ‘every prisoner shall be provided by 
the administration at the usual hours with food of nutritional value adequate for health and 
strength, of wholesome quality and well prepared and served.’681 
In Gorji v Cameroon the Committee reiterated its standard argument concerning the treatment 
of detainees in Cameroon. It   stated that the conditions of detention did not meet the minimum 
standard rule because the complainant was kept in a wet and dirty cell without a bed, table or 
any sanitary facilities. It reiterated that persons deprived of their liberty may not be subjected 
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to any hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty.682 It is 
the same argument made by the Committee in Mukong v Cameroon. Mukong complained that 
because of insalubrious conditions of detention facilities, overcrowding of a cell at the First 
Police District of Yaoundé, deprivation of food and clothing, and death threats, his rights under 
article 10 was violated. 
Cameroon has used the argument of underdevelopment in almost all the complaints as its 
defence against a violation of article 10. This textbook approach has spanned across two 
decades, from Mukong to Akwanga, in total disregard of the development of the jurisprudence 
of the Committee and even the development of the minimum standards into the Mandela rule. 
5.8 ON THE SUBJECT OF FAIR TRIAL AS IN ARTICLE 14 
In his complaint to the HRC, Akwanga   stated that all through the process of the arrest, torture, 
and interrogation, he was not allowed to see a lawyer; was interrogated at odd hours of the 
night (sometimes at 2 a.m.) without a lawyer; was forced to stand sometimes for up to five 
hours during the interrogations and was threatened with death during such interrogations. It 
should be noted that the same materials that Cameroon admits were obtained through 
cooperation with interrogators and which JAE claims, quoting the Commander of the 
Gendarmerie Legion of Bamenda were obtained through forceful methods that constituted 
Cameroon’s principal evidence used to convict Akwanga. Such a practice is inconsistent with 
the spirit of the practice outlined by CAT and article 315(2) of its CPC, which   states that 
materials obtained through torture must be invalid in any criminal hearings. In responding to 
the allegation that Akwanga was tried in a language he did not understand, Cameroon cited law 
No. 6 of 18 January 1996 which   states that ‘…the official languages of the Republic of 
Cameroon may be English and French, both languages having the same status’. It further 
argued that “...beyond this constitutional right and obligation... requires that every Cameroon 
citizen should make an effort to understand and master both official languages...’. As usual, as 
it failed to address the substantive claim but preferred to focus on stating and defending its 
inadequate Laws. 
                                                 




Cameroon’s claim that bilingual interpreters were provided flies in the face of the official 
documentation which shows that all of the interrogation reports were presented in French. In 
failing to provide counsel to Akwanga, it made it impossible for him to study and understand 
the accusations against him which unfortunately were all written in French. The conditions of 
detention compounded by poor feeding and poor medical conditions made a criminal 
proceeding which carried the death penalty as sought by Cameroon to violate the basic tenet of 
fairness.  
It should also be noted that Akwanga was kept incommunicado for 18 months during which 
time a state of emergency was declared. Under the state of emergency, all legal safeguards such 
as the right to contact a lawyer and the outside world, the right to be brought before a judge 
and the right to challenge the legality of his detention before a judge was suspended. The 
limitations provided by trial in a military tribunal compounded issues of access to relevant 
evidence presented by the state party and possible transparency in the entire process. The HRC 
in its ruling in the Mukong case declared that the trial of civilians in military tribunals violated 
the tenet of fairness. The African Commission in its ruling in communication 266/2003 in 
declaring a violation of article 7 reached the same conclusion.683 
The above conditions made fair trial a near impossibility. In its views, the Committee argued 
that: 
 ‘…the   state party must demonstrate, with regard to the specific class of individuals at issue, 
that the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake the trials, that other alternative forms of 
special or high-security civilian courts are inadequate for the task and that recourse to military 
courts is unavoidable. The   state party must further demonstrate how military courts ensure 
the full protection of the rights of the accused pursuant to article 14.’684 
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The above reference to the Committee’s jurisprudence cited in General Comments 32 provoked 
a concurring view from six Committee members. They argued that military courts should not 
in principle have jurisdiction to try civilians, and if that should be the case, the   state party 
must provide under article 40 of the Covenant or in a communication under the Optional 
Protocol, compelling reasons or exceptional circumstances that force them to derogate from 
the principle. These concurring views were deemed weak from Committee member Fabian 
Omar who argued that in the Committee’s decision on the Akwanga case, it missed a clear 
opportunity to declare that the trial of civilians by military courts as incompatible with article 
14 of the Covenant and to correct this regressive aspect of human rights law.685 
6 VIEWS OF THE COMMITTEE 
Three years after the initial submission of the complaint, the Committee issued its views on 
both the admissibility and merits parts of the complaint. The Human Rights Committee acting 
under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol of the Covenant is of the view that the facts before 
it discloses a violation of the rights of Akwanga under article 7; article 10(1)(2); article 
9(2)(3)(4); and article 14. In accordance with article 2(3a) of the Covenant, Cameroon is under 
an obligation to provide Akwanga with an effective remedy, which should include a review of 
his conviction with the guarantees enshrined in the Covenant, an investigation of the alleged 
events and prosecution of the persons responsible, as well as an adequate reparation, including 
compensation.  
6.1 CAMEROON’S REACTION TO THE VIEWS OF THE COMMITTEE 
The views of the Committee were issued in the Akwanga case in 2011; six years have gone 
past with Cameroon fulfilling none of the recommendations. In February 2012, Cameroon’s 
Justice Minister issued its observation on the views of the Committee. On the Committee’s 
recommendation that Cameroon reviews Akwanga’s conviction of 1999 following the views 
of the Committee on article 14, he responded that internal mechanisms permit the 
reexamination of sentences within the framework of the right of appeal.  The minister also 
stated that for Akwanga to be able to appeal the decision of his sentencing, the  state must first 
                                                 




execute the warrant of arrest issued against him. In essence, what Cameroon is saying here 
concerning the Committee’s recommendation to review the decision sentencing Akwanga to 
20 years in jail is that he must first surrender himself to the authorities for arrest and detention. 
What Cameroon’s response failed to capture is the aspects of the violation of article 14 which 
compelled the Committee to recommend a review. For example, in recalling its General 
Comment 32 on article 14, the Committee argues that the   state party must demonstrate how 
military courts ensure the full protection of the rights of the accused according to article 14. 
Cameroon failed to demonstrate its preference of a military court over a civilian court with its 
safeguards of fairness and transparency. Instead, as Akwanga pointed out in his response to 
Cameroon’s observation, its attempt to re-open the merits of the case are ‘irrelevant at the 
implementation stage…’ In the absence of any alternative procedure to implement the view of 
reviewing Akwanga’s conviction, he argues that Cameroon thus needs to urgently take steps 
to change its legislation in order to comply with the Committee’s views.  
On the Committee’s recommendation to investigate and prosecute those responsible for 
Akwanga’s torture, Cameroon continued with the same line of argument, emphasizing 
procedural guarantees to appeal which can only be invoked if Akwanga was present in the 
country. Akwanga argued that ‘an investigation, investigations into allegations that have 
formed the basis of the views of the Committee, must not be dependent on any further steps he 
takes including his physical presence in the country. 
On the question of appropriate reparation and particularly compensation to Akwanga, 
Cameroon argued that no appropriate reparation could be offered without the prosecution and 
condemnation of the alleged perpetrators of the crimes against Akwanga. Akwanga argues 
regarding the jurisprudence of the Committee that article 2(3) requires that state parties make 
reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Without reparation to 
individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective 
remedy which is central to the efficacy of article 2(3) is not discharged. 
The nature of the general legal obligation requires that   states should act in good faith both in 
their participation in the procedures under the Optional Protocol and the Covenant itself. It 
goes further to state that the duty to cooperate with the Committee arises from an application 
of the principle of good faith to the observance of all treaty obligations.  Cameroon has not 
shown this good faith in its participation. Either it has focused on the alleged crimes that got 




Committee, Cameroon’s observation refers to general remedies under Cameroonian law. They 
do not provide information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s views 
in his case. This approach ignores Cameroon’s specific obligations to provide effective 
remedies in this case as set out in the views of the Committee.  
Cameroon seems not to have fully accepted the views of the Committee and has sought to 
reopen the merits of the communication in the implementation phase and in so doing attacks 
both the integrity of the process and that of the victim. It is a pattern which it has used in most 
of the other communication whose views have gone in favour of the complainant. Cameroon 
has thus used procedural bottlenecks and innuendoes to delay and frustrate the implementation 
of the Committee’s views. It did the same in Mukong as well as in Gorji.  
Seven years since the Committee issued its views and 20 years since Akwanga was arrested 
and subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment and 18 years since 
he was subjected to a kangaroo military tribunal, his abusers are yet to be brought to justice.  
The laws that facilitated the unjust and unfair processes remain in place, the prison conditions 
have not changed, and no form of compensation has been given to him. 
6.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIEWS OF THE COMMITTEE 
International law requires   states to provide effective procedural remedies under domestic law 
to guarantee adequate reparation to victims of human rights violations. In other words, the right 
to reparation for torture and other human rights violations includes both the right to substantive 
reparations (such as compensation) and the right to effective procedural remedies to enable 
victims to access substantive reparations (e.g., access to civil, administrative and criminal 
remedies). The jurisprudence of the ECtHR clarifies in that ‘a remedy must be effective in 
practice as well as in law, particularly in the sense that acts or omissions by national authorities 
must not unjustifiably hinder its exercise.’686 
There are three important institutional requirements for the implementation of the views of the 
Committees. The obligation of the state to provide legislative, judicial and administrative 
measures for the implementation has been considered in Chapter 4. Legislative measures for 
                                                 




the enjoyment of these rights and even the availability of a judicial remedy will be of little 
meaning unless the government provides the administrative measures necessary for the 
achievement of a right.  
Seibert-Fohr examined what and when the Covenant required a particular act of 
implementation and he concluded that the right of individuals and corresponding obligation of 
the  state should first and foremost become a reality in law and practice.687 Consequently, 
Shelton argues that ‘  states must ensure that they put in place such remedial institutions and 
procedures to which victims of violations of human rights may have access.’688Article 2(3) 
does not only guarantee the provision of remedy but in its para. 2(3)(c), it obligates the   states 
parties to enforce such remedial measures. 
By acceding to the Covenant   states accept the obligation to respect, protect and implement 
positive measures to give full realisation and effect to the rights outlined in the Covenant. While 
the state Reporting mechanism and the Individual Complaint procedure stand out as the core 
pillars of the Covenant implementation mechanisms, the commitment of a  state in translating 
both its positive and negative obligations under the Covenant within the framework of the right 
to effective remedy is also crucial as a measure of its commitment to its obligation. The right 
to effective remedy which is central to this goal both at a domestic and international levels 
remains the central mechanism through which individuals can seek and receive redress for 
breach of Covenant rights. In order for remedies to be effective, they need to be enforceable.  
In practice, victims face procedural and political barriers to lodge a claim, but even in those 
instances when their claims are successful, and they obtain a positive judgment/views, the 
practical enforcement of the decision can be as hard, or even harder, than the process of 
bringing the initial legal claim. Often there are no effective remedies in the   states where the 
acts were committed. These crimes usually imply and often require a certain level of state 
involvement. To obtain justice and redress implies that the state acknowledges responsibility 
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and makes amends, but the perpetrators are often supported by the very   states which should 
be punishing them.  
The Human Rights Committee has created two follow-up procedures to monitor the 
implementation of state obligations under reporting procedure and individual communications 
procedure. Once the Committee finds a violation of any of the rights in the Covenant, it gives   
state party 90 days to implement the views of the Committee. The Special Rapporteur on views 
under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant is charged with organising a follow-up should the   
state party fail to meet up with the very flexible 90 days deadline. It publishes an annual report 
on information shared between a victim and a   state party and any progress made. 
The implementation rate of HRC views is generally poor. To illustrate, since the Committee 
started its work in its second session in 1977 until 2016, it has received 2970 communications 
of which 697 have been declared inadmissible, 395 discontinued or withdrawn, 542 not yet 
concluded and consideration concluded by the adoption of views under article 5 (4) of the 
Optional Protocol of 1200, in which 994 violations of the Covenant were found.689  
In the last 34 years since accession to the Covenant and its Optional Protocol, the Human Rights 
Committee has found Cameroon in breach of the personal integrity rights of eight complainants 
and has thus requested appropriate compensation and measures to ensure that such violations 
do not occur again. In three of the eight cases, an investigation and prosecution of alleged 
perpetrators of torture were recommended. This has not happened in any of the three cases. In 
the case of Njaru v Cameroon, the   state party argues that the conduct of investigations 
encountered some difficulties that hinder and render judicial proceedings against the accused 
almost impossible. Investigations were restricted to secondary sources (documents, witnesses) 
which do not provide evidence based on which court action can be instituted.  
Regarding the compensation of Njaru, on the 16th December 2009, the   state party ‘informed 
the Committee that arrangements had been made to compensate the author, but despite efforts 
made, they had not been able to contact him’690. On the 25th February 2010, the author informed 
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the Committee that the   state party had failed to implement the views effectively. Despite an 
initiative taken by the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF), the 
author had not been provided any reparation. Two months later, a ministerial Committee of the 
Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon proposed a compensation package of 30.000.000 
CFA (approx. 56.000 US $). The author rejected this offer and requested a compensation 
package of 500.000.000 CFA (approx. 930.000 US $) ‘for the general and special damages he 
suffered because of the violations of his human rights. And that the   state party pay for his 
medical treatment abroad; that the perpetrators are tried in court and punished according to the 
law; that all other threats against him by officials be promptly investigated and perpetrators be 
tried in court; and that the   state party ensure his security.’691 
In Engo v Cameroon, the author ‘informed the Committee on 20 July 2010, that the state party 
had taken no action to implement the Committee’s decision. However, he had been summoned 
continually before the Tribunal de Grande Instance relating to issues arising from the facts of 
his case considered by the Committee.’  According to the Committee, Engo’s comment was 
sent to Cameroon on 9 August 2010 with a reminder for comment. 692. In 2014, according to 
the follow-up submission, Cameroon argued that 
The author could not be released after having served a 10 year-prison sentence because of five 
other judicial procedures pending against him, and because he could abscond. Accordingly, the 
first part of the remedy cannot be implemented. The author was provided access to an 
ophthalmologist, as well as to external medical visits. His overall health condition is deemed 
satisfactory. He receives regular visits and is allowed to consult legal counsels693 
A year later, Engo’s Counsel made a further submission to clarify the state of the 
implementation of the views of the Committee 
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The author’s Counsel submits that Cameroon failed to provide an effective remedy, or to 
release Mr. Engo from detention. The   state party has not provided any reason for its contempt 
of the Committee’s views. According to the author’s counsel, this requires appropriate financial 
compensation and orders bringing the state of impunity to an end694 
In the follow up  
The state party reported that it had re-instated the author to the judiciary and that it had offered 
him compensation, which he refused to accept because he considered it to be inadequate.695 
According to the records established in 2017, in 7 of the 8 cases follow up ‘dialogue is ongoing’ 
where the Committee has found a violation of the Covenant and has recommended action. In 
the case of Mazou, “the follow-up dialogue in the case was closed as the Committee deemed 
that the state party had complied with the views”696. 
Cameroon has focused on compensation as its principal strategy in the implementation of the 
views of the Committee. Of the eight cases in which the Committee has requested some form 
of action, it has made offers in two697and only in one of the eight cases has compensation been 
paid. 698 
In the Concluding Observations of its fifth periodic report the Committee regretted that  
‘…often significant delays in the implementation of its views, in particular with regard to 
compensation’ (art. 2) and urges Cameroon to take all appropriate measures to give full effect 
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to the Committee’s views without undue delay and to ensure that an effective remedy is 
available to persons whose rights under the Covenant have been violated’699.  
Bertelsmann Institute has concluded that ‘on paper, citizens enjoy the right to seek redress for 
alleged wrongs through administrative procedures or the legal system. However, according to 
an assessment by the U.S.  state Department, both options involve lengthy delays, coupled with 
problems enforcing civil court orders due to bureaucratic inefficiency.’ 700 The failure to 
accurately translate its commitment into compliance is also a factor of the nature of its 
constitutionalism which fails to provide the enabling environment for rights protection 
adequately. With the semantic constitution that serves to formalise the existing locus of power 
for the benefit of those exercising it, torture, deprivation of liberty, inhuman treatment in 
detention and unfair trials do not only occur because of the existence of autocratic political 
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This research has focused on analyzing the implementation approaches of Cameroon’s 
obligations under articles 2(3), 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The research has established that while Cameroon has acceded to the Covenant, and partially 
reformed its constitutional system to incorporate these rights, its courts and the National 
Commission of Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) have yet to develop a consistent 
implementation method that is consistent with Cameroon’s obligations as defined by the 
Covenant. The implementation approach to these Covenant articles is impaired by the nature 
of the political and constitutional systems, domestic institutional limitations and narrow 
interpretation of its obligation under the Covenant. An imperial executive and institutional 
limitations are the most important reasons why Cameroon’s implementation regime is limited 
in scope and fails in its objective to fulfil its obligations under these Covenant rights. The desire 
to protect the executive has given rise to rules, procedures, and actions that seek purposely to 
shield the executive from any perils arising from its actions. These actions involve those of the 
police, judiciary and legislation that deal with the law and rules in a way that shields the 
executive from any threat and therefore compounds rights protection. Apart from the imperial 
executive, the structure of the judiciary is in ways that make it accountable to the executive and 
in particular the President, thus jeopardising its independence which is vital for the protection 
of these Covenant rights. These deficiencies are compounded by a restrictive mechanism for 
judicial review which precludes review of promulgated legislation and prevents ordinary 
citizens from challenging the constitutionality of oppressive laws. Consequently, emphasis on 
procedures consistent with limited national legislation rather than substantive steps taken to 
ensure the enjoyment of these rights captures its implementation approach 
In reaching this general conclusion chapter three has examined the historical evolution of the 
political structures of Cameroon and their impact on the implementation of these Covenant 
rights. Cameroon’s current political structure is a product of French and British colonial 
legacies and a reflection of the presidential imperial executive structure of the fourth French 




periodically co-opted to grant legitimacy to presidential authority. The political institutions that 
emerged from the colonial state have been dominated by a strong presidency, weak judiciary 
and a house of assembly entirely under the control of the executive. The imperial executive 
and general structural relation between the different arms of government ensures that the 
President shares powers with weak institutions which exist to legitimise presidential rule. 
Parliamentary majority is constant and achieved through fraudulent elections and a 
constitutional system of presidential appointments of members of parliament and entirely under 
the de facto or de jure control of the executive. Executive priorities mostly dictate Legislative 
action and thus determines the nature and scope of the protection regime of these rights. 
Consistent with Thompson and Boyle’s argument, Cameroon is a strong state, and strong   
states tend to filter or pre-empt individual action including legal action at the international level 
just as it does at the local level.701.  
Chapter four has examined the domestic institutions and how best they are structured for the 
implementation of the state’s obligation under the Covenant and specifically in the protection 
of the specific rights under consideration. The institutional design for the separation of powers 
continues to ensure that the executive retains excessive powers. The president exercises control 
through the power of appointment, promotion, transfer, discipline and remuneration of judges. 
Even the financing and administration of the judiciary are left in the unfettered control of the 
executive. It exposed the fundamental weaknesses of the domestic framework of the protection 
regime of these rights. Its constitutional framework is derived from its historical interaction 
with foreign systems which transformed its internal legal configuration, displaced customary 
law and imposed both common and Civil Law systems which have hardly taken root. These 
inadequacies have failed to enhance the protection of these rights. It would be concluded that 
the model of coexistence of the alien legal systems has been weak in conceptualisation and 
application and has been exploited by the autocratic political configuration. The adoption of 
institutional structures has proven to be problematic for the context of rights protection because 
of internal deficiencies in conceptualization and implementation. It demonstrated that while 
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Cameroon has ratified the Covenant and its Optional Protocol and has taken measures to ensure 
that its domestic protection regime is structured to protect these rights, on the other hand, at the 
micro level the system is based on a very weak separation of powers between the different 
branches of government within which the executive has the power to legislate through 
ordinances and control the judiciary. The constitutional structure provides a limited scope for 
judicial review because individuals whose rights have been violated cannot challenge the 
constitutionality of the law or action. The system has thus evolved into one in which power is 
personalised thereby creating an executive which is protected by the constitution and can 
prolong its lifespan through dubious constitutional amendments. Such a degree of institutional 
tyranny imperils the very conditions which constitutionalism seeks to prevent. The chapter has 
also shown the inadequacy of institutions like the NCHRF and the inter-Ministerial Committee 
in their role in implementing Cameroon’s obligation. The lack of independence and inadequate 
funding are two issues that hamper the work of these institutions. One of the most significant 
inadequacies in the provision of an institutional framework for the implementation of its 
obligation has been the lack of resources deliberately to undermine independence and 
effectiveness 
Chapter 4 analysed how the institutions discussed in chapter 4 function in the implementation 
of Cameroon’s obligations which showed that domestic implementation of its obligations is a 
function of the institutions that it has put in place to support the rights protection in general and 
those considered herein in particular. It dealt with the impact of constitutionalism on the 
protection of these rights with a focus on the practices of the courts and other administrative 
authorities directly concerned with rights protection. It also analysed what the bijural nature of 
Cameroon’s legal system with a political structure that supports the Civil Law over the 
Common Law has meant to the implementation of its obligations under these specific rights. 
So far, the constitution of Cameroon, secondary legislation and other institutions created to 
support rights protection and the implementation of its obligation under these Covenant rights 
have all failed woefully to limit governmental arbitrariness and thus allowed for practices that 
inherently imperil the protection of personal integrity rights. This was shown in the case of 
Wakai and 172 others v The Prosecutor. While attempts at harmonisation of the two systems 




scope for executive manipulation.702Access to justice and executive influence have made 
implementation of obligations under these rights extremely tenuous. This difficulty has pushed 
a few with the knowledge of the existence of an international mechanism of adjudication to 
seek justice outside. This has been the essence of chapters 5 and 6. 
The last two chapters have dealt with two important mechanisms which the international 
system uses in monitoring the implementation of the obligations of   states parties to the 
Covenant. As indicated earlier, human rights protection is the primary role of the state. 
However, as shown in the previous chapter, deficiencies in both the institutional framework of 
the  state and the desire of the regime to survive has meant that the violation of these rights is 
a matter of choice. Chapter five has thus analysed the only obligatory mechanism in the 
monitoring of Covenant implementation. The reporting procedure provides an interactive 
framework between the government, civil society and the Human Rights Committee in what is 
known as part of the constructive dialogue to determine the extent to which a state implements 
its obligations and the obstacles it faces. The chapter did so by examining all the reports 
Cameroon has submitted to the Committee. While Cameroon has submitted several reports to 
the Committee, it has done so late making it difficult for the Committee to monitor ongoing 
situations and take immediate action. This has been a deliberate strategy of Cameroon to allow 
the persistence of violations, avoid interim measures and destroy the domestic opposition. The 
chapter also considered the quality of the reports and the specific approaches it uses to give 
effect to the Concluding Observations in its next report. The basic approach of Cameroon on 
how it prepares and presents its reports has been to merely list its laws and the consistency of 
the spirit of those laws to the Covenant. It has failed to explicitly address the specific steps it 
has taken to address institutional weaknesses, substantive issues of persistent rights violations 
and the specific steps it has taken to remedy the violations and domestic limitations to its 
implementation regime.  
Chapter 6 investigated the implementation of its obligation under the individual 
communication Procedure under the Optional Protocol of the Covenant as a mechanism for the 
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implementation of Cameroon’s obligation under the Covenant. It examined Cameroon’s 
interaction with the Committee in considering communication from different individuals and 
its approach to implementing the views of the Committee concerning the rights considered. 
Cameroon relies on its legislation and institutions in domestic implementation approaches both 
for domestic cases and the views of the Committee. For example, in the Akwanga case and 
specifically in its defence on the violation of article 9, Cameroon declared that investigations 
to the arrest and detention of Akwanga were carried out in ‘full respect of the legislation in 
force at the time’703. Chapters 4 and 5 showed clearly that both the laws and institutional 
framework are limited in their scope to enable Cameroon to live up to its obligations. In 
response and consistent with its jurisprudence,  
‘the Committee finds that nothing suggests that at the time of arrest, the author was informed 
of the reasons for his arrest, that he was ever brought before a judge or judicial officer, or that 
he ever was afforded the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest or detention’ 
The Human Rights Committee does not take a prescriptive approach to the implementation of 
its views since they are not legally binding. For example, in the case of Sankara v Burkina Faso 
the   state party was ‘required to provide Ms. Sankara and her son with an effective and 
enforceable remedy in the form, inter alia, of official recognition of the place where Thomas 
Sankara is buried, and compensation for the anguish suffered by the family.’704 On the other 
hand in the Akwanga, Mukong and Gorji cases, the Committee   stated in its usual non 
prescriptive style that  ‘in accordance with article 2, para. 3 (a) of the Covenant, the   state party 
is under an obligation…’ 705 without the kind of emphasis injected in the Sankara case. 
Cameroon merely exploits the lack of such non-enforceable powers at the Committee level, the 
institutional limitations in its domestic constitutional order and a narrow interpretation of its 
obligation under articles 2(3) to delay the implementation of Committee views, payment of 
compensation or investigate and bring to justice those responsible for the ill-treatment and 
torture of these persons or review the legislation that gave rise to the violations. 
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The study also identified a pattern of denial and abdication of responsibility on the part of 
Cameroon when it comes to torture. Each time it has been accused of torture, it has argued that 
the onus of proof rest with the alleged victim rather than the state. Such a position has shown 
Cameroon’s misconception of its obligation, especially of an obligation that has attained 
peremptory norm status under international law. 
On the implementation of its obligation under article 9, the study found that deprivation of 
liberty is determined primarily by political exigencies overseen by the executive through 
dubious illegal administrative detention procedures that can order detention for long periods 
without court orders. The government uses these lengthy pretrial detentions as a political 
weapon against dissidents and political opponents. Thus, while administrative detentions are 
legal in Cameroon, it goes against the spirit of the Convention as in most cases detainees are 
unable to challenge the legality of their detention and in the few cases where they have done 
so and succeeded, the executive has refused court orders for their release.  
Concerning the right to be treated with humanity while under detention, Cameroon has shown 
notoriety for poor detention conditions, feeding and general overcrowding in its detention 
facilities. It has tried continuously to absolve itself from the deplorable conditions of detention 
in which people like Akwanga found themselves, citing lack of resources in total disregard of 
the Committee’s jurisprudence under the minimum standard rule to which every country must 
subscribe. It has used this argument for the past 20 years across the cases of Mukong to that of 
Akwanga. Because it has used salubrious prison conditions and starvation as a weapon of 
coercion against detainees, the study found that this is a systematic approach used by Cameroon 
to coerce detainees and reduce the cost of incarceration deliberately. As the study has shown, 
the inadequacies of these procedures render effective protection difficult. Chayes and Chayes 
have argued that ambiguity and indeterminacy in the text of treaties, limitations in the capacity 
of parties might account for the gap between ratification and compliance. 706 About the 
limitations in the capacity for example, the Covenant has offered in certain circumstances 
minimum requirements for   states parties in the implementation of their obligations. This is 
seen in the condition of the detention of persons guaranteed under article 10(1). As has been 
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shown from the Mukong to the Akwanga cases, Cameroon has not only failed to improve on 
detention conditions but through deliberate political policies of administrative and lengthy 
pretrial detentions exacerbated the inhuman conditions of detentions. 
In its desire to forestall implementation of its obligations it has also constantly narrowly 
interpreted its negative obligation in terms of the violation of the rights of people within its 
custody in violation of the obligation of the   state party to protect everyone within their 
jurisdiction and to investigate and punish those who violate the rights of detainees. It has thus 
failed to implement its obligation under article 10(1) through a narrow interpretation of its 
obligations coupled with institutional limitations. For example, the manner of interpretation of 
its obligation dictates its approach of implementation as was observed in the admissibility 
argument in Mukong:  
‘…it transpires from the   state party’s submission that the Government’s arguments relate 
primarily to the merits of the author’s allegations - if the   state party were to contend that 
because there are no merits in Mr. Mukong’s claims, they must also be deemed inadmissible, 
the Committee would observe that the   state party’s argument reveals a misconception of the 
procedure under the Optional Protocol, which distinguishes clearly between formal 
admissibility requirements and the substance of a complainant’s allegations.’707 
On the right of fair trial, the elements of fair trial which include ‘an independent and impartial 
judiciary, the right to counsel, the right to present a defense, a presumption of innocence, the 
right to appeal, the right to an interpreter, protection from ex post facto laws, a public trial, the 
right to have charges presented, and timeliness’708have been entirely absent in all of the cases 
considered. Even in cases where domestic courts have issued decisions in favour of victims, 
the government has been unable to implement those decisions; similar situation has been 
observed in the cases of Akwanga, Mukong, Gorji and others where government inability to 
implement the views of the Committee can only be attributed to both factors of limitations, 
inadequacies and deliberate deviation from standard practice. As observed in all the cases from 
Mukong to Akwanga, the victims were arrested arbitrarily, never promptly informed of the 
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reasons of their arrests, and they could not challenge the legality and information used in their 
trial were mostly extracted through coercion. 
Chayes and Chayes again argue that treaties are effective when lawyers, voters, or activists can 
leverage them and when they are compatible with existing practices709and preferences. Rather 
in Cameroon, lawyers are the first victims of executive actions. In the past 58 years since 
Cameroon’s independence, voters have never leveraged the outcome of any election. In the 
past 58 years there have been two presidents both of whom have never organised a free and 
fair election; executive appointed government delegates replace elected mayor; the executive 
appoints one third of the members of the Senate as a rule by executive fiat continuous unabated. 
Bureaucratic inadequacies reduce the capacity of the state to implement its obligations. For 
example, limited access to courts; poor prison conditions are as a result of such inadequacies; 
lack of funding to the NCHRF prevents investigations of cases of torture etc… 
We live in a real world in which the ‘human rights protection regime’ is constructed along a 
statist ontology which the world prefers to frame around different notions of protection from a 
top down perspective. Though the concept of sovereignty that cloaks territorial control is no 
longer considered a static concept, the legal framing of its pre-eminence as defined by the UN 
Charter still revolves around the protection of political independence and territorial integrity. 
It may be devil’s advocacy to suppose without contest that Cameroon’s attitude towards the 
Covenant is rooted in a mundane codification regime whose success depends solely on altering 
the attitude of the state. That could be true if the actions of an autocratic state towards the 
Covenant were dictated by a singular factor whether domestic or international. As this thesis 
has shown, domestic as well as exogenous factors account for the attitude of Cameroon towards 
its obligations under the Covenant. In a nutshell, the study was able to show that the different 
thematic considered influenced in some way the approach to Cameroon’s implementation of 
the rights herein considered and that the regime of implementation is also adversely affected 
by the structures of the domestic institutions. It is a question worth pursuing further but only 
through this multifaceted understanding could one have understood Cameroon’s 
implementation regime and arrive at a normative judgement.  
                                                 




This research has offered a framework for the understanding of the gradual construction of an 
autocratic political regime that emerged from two diverse colonial systems and how this regime 
constructed a domestic constitutional order antithetical to the protection of personal integrity 
rights. Based on the lessons learned from this study, the research suggests a fundamental 
alteration of the framework for rights incorporation, interpretation and implementation and the 
use of international human rights norm in judicial reasoning in Cameroon in general, especially 
in the following specific ways. 
• Proper separation of powers that ensures the independence of the judiciary to protect 
the integrity of the implementation process 
• Cameroon must ensure that the implementation of the views of the Committee whether 
through the Individual Communication or state Reporting Procedures is transparent, 
measurable and timely 
• A clear demarcation between the two legal systems inherited at independence 
• Ensuring the independence of the National Commission of Human Rights and 
Freedoms in the areas of budget allocation and appointments 
• Review of secondary legislation on administrative pretrial detentions to avoid 
overcrowding in prisons 
The above alterations will be meaningless if the following fundamental political and structural 
issues that imperil the respect of these rights are not resolved: 
• A robust constitutional framework. Under a democratic regime with a secure 
leadership, a constitutional framework that ensures the separation of powers may likely 
to a certain extend guarantee the respect of personal integrity rights since internal 
dissent is not criminalised. On the other hand, a plural autocratic system like Cameroon 
with insecure leaders will render even a robust constitutional order ineffective. 
• Change of leadership. Courtenay and Hencken argue that politically insecure leaders, 
desperate to retain power, repress to control the destabilizing effects of dissent… 




effect on rights protection in   states headed by secure leaders’.’710 This insecurity has 
span for more than half a century and the institutions necessary to protect these rights 
have been shaped to protect the leadership with domestic policies tailored towards more 
repression. A commitment to the protection of these rights will be counterproductive to 
the very survival of the regime. The best constitution will still be undermined by 
insecure leaders not committed to the implementation of human rights. Alteration of 
power through free and fair elections ensures that leaders can be held accountable and 
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1. International Treaties/Conventions 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter) 
American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 UNTS 144, 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978. 
Charter United Nations (adopted 26 June1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 
XVI 
Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Note to Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ CETS No. 213 
Convention on the elimination of racial discrimination Adopted pursuant to UNGAOR 2106 
17(XX) of 21 Dec.1965) 
Convention on the rights of the child Adopted by UNGAOR 44/25 of 20 November 1989 and 
entered into force 2 September 1990 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277, 9 
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951. 
Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. ETS 
No. 005, 213 UNTS 221, 4 November 1950, as amended by Protocol Nos. 11 (ETS No. 155) 
and 14 (CETS No. 194), entered into force 1 June 2010. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976 
International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion 1951) 
International Labour Organization Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour, ILO/C29, 28 June 
1930, entered into force 1 May 1932. 
International Labour Organization Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, ILO/C87, 9 July 1948, entered into force 4 July 1950. 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969, entered into force 






2. Cases: Regional bodies European Commission and Court of Human Rights 
European Commission, The Cyprus Case (Greece v. the United Kingdom) (1958-59) 2 
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